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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis focuses on central bank independence (CBI) in 20 selected African countries over 
1990-2008. Firstly, we measure the degree of CBI. Secondly, we measure the effects of CBI on 
macroeconomic performance. Thirdly, we measure the effects of fiscal dominance (FD) on CBI 
and macroeconomic performance. The thesis has 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are stand-alone related papers on CBI and macroeconomic performance. 
Chapter 5 is the conclusion.  
Chapter 1 introduces the study. We give a brief background of the study, its motivation, the main 
objectives and the hypotheses to be tested. We describe the innovations that we make to CBI 
measurement, effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance, and the effects of FD on CBI and 
macroeconomic performance. We highlight the key findings and notable limitations of the study. 
Finally, we conclude with a brief outline of the rest of the chapters namely 2, 3, 4 and 5.  
Chapter 2 measures CBI. We develop a comprehensive set of CBI indices. We follow the 
methodologies developed by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992). Firstly, we measure 
CBI in legal (de jure) and in factual (de facto) terms. Secondly, we measure CBI in political 
terms and in economic terms. We measure factual CBI by the annual average turnover rate 
(TOR) of central bank (CB) governors. We use central bank Acts and their amendments as well 
as country constitutions (where applicable) to calculate the legal CBI indices. 
The results suggest that legal CBI is low but factual CBI is high. Political CBI is low but 
economic CBI is high. In overall terms, both legal and factual CBI have improved from their late 
1980 levels. The levels of legal CBI over 1990-2008 are slightly above what characterized 
developed countries in the late 1980s. Factual CBI has improved significantly in most African 
countries, but it still varies considerably across the countries. The variations seem to reflect 
different political, economic and legal conditions. The results suggest that legal CBI still deviates 
considerably from actual CB practices in Africa. Factual CBI seems to proxy actual CBI better 
than legal CBI. However, to some extent, factual CBI seems to reflect subservience of some CB 
governors in Africa. We conclude that African governments still need to grant their CBs, more 
CBI in line with modern-day CBs, world-wide. Specifically, they need to consider 
constitutionalizing CBI, so that it is not easily violated by some political authorities.  
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Chapter 3 measures the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance. We use the difference-
in-difference (DID) method. This method is associated with Ball and Sheridan (2005), who 
investigate the effects of inflation targeting (IT) on macroeconomic performance in 20 OECD 
countries in the 1990s. We use simple cross-country regression analysis with period averages 
macroeconomic variables of choice. We use the CBI dummy variable (Di) as the target 
explanatory variable instead of the CBI index ratings in levels. We use 3 measures to control for 
the effect of the regression to the mean (RTM). The results suggest that CBI does not matter for 
macroeconomic performance. Instead, we find that the recent past and initial macroeconomic 
performance have significant impact on macroeconomic performance during CBI reform. This is 
because pre-reform poor performers perform better during reform. The results reflect some effect 
of the RTM on inflation and interest rates, which have considerable cross-country variations. 
Generally, the results suggest that CBI per se, is not a panacea for improved macroeconomic 
performance. In order to improve macroeconomic performance, African governments need to 
restructure their economies, alongside and beyond CBI reforms. 
Chapter 4 measures the effects of FD on CBI and macroeconomic performance. We use the 2-
step system generalized method of moments (GMM) in dynamic panel data (DPD). This method 
is associated with Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). It is a recent move 
away from simple correlation analysis and Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models. We do not find 
evidence that fiscal deficits are monetized over the study period. This outcome could be 
reflecting effectiveness of anti-inflation strategies undertaken by high fiscal-deficit countries. 
The results suggest that FD generally does not matter for CBI and macroeconomic performance. 
FD only matters for political and factual CBI. The results suggest that domestic inflation, which 
is explained by exchange rate depreciation, is a major determinant of factual CBI, economic 
growth and interest rates. The relative static nature of the legal CBI indices, due to the infrequent 
changes in CB legislation in most African countries, makes it difficult to establish any systematic 
link between the legal CBI indices and their potential determinants.  
Chapter 5 concludes the study. We summarize the key CBI issues covered in chapters 1, 2, 3 and 
4. We highlight the main contributions of the study and its key policy implications. Finally, we 
conclude by suggesting outstanding areas for any further research in the relationship between 
CBI and macroeconomic performance.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 Background to the Study  
 
Central bank independence (CBI) is the freedom of the central bank (CB) to conduct monetary 
policy without undue political interference (Walsh (2005)). Although not a new concept, CBI has 
generated considerable debate since the 1990s. The theoretical argument for CBI is associated 
with the dynamic inconsistency theory of monetary policy. This concept is due to Kydland and 
Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), among others. The theory suggests that political 
authorities have a tendency to abuse the money printing aspect of CBs to finance fiscal deficits. 
This practice leads to the dynamic inconsistency problem of monetary policy. The theory 
suggests that CBI can reduce the dynamic inconsistency problem of monetary policy and 
inflation bias, which is linked with political business cycles (Nordhaus (1975)). To solve the 
dynamic inconsistency problem, Rogoff (1985 a) advocates for a conservative CB governor, 
whose priority is on price stability and CB credibility building. Priorities of the Rogoff (1985 a) 
CB governor differ from those of political authorities, with short-term political objectives.  
The importance of CBI rests on the premise that inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon 
and that the cost of reducing inflation can be lowered by an independent CB, using monetary 
policy and institutional credibility (Wessels (2008)). The general support for CBI stems from the 
argument that the power that creates money should be separated from the power that spends it. 
This suggests a separation between the CB and the national Treasury. This is relevant for African 
countries with weak legal institutions and high fiscal deficits. This is because in such countries, 
governments with weak fiscal revenue sources tend to put pressure on the CBs to monetize the 
fiscal deficits. Advocates of CBI suggest that CBI can reduce the pressure to monetize fiscal 
deficits (Pollard (1993)). However, contrary arguments are that excessive fiscal deficits can still 
tempt governments to force CBs to monetize the fiscal deficits even when the CB is independent. 
Under such conditions, institutional CBI may not necessarily guarantee monetary policy 
independence (Cukierman et al. (1992)). These conflicting arguments are still debatable. 
In Africa, the move towards more CBI has also been promoted by regional organizations. In the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) region, CBI is considered as one of the key 
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requirements for the establishment of an effective monetary union in 2016. As part of the move 
in that direction, a model SADC CB Act has already been drafted. According to the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), CBI is stated as one of the pre-requisites for the 
establishment of an effective economic and monetary union in the SADC region. The formation 
of the African Monetary Union (AMU), envisaged to start in 2021, with an African CB (ACB), 
places high priority on CBI. The proposed ACB requires free centrally decided monetary policy 
without national political interference. CBI is part of the eligibility criteria for membership.  
There is general empirical literature that suggests that CBI can have potential benefits for 
enhanced macroeconomic performance (Mangano (1998); Oately (1999); DeHaan and Kooi 
(1997, 2000); Arnone et al. (2008); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). CBI can help reduce average 
inflation and its variability, cushion the adverse effects of political business cycles on the 
economy, enhance financial sector stability and boost fiscal discipline without much sacrifices in 
terms of real output losses or an increase in output variability (Arnone et al. (2008)).  
Despite the good attributes accorded to CBI by some authors, there are some contrary arguments 
against CBI. According to DeBelle and Fischer (1994), CBI may not stabilize real output 
because the sacrifice ratio can be high with CBI. There are empirical studies that do not find 
convincing and conclusive evidence that CBI can improve macroeconomic performance 
(Banaian et al. (1995); Posen (1995, 1998); Campillo and Miron (1997); Fuhrer (1997); Crosby 
(1998)). These contrary arguments on potential benefits of CBI are still subject to investigation.  
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem  
Empirical evidence on the envisaged potential benefits of CBI on macroeconomic performance is 
mixed and inconclusive. There is lack of evidence on African countries in the post-1989 period. 
African countries have not been adequately researched using updated CBI indices and current 
methods that link CBI to macroeconomic performance. In addition, African countries have been 
reforming their CBs, post-1989, in a bid to boost CBI. Part of this move towards more CBI has 
been motivated by the need to harness the envisaged benefits of CBI. So far, not much empirical 
work has been done to assess how far African countries have gone in enhancing CBI, what 
impact this has had on macroeconomic performance and any constraints that could be there. This 
study investigates the status of CBI in Africa, its impact on macroeconomic performance and the 
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current interactions between monetary authorities (policies) and fiscal authorities (policies). We 
investigate how far African countries have gone in meeting the modern-day CBI requirements.  
1.3 Motivation for the Study 
 
We are motivated by the need to focus on Africa, post-1989. Previously, a number of studies 
have been done for different countries over different periods. However, most of them have 
focused on different groups of countries and individual countries (Cukierman (1992); Cukierman 
et al. (1992); Alesina and Summers (1993); DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Sturm and DeHaan 
(2001); Arnone et al. (2008); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). A few studies that have focused on 
African countries only, have used small numbers of these countries (Presnak (1996); Wessels 
(2006, 2007, 2008)). Presnak (1996) covers 11 Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries over 1960-
1989. These include Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Wessels (2006) covers 6 African countries. These 
include Botswana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Tanzania and South Africa. Wessels (2007) covers 4 
Common Monetary Area (CMA) countries of Southern Africa. These include Lesotho, Namibia, 
Swaziland and South Africa. Wessels (2008) covers 5 SADC countries. These include Angola, 
Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Small numbers of African countries like these may 
not adequately reveal much of any systematic differences in CBI that may prevail among the 
African countries. These include political, economic and legal differences. Countries with some 
notable CBI features like Angola and Mauritania have not been adequately covered in these and 
most other previous studies, which include African countries (Cukierman et al. (1992); DeHaan 
and Kooi (2000); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). Possible reasons include lack of data, outliers in 
some of the data, poor supportive documentation and language problems pertaining to these 
countries. Studies on African countries only, have used legal and factual indices. Wessels (2006) 
and Wessels (2008) use unit-weight indices with 14 and 12 legal CBI variables, respectively. 
Presnak (1996) uses a legal and a factual index, the annual average TOR of CB governors.  
Most previous studies have focused more on developed countries, particularly the OECD 
countries (Grilli et al. (1991)). We specifically focus on Africa. Existing literature suggests that 
the concept of CBI in less developed countries, of which African countries are a part, differs 
from what attains in developed countries and other regions (Cukierman et al. 1992); Arnone et 
al. (2008); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). We examine these differences among 20 selected 
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African countries, given that there are already well-known and well-documented differences 
between Africa as a region and other regions, developed countries and less developed countries 
(Cukierman et al. (1992); Arnone et al. (2008); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)).  
Most previous studies have used legal CBI indices (Bade and Parkin (1977, 1982, 1988); Alesina 
(1988, 1989); Bodart (1990); Grilli et al. (1991); Cukierman (1992); Cukierman et al. (1992); 
Eijffinger and Schaling (1993); Alesina and Summers (1993); Ilieva and Healey (2001); Jácome 
and Vázquez (2005), Arnone et al. (2007); Arnone et al. (2008)). Legal indices have been found 
to be weak indicators of actual CBI in less developed countries (Cukierman et al. (1992); Dreher 
et al. (2007); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). Most previous studies use legal indices because they 
mostly focus on developed countries, where legal CBI suffices to measure actual CBI. It is 
relatively easy to quantify CBI in developed countries. The gap between the letter of the law and 
the actual practices or application of the law in CBs is argued to be narrower in developed 
countries and wider in less developed countries (Cukierman et al. (1992)). In addition, it is 
difficult to measure factual CBI because the process involves quantifying factors such as 
informal arrangements and evolved behavioural norms between the CB and the government.  
Over years, a few previous studies have used factual CBI indices, commonly the annual average 
TOR of CB governors (Cukierman (1992); Cukierman et al. (1992); Cukierman and Webb 
(1995); DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Sturm and DeHaan (2001); Dreher et al. (2007); DeHaan and 
Klomp (2010)). The TOR index has been found to be a better proxy for actual CBI in less 
developed countries than legal indices. We use 2 legal indices, 1 factual index and a qualitative 
CBI dummy variable. We seek to account for the multidimensional aspect of CBI, which some 
previous studies have ignored. Single indicators, which have been used in some previous studies, 
narrow the analysis of CBI, which is a multidimensional concept.  
Existing data sets from typical comprehensive indices are now outdated. These include the Grilli 
et al. (1991) and the Cukierman et al. (1992) data sets. The Grilli et al. (1991) study on political 
and economic CBI only covers 18 OECD countries over 1950-1989. The Cukierman et al. (1992) 
study covers 72 countries over 1950-1989. These include 11 of the countries in our sample. 
These indices are no longer relevant for current analysis of CBI and its relationship with fiscal 
dominance (FD) and macroeconomic performance. A study by Arnone et al. (2008) uses political 
and economic indices, but it only covers 2 periods, end-1980s and end-2003. It also does not 
 
 
5 
 
cover all the countries in our study. Another CBI study by DeHaan and Klomp (2010) focuses on 
over 100 countries, both developed and less developed countries, over 1970-2005, but it only 
uses a single factual index, the annual average TOR index. There are thus no previous updated 
comprehensive indices that we can use. Most of the previous studies used indices previously 
constructed by Cukierman et al. (1992), which are now outdated. We construct a new 
comprehensive set of 5 indices. We take account that CBI has both (i) legal and factual aspects, 
(ii) economic and political aspects and (iii) quantitative and qualitative aspects.  
Although there is considerable work that investigates the effects of CBI on macroeconomic 
performance, empirical evidence is still mixed, conflicting and inconclusive. There are studies 
that find that CBI matters for macroeconomic performance (Grilli et al. (1991); Cukierman et al. 
(1992), Cukierman et al. (1992); Alesina and Summers (1993); Oately (1999); Arnone et al. 
(2006, 2007, 2008)). There are also studies that find that CBI does not matter for macroeconomic 
performance (Burdekin and Wohar (1990); Lohmann (1992); DeBelle and Fischer (1994); 
Fuhrer (1997); Banaian et al. (1998); Posen (1995, 1998); Crosby (1998); Campillo and Miron 
(2007); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). Most of these studies have used simple correlation analysis 
and bivariate regressions between CBI indices in levels and macroeconomic variables of choice, 
also in levels. These studies have been prone to endogeneity bias, reverse causality, simultaneity 
bias, errors of measurement, omitted variable bias and other estimation problems associated with 
bivariate regressions. CBI indices in levels are determined with subjectivity and arbitrariness. 
We use the DID method to avoid some of the previous estimation problems, elements of 
subjectivity and arbitrariness associated with the construction of CBI indices in levels.   
Although there is considerable work that investigates the effects of FD on CBI and 
macroeconomic performance, empirical evidence is still mixed and inconclusive. There are 
studies that find that FD matters for CBI and macroeconomic performance (Choudhary and Parai 
(1991); Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1993); Metin (1998); Neyapti (2003)). There are also 
studies that find that FD does not matter for CBI and macroeconomic performance (Masciandaro 
and Tabellini (1988); Burdekin and Wohar (1990); Grilli et al. (1991); Fujiki (1996); Fry (1998); 
Sikken and DeHaan (1998)). Most of the previous studies have used simple correlation analysis 
and Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models (Aisen and Hauner (2007, 2008)). We use the 2-step 
system GMM in DPD to reduce some of the estimation problems associated with these previous 
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estimation techniques. These include endogeneity bias among estimable variables. We use 
several descriptive statistics to support the regression analysis results. Most previous studies 
were done for a combination of developed countries and less developed countries. The case of 
African countries only, could yield different results. This is the subject of our investigation. 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
 
The objectives of the study are as follows. 
(i)   To measure CBI in 20 selected African countries. 
(ii)   To measure the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance. 
(iii)  To measure the effects of fiscal dominance on CBI and macroeconomic performance. 
The selected countries are Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The study period is 1990-2008. 
1.5 Hypotheses of the Study 
 
Chapter 2: Hypothesis 
Chapter 2 has no hypothesis. We simply construct a comprehensive set of CBI indices based on 
the well-known methodologies developed by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992). 
Chapter 3: Hypothesis 3.1 
Hypothesis 3.1 is on the effects of central bank independence on macroeconomic performance.  
H0: Central bank independence does not matter for macroeconomic performance. 
H1: Central bank independence matters for macroeconomic performance. 
Chapter 4: Hypothesis 4.1 
Hypothesis 4.1 is on the effects of fiscal dominance on central bank independence. 
H0: Fiscal dominance does not matter for central bank independence. 
H1: Fiscal dominance matters for central bank independence. 
 
 
7 
 
Chapter 4: Hypothesis 4.2 
Hypothesis 4.2 is on the effects of fiscal dominance on macroeconomic performance. 
H0: Fiscal dominance does not matter for macroeconomic performance. 
H1: Fiscal dominance matters for macroeconomic performance. 
1.6 Key Findings of the Study  
 
The results suggest that on average, legal CBI is still low but factual CBI is high in African 
countries. Political CBI is low but economic CBI is high. On average, both legal and factual CBI 
have improved significantly from what they were in the late 1980s. Current levels of legal CBI 
are slightly above what characterized developed countries in the late 1980s. Factual CBI still 
varies considerably across Africa. The results suggest that legal CBI, as stipulated in the CB 
laws, still deviates considerably from actual CB practices. In Africa, factual CBI seems a better 
proxy for actual CBI than legal CBI. However, to some extent, factual CBI seems to suggest 
subservience of CB governors in some of the African countries.  
The results suggest that CBI does not matter for macroeconomic performance. Instead, recent 
past and initial macroeconomic performance have significant impact on macroeconomic 
performance during CBI reform. Pre-reform poor performers generally perform better than pre-
reform high performers, during CBI reform. CBI seems to be efficient in previously poor 
performing countries. The results indicate some effect of the regression to the mean (RTM) for 
inflation and interest rates. Improved macroeconomic performance over the study period seems 
to be associated with factors, other than CBI reform. 
The results suggest that FD does not matter for CBI and macroeconomic performance. We do not 
find evidence that fiscal deficits are monetized in the selected African countries over the study 
period. We attributed this to anti-inflation strategies in African countries with high fiscal deficits. 
Domestic inflation, which is explained by exchange rate depreciation, is a major determinant of 
factual CBI, economic growth and interest rates. It is generally not clear what determines legal 
CBI. The relative static nature of legal CBI indices, due to the infrequent changes in CB 
legislation in African countries, makes it difficult to establish any systematic link between the 
legal CBI indices and their potential determinants. The factual measure of CBI is more relevant. 
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1.7 Innovations of the Study  
 
To fill some of the existing gaps in the literature, we make several innovations in our analysis of 
CBI. Firstly, we focus on 20 selected African countries over 1990-2008. As far as we know, this 
is one of the latest studies in CBI. The multicounty nature of the study accounts for the potential 
variations in CBI across different political, economic and legal conditions. We include some 
African countries with notable CBI characteristics. These include Angola, Mauritania and 
Zimbabwe, among others. There are several previous multicounty CBI studies in the literature 
(Bade and Parkin (1980); Skanland (1984); Alesina (1987); Parkin (1987); Masciandaro and 
Tabellini (1988); Bodart (1990); Swinburne and Castello-Branco (1991); Grilli et al. (1991); 
Cukierman et al. (1992); DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Sturm and DeHaan (2001); DeHaan (2001); 
Jácome (2001); Jácome and Vázquez (2005); Dreher et al. (2007); Arnone et al. (2006, 2007, 
2008); DeHaan and Klomp (2010); Klomp and DeHaan (2010)). However, most of these 
previous studies are now outdated for the current analysis of CBI. Some of the latest studies do 
not cover all the countries in our sample (Arnone et al. (2008) and, DeHaan and Klomp (2010)).  
Secondly, we account for the multidimensional aspect of CBI by constructing a comprehensive 
set of both legal (de jure) and factual (de facto) CBI indices. We use recent data covering 1990-
2008. We use a basket of CBI indices, 2 legal and 1 factual. We use 2 types of legal indices, 
following Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992). We use both legal and factual indices 
for some reasons. Firstly, legal CBI is an essential component of actual CBI. It indicates the 
degree of CBI that the legislators meant to confer on the CB. Secondly, most previous attempts 
at rating CBI commonly start with legal CBI indices. Some of the previous studies are actually 
based solely on legal CBI indices (Bade and Parkin (1977, 1982, 1988); Alesina (1988, 1989); 
Bodart (1990); Grilli et al. (1991); Cukierman (1992); Cukierman et al. (1992); Eijffinger and 
Schaling (1993); Alesina and Summers (1993); Ilieva and Healey (2001); Jácome and Vázquez 
(2005); Arnone et al. (2007); Arnone et al. (2008)). Thirdly, comparing results in this study to 
the results in most previous studies, requires a legal CBI index. This is because previous 
comparable CBI studies commonly used legal indices only. However, since CB laws in Africa 
are often incomplete, subject to interpretation spreads, least respected and do not cover all 
possible contingencies, we use a factual CBI measure as well. Previous studies suggest that 
factual measures of CBI are a better proxy for actual CBI in less developed countries 
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(Cukierman (1992); Cukierman et al. (1992); Cukierman and Webb (1995); Presnak (1996); 
DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Sturm and DeHaan (2001); Dreher et al. (2007); and DeHaan and 
Klomp (2010)). We use both aggregated and disaggregated indices to allow for both generality 
and specificity in CBI analysis. The indices we develop cover a wide range of CBI aspects. The 
multiple indices are a robustness check on the results because any one index is a noisy indicator 
of actual CBI. The indices complement each other in explaining CBI because each one of them 
focuses on only one and a different aspect of CBI. In addition, and to support the statistical 
results, we use a considerable amount of qualitative information on CBI in each country. 
 
Thirdly, we use a new method of measuring the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance, 
the difference-in-difference (DID) method. This method is associated with Ball and Sheridan 
(2005), who investigate the effects of inflation targeting (IT) on macroeconomic performance in 
20 OECD countries in the 1990s. We use the DID method to avoid subjectivity and arbitrariness 
associated with the construction of CBI indices in levels. Using this approach, we reduce some 
level of endogeneity bias associated with CBI indices in levels and the macroeconomic variables 
of choice. Our application of the DID method from IT in Ball and Sheridan (2005) to CBI in this 
study is a recent innovation in CBI literature. It is also one of the first of such studies. 
Fourthly, recently there is an alternative technique that is being used to investigate the effects of 
fiscal dominance (FD) on CBI and macroeconomic performance. We attempt this estimation 
technique in this study. It is the 2-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) in 
dynamic panel data (DPD). The method is originally associated with Arellano and Bover (1995) 
and Blundell and Bond (1998). We use it mainly to reduce endogeneity bias among variables and 
other common estimation problems associated with methods in previous studies. 
1.8 Limitations of the Study 
 
The study is limited by the relatively small sample size and short study period. A larger number 
of countries and a longer study period would have broadened analysis. Because of these data 
limitations, we could not do more rigorous sensitivity analysis in terms of sub-groups of 
countries and sub-periods of the study period. With a larger sample size, we could have split 
Africa into its various sub-African regions. We would have checked for any systematic 
differences in CBI across the sub-African regions. With a longer study period we could have 
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observed factual CBI over more legal terms of office of CB governors instead of the current 3.2-
4.8 legal terms. Some countries have weak data on CB institutional variables. As a result, we 
were limited to the use of only one factual CBI measure, the annual average TOR of CB 
governors. In addition, accuracy of the legal CBI indices partly largely depends on accurate 
interpretation of the CB laws, CBI criteria choice and the validity of the weights and codes used.  
We could not get suitable instrumental variables (IVs) to instrument the CBI dummy variable 
(Di). As a result, we could not do much to control for its own potential endogeneity bias. We 
could not get a reasonable number of comparable previous studies that investigate the effects of 
CBI on macroeconomic effects, which specifically use the DID method. As a result, we do not 
directly compare our findings to any previous similar studies. However, we borrow some 
methodology ideas from Daunfelt et al. (2008) and Daunfeldt and Luna (2008). Due to the short 
study period, we could not create several break years between the pre-reform and the post-reform 
periods as part of the sensitivity analysis with respect to time. We restricted analysis to one break 
year, 1998. More break years would have produced more robust and more conclusive results.  
We could not get complete and consistent data on alternative measures of FD. As a result, we 
were limited to the use of only one measure of FD, the fiscal balance as a percentage of GDP. 
More FD measures would have constituted a robustness check on the analysis. This is because 
each measure is a noisy indicator of FD. With alternative measures, we would have possibly got 
more robust and more conclusive results. We would have compared impact among several FD 
measures. We are aware that the primary balance, measured on a cash basis, is a more 
appropriate measure of FD but we could not get data on it. We could not get data on the Treasury 
component of the monetary base for some of the countries. This variable has a more direct link 
with FD. We resorted to the use of the money supply growth rates because of this data limitation.   
1.9 Organization of the Study 
 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter 2 measures the degree of CBI. Chapter 3 
measures the effect of CBI on macroeconomic performance. Chapter 4 measures the effect of FD 
on CBI and macroeconomic performance. Finally, chapter 5 concludes the study with some 
policy implications and recommendations. We suggest some areas for any further research in the 
relationship between CBI and macroeconomic performance in African countries.  
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CHAPTER 2: MEASUREMENT OF CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE  
2.1 Introduction 
 
The 1990s were marked by increased quest for CBI, world-wide. As a result, most countries 
revised their CB legislation in a bid to enhance CBI, with expectations of improved 
macroeconomic performance. One of the main reasons behind arguments for CBI is the claim 
that CBI can restrict potential avenues for undue political interference in the conduct of monetary 
policy (Woolley (1984) and Goodman (1992)). CBI has also been promoted as part of financial 
globalization, evolution of new monetary policy strategies and increased search for institutions 
designed to safeguard the price stability objective (Maxfield (1997); Rogoff (2003); Mishkin 
(2007)). CBI is associated with credible monetary policy conduct (Arnone et al. (2008)). 
 
The widespread interest in CBI has been motivated by claims that credible international 
commitment to monetary policy coordination requires some guarantee of CBI from government. 
Actions and the capacity of a CB are considered critical signals to national creditors, purchasers 
of government paper, private international banks, bilateral and multilateral lending agencies. CBI 
ratings are used for international credit ratings by international creditors such as the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). High CBI ratings signal government 
commitment to credible monetary policy. International creditors consider CBI ratings critical in 
determining the likelihood that a nation’s economic policies will promote sustainable economic 
growth and the capacity to repay external debt (Maxfield (1997)).  
 
Some literature suggests that CBI can enhance macroeconomic performance. This is because 
there are claims that CBI can assist countries achieve lower average inflation and reduce its 
variability, reduce the impact of political business cycles on the economy (Nordhaus (1975)), 
foster fiscal discipline and enhance financial stability without any real additional costs or 
sacrifices in terms of reduced average output growth or an increase in output growth variability 
(Alesina and Summers (1993) and Arnone et al. (2008)).  
 
Some African countries are now moving towards inflation targeting (IT) and others are 
contemplating and working towards doing so (for example Nigeria and Zambia). The South 
African Reserve Bank and the Bank of Ghana started IT in 2000 and 2007, respectively. CBI is a 
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requisite institutional arrangement for IT. CBI ratings can be used to assess the readiness of a CB 
for IT. There are also claims that high CBI could reduce the fiscal dominance (FD) of monetary 
policy. This is because there are claims that highly independent CBs are likely to resist 
government pressure to monetize fiscal deficits (Pollard (1993) and Chandavarkar (1996)). 
 
Despite the good attributes that some authors associate with CBI, there are counter claims that 
high CBI might not improve macroeconomic performance as it is commonly claimed. As argued 
by DeBelle and Fischer (1994), monetary policy may not stabilize real output if CBI is 
excessive. The inflation-output trade-off may be widened by CBI. DeBelle and Fischer (1994) 
claim that the sacrifice ratio in terms of output losses and increased output variability, could be 
high with CBI. Other contrary claims are that CBI could possibly weaken the accountability and 
transparency of CBs. This is because these CBI aspects require enforceable mechanisms, which 
are often lacking in most African countries. For these and other reasons, CBI reforms commonly 
grant the CBs, instrument CBI and leave goal setting to the country’s legislature (Walsh (2005)). 
 
We measure the degree of CBI in 20 selected African countries over 1990-2008. We measure 
CBI through country ratings and cross-country rankings of the CBI scores in levels. We account 
for the multidimensional aspect of CBI by constructing a comprehensive set of 5 CBI indices. 
This approach follows Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini (GMT (1991)) and Cukierman, Webb 
and Neyapti (CWN (1992)). Following Grill et al. (1991), we define CBI in political and in 
economic terms. Following Cukierman et al. (1992), we define CBI in legal (de jure) and in 
factual (de facto) terms. We calculate the GMT (1991) and the CWN (1992) type of indices. 
We rate and rank CBI at aggregated and disaggregated levels. We identify notable strengths and 
weaknesses in CBI aspects. We benchmark our CBI ratings against 6 of the world’s most 
renowned CBs. These include the Bank of Canada (CAD), Bundesbank, Bank of England 
(BOE), National Bank of Switzerland (CHF), US Federal Reserve Bank (USD), Reserve Bank of 
Australia (AUD) and Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZD). We compare our CBI ratings 
and rankings to the last decade ratings in Cukierman et al. (1992), which we use as the 
benchmark previous related empirical study. Their last decade covers the period 1980-1989.  
Our main contribution is that we produce a new and updated comprehensive set of 5 CBI indices, 
based on 20 selected African countries. We indicate the extent of progress in CBI reforms in 
Africa since the 1990s. The results suggest that legal CBI is low but factual CBI is high. Political 
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CBI is low but economic CBI is high. CBI ratings vary across CBs, depending on specific CBI 
aspects. Both legal and factual CBI have improved over the years since the early 1990s. This 
implies that the CBI reforms have had some effect on the levels and the status of CBI in Africa. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 outlines the theoretical and empirical 
cases for CBI. Section 2.3 presents the methodology and sample data. Section 2.4 presents 
empirical findings. Finally, section 2.5 concludes the paper. 
2.2 Theoretical and Empirical Cases for Central Bank Independence  
 
Among several theories, the case for CBI is associated with the (i) political business cycles 
model (Nordhaus (1975)), (ii) dynamic inconsistency problem of monetary policy (Kydland and 
Prescott (1977)), and the (iii) delegation theory of monetary policy (Rogoff (1985)). These 
theories claim that there are incentives for political authorities to misuse the money printing 
aspect of the CBs, to achieve real economic objectives or short-term political motives. In view of 
the dynamic inconsistency problem of monetary policy and the inflation bias, these theories 
argue for CBI. These theories suggest that independent CBs are likely to resist political pressure 
to monetize the fiscal deficits (Nordhaus (1975) and Pollard (1993)). These claims imply that 
more independent CBs can implement monetary policy with commitment. The theories suggest a 
separation between political policy makers and CB authorities. The reasons are that, to avoid 
potential misuse of money printing, there is a need to separate the authority that prints money, 
which is the CB, and the authority that uses the money, which is the government.  
Kydland and Prescott (1977) claim that CBI is associated with credible monetary policy and 
enhanced macroeconomic performance. CBI can improve macroeconomic performance in 
several ways. Firstly, an independent CB that is free from political pressure may behave more 
predictably, promote economic stability and reduce risk premia in real interest rates (Romer and 
Romer (1989)). Secondly, there are claims that an independent CB may insulate the economy 
from political business cycles either by preventing pre-election manipulation of monetary policy 
(Nordhaus (1975), Rogoff and Sibert (1988)) or by reducing partisan shocks to policy, following 
elections (Hibbs (1987); Alesina (1988, 1989); Willett (1988)). Independence of the CB from the 
government might enhance the effectiveness of the CB in conducting monetary policy with 
commitment (Alesina and Summers (1993); Lybek (1999); Fischer (1995); Cukierman (2005)).  
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Rogoff (1985) suggests that to reduce the dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy, policy 
making should be delegated to an independent and conservative CB governor whose preferences 
differ from the short-term focused politicians. This is because the Rogoff (1985) type of CB 
governor cares more about confidence building and the credibility of the CB. The Rogoff (1985) 
central banker’s preference for price stability relative to economic growth is stronger than that of 
general society. The Rogoff (1985) model CB has both goal and instrument CBI. Romer and 
Romer (1989) suggest that more consistently inflation-averse policy, associated with enhanced 
CBI would be associated with less variable macroeconomic performance. This implies that CBI 
is associated with enhanced macroeconomic stability. Romer and Romer (1997) claim that CBI 
can depoliticize the monetary policy making process. In this case, the CB becomes credible. 
The empirical case for CBI rests on considerable empirical evidence suggesting that, on average, 
countries with more independent CBs have lower average inflation rates and reduced inflation 
variability (Burdekin and Willett (1991); Masciandaro and Spinelli (1993); Alesina and 
Summers (1993); Banaian (1995, 1997); DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Mangano (1998); Oately 
(1999); Arnone et al. (2007, 2008); Cukierman (2008)). However, despite the claims of potential 
benefits of enhanced CBI on macroeconomic performance, some other authors have found little 
or no evidence of the macroeconomic benefits of CBI (Banaian et al. (1995); Posen (1995, 
1998); Campillo and Miron (1997); Fuhrer (1997); Crosby (1998); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)).  
Empirical evidence on the hypothesized improved macroeconomic performance, associated with 
enhanced CBI, is largely mixed and inconclusive. Empirical results tend to vary with groups of 
countries, study periods, CBI indices, macroeconomic variables of choice and methods of 
analysis used (Banaian and Willett (1983); Bade and Parkin (1985); Alesina (1988); Grilli et al. 
(1991); Cukierman (1992); Cukierman et al. (1992); Alesina and Summers (1993); Cukierman 
and Webb (1995); Eijffinger and DeHaan (1996); Dolmas et al. (2000); Neyapti (2003); Diana 
and Sidiropoulos (2003); Down and Siklos (2004); DeHaan and Klomp 2010)).  
Over the years, considerable research has been done in the measurement and analysis of CBI. 
However, most pre-1990 studies have relied more on the comprehensive set of CBI indices 
published by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992). The Grilli et al. (1991) indices only 
cover 18 OECD countries over 1950-1989. The Cukierman et al. (1992) indices cover 1950-1989 
on a decade-wise basis. They include 72 countries, 51 less developed countries and 21 developed 
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countries. Out of the 51 less developed countries, 12 are African countries. These indices (GMT 
(1991) and CWN (1992)) have several merits. Firstly, these are baseline indices that have been 
used as reference indicators of CBI, globally (Arnone et al. (2008)). The indices have been used 
in their original, modified and in extended form by several previous authors, among others 
(DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Arnone et al. (2006, 2007, 2008); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). 
Secondly, the indices are still comparable to new ones that come up in the literature. Thirdly, the 
indices are comprehensive in terms of numbers of CBI variables covered. The Grilli et al. (1991) 
index has 15 variables with 2 sub-indices, political CBI and economic CBI. The Cukierman et al. 
(1992) index has 16 variables with 4 sub-indices, which cover (i) personal, (ii) policy, (iii) goal 
and (iv) financial (fiscal) CBI. In addition, it includes factual (de facto) measures of CBI. The 
wide range of CBI variables accounts for the multidimensional aspect of CBI. Fourthly, the 
indices are quantitative and easy to replicate. The guidelines for calculation are available in their 
code tables. These cover the CBI variables, their corresponding weights and codes.  
 
Over years, some authors have made some updates and extensions to the CWN (1992) data sets. 
The annual average TOR of governors index, originally introduced in chapter 19 in Cukierman 
(1992) and in the Cukierman et al. (1992) study is updated and extended to cover a wider sample 
of 82 countries over 1980-1989 by DeHaan and Kooi (2000). They also use legal aspects of both 
the GMT (1991) and the CWN (1992) indices. Dreher et al. (2007, 2008) update and extend the 
CWN (1992) annual average TOR data set by applying it to 137 countries over 1970-2004. 
Jacome and Vazquez (2008) update the CWN (1992) legal index for 24 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries over 1985-2002. Arnone et al. (2006) reconstruct the GMT (1991) index for 
82 countries, developed and less developed. Their study period covers 2 periods, end-1980s and 
end-2003. Arnone et al. (2008) calculate CBI indices for 163 CBs for end-2003. These include 
28 developed countries, 32 emerging market economies and 103 less developed countries. 
DeHaan and Klomp (2010) calculate TOR index for over 100 countries during 1980-2005. 
Existing CBI indices, their updates and extensions seem to cover specific groups of countries and 
study periods. They are based on specific CBI variables. Most authors have focused more on the 
legal definition of CBI (Bade and Parkin (1982); Alesina (1988, 1989); Grilli et al. (1991); 
Eijffinger-Schaling (1993); Jacome and Vazquez (2005)). We take account that reliance on legal 
CBI measures only may be inadequate for the analysis of CBI in African countries. This is 
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because these countries have weak legal institutions. In addition, reliance on only one type of 
CBI index, narrows the analysis of CBI, which is a multidimensional concept. Most previous 
studies have focused more on developed countries. Possible reasons include that it is likely easier 
to measure CBI in developed countries because the CB Act suffices to measure actual CBI. The 
case of less developed countries is likely to be different because there is a claimed wide gap 
between the “letter of law” and the “application of the law” in such countries (Cukierman et al. 
(1992); DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Dreher et al. (2007); and DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). 
2.3 Methodology and Sample Data 
 
We calculate the legal CBI indices from the reading of the CB Acts, Act amendments and 
country constitutions. The latest Acts are shown in table 2.1 and their detailed specifications are 
cited in appendix 2.3. The sources of the Acts are the CB databases and the Arnone et al. (2008) 
database on CB laws, that is available on http://marco.arnone.googlepages.com/centralbanklaws. 
We use country constitutions because in some countries, legal CBI is constitutionally granted.  
Table 2.1: Selected Central Banks and the their Latest Acts 
Country 
Name of  
Central Bank  
Central Bank 
Acronym 
Commencement 
 Date 
Latest 
 Central Bank Act 
Algeria Bank of Algeria BOA 1963 2003 
Angola National Bank of Angola BNA 1975 1997 
Botswana Bank of Botswana  BOB 1975 1996 
Egypt Central Bank of Egypt  CBE 1961 2003 
Ethiopia National Bank of Ethiopia  NBE 1963 2008 
Ghana Bank of Ghana  BOG 1957 2002 
Kenya Central Bank of Kenya  CBK 1966 1997 
Malawi Reserve Bank of Malawi  RBM 1964 2002 
Mauritania Central Bank of Mauritania BCM 1973 1994 
Mauritius Bank of Mauritius BOM 1967 2004 
Mozambique Bank of Mozambique  BM 1975 1992 
Nigeria Central Bank of Nigeria  CBN 1958 2007 
Rwanda National Bank of Rwanda  NBR 1964 1997 
South Africa South African Reserve Bank  SARB 1921 2000 
Sudan Bank of Sudan BOS 1960 2002 
Tanzania Bank of Tanzania  BOT 1965 2006 
Tunisia Central Bank of Tunisia  BCT 1958 2006 
Uganda Bank of Uganda  BOU 1966 1993 
Zambia Bank of Zambia  BOZ 1985 1996 
Zimbabwe Reserve Bank of  Zimbabwe  RBZ 1956 2001 
Source: Central bank databases and the Arnone et al. (2008) database on CB laws on (http://marco.arnone.googlepages.com/centralbanklaws). 
We calculate the factual CBI index from the number of CB governor changes. We collected this 
data mainly from the CB databases. Most CBs post a list of current and previous governors on 
their internet websites. We filled the data gaps through e-mail correspondence with the CBs. As 
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a consistency check on the accuracy of this information for CBs that do not systematically 
display it, we consulted IMF databases. These include the Morgan Stanley Dean Witter’s Central 
Bank Directory (2004) and the IMF Article IV Consultation documents on individual countries. 
 
The study is based on 20 African countries. Out of the 20 selected countries, Egypt and South 
Africa are emerging market economies and the rest are less developed countries. 11 of the 
selected countries are investigated in Cukierman et al. (1992), which includes 12 African 
countries out of the 72 countries studied. The 11 countries are Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Our 
sample size is limited to 20 African countries for several reasons. Firstly, we seek to account for 
the claimed CBI variations across political, economic and legal conditions. Secondly, we exclude 
countries that belong to monetary unions or monetary arrangements, except the lead countries 
like South Africa in the CMA region of Southern Africa. This is because in a monetary union, 
the broad monetary policy stance is determined by the monetary union or lead country (for 
example South Africa in the CMA region of Southern Africa) as opposed to the individual 
countries. Thirdly, we considered data availability and consistency in sample choice. Fourthly, 
we exclude countries that are not strategic to CBI analysis. Fourthly, we chose countries whose 
CBs are prominent in their geographical sub-African regions. Our sample covers East, West, 
North and Southern Africa. The selected countries are regionally important in terms of political, 
economic and legal conditions. By selecting countries with different backgrounds, we seek to 
broaden the analysis of CBI. We examine sources of any systematic differences in CBI across 
African countries. This is because actual CB practices tend to vary across countries. 
   
Due to the relatively small sample size and the relatively short study period, we do not create 
sub-groups of countries or sub-periods. We examine the whole sample. Analysis starts from 
1990 for several reasons. Firstly, by 1990, all the selected CBs were already operating. Secondly, 
the 1990s were marked by increased quest for CBI as suggested by the widespread CBI reforms. 
Thirdly, before the 1990s, some of the selected countries had dictatorships. The concept of CBI 
is less plausible under dictatorship. The end of the study period (2008) was determined by data 
availability on the macroeconomic variables of choice, which we use in chapters 3 and 4. 
The methodology of the paper involves CBI index calculation, country ratings and cross-country 
rankings. We calculate a comprehensive set of 5 indices for several reasons. Firstly, this accounts 
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for the multidimensional aspect of CBI. Secondly, the indices are complementary in explaining 
CBI status because each focuses on a different aspect of CBI. Thirdly, since each CBI index is a 
noisy indicator of CBI, a comprehensive set constitutes a robustness check on the analysis. 
Fourthly, each CBI index measures a somewhat different aspect of CBI. To calculate legal 
indices, we use the Grilli et al. (1991) and the Cukierman et al. (1992) code tables. We take the 
CBI variables, codes and weights as given in the adopted approaches without extensions or 
modifications. We do this for comparative analysis of the indices calculated in this paper and 
those in the benchmark study by Cukierman et al. (1992). The code tables are shown in 
appendices 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Our aggregation process follows the adopted approaches.  
In equations 2.1-2.5, we measure legal CBI, following Cukierman et al. (1992). In equations 2.6-
2.8, we measure legal CBI, following Grilli et al. (1991). In equations 2.9-2.10, we measure 
factual CBI, following Cukierman et al. (1992). We calculate each CBI variable for country i 
where i=1,2,3…20. We define the study period by t, where t=1990-2008.  
2.3.1 Legal Central Bank Independence Indices: Cukierman et al. (1992) Approach 
 
We calculate the aggregate legal CWN index as defined in equation 2.1.  
 
Where, CWNi,t is the aggregate legal CBI index for country i over period t. CBGCi,t is the CB 
governor characteristics for country i over period t. CBGCi,t measures the personal independence 
of the governor in country i over period t. This concerns the authority that appoints the governor; 
legal term of office (TOO) of the governor; dismissal conditions of the governor; and whether 
the governor is allowed to take any other office in government during his or her term of office. 
CBPOi,t is the legal CB policy objective (s) for country i over period t. CBPO measures goal 
independence of a CB. PFAAi,t is the monetary policy formulating authority in country i over 
period t. PFAA measures the policy independence of a CB. CBLCi,t  is restrictions on CB lending 
to government in country i over period t. CBLC measures the financial independence of a CB. 
The coefficients in equation 2.1 are the corresponding weights for each of the variables. They 
each represent the significance and contribution of the individual sub-components of the index or 
variables to the overall index. These weights are shown in appendix 2.1 (See Appendix 2.1). 
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The aggregate CWN index is a weighted average of the 4 sub-indices from the 16 CBI variables 
that compose the index. Each of the 16 CBI variables takes values on a continous scale of 0-1. 
The higher the value of the index, the higher the level of CBI, and vice versa. The weights across 
CBI aspects are not uniform as shown in equation 2.1. The sub-indices in equation 2.1 are each 
decomposed further. The first component of equation 2.1, CBGCi,t, is defined in equation 2.2.  
                                                                              
Where CBGCi,t is as defined before; GTOFi,t is the governor’s legal term of office in country i 
over period t; GAATi,t is the authority that appoints the governor in country i over period t; 
GDATi,t is the authority that can dismiss the governor in country i over period t; and GOOFi,t 
means other offices that the governor can hold in government in country i over period t. CBGCi,t 
is a simple average of the 4 components GTOFi,t, GAATi,t, GDATi,t and GOOFi,t. The second 
component of equation 2.1, CBPOi,t, is defined in equation 2.3.  
 
The only component of CBPOi,t is PSOBi,t. PSOBi,t is the CB price stability objective in country i 
over period t. The price stability objective is considered as the primary objective of a CB. The 
third component of equation 2.1, PFAAi,t, is defined in equation 2.4.  
 
Where PFAAi,t is as defined before; MPFAi,t is the monetary policy formulating authority in 
country i over period t; CFRMi,t is the existence of a policy conflict resolution mechanism 
between the CB and government in country i over period t; and CBBGi,t is the CB role in 
government budget process in country i over period t. The fourth component of equation 2.1, 
CBLCi,t, is defined in equation 2.5.  
 
Where CBLCi,t is as defined before; CBGAi,j is the stringency of limits in CB advances to 
government in country i over period t; is the CLGLi,t is the stringency of limits in CB loans to 
government in country i over period t; CLGTi,t is the authority that determines the terms of 
lending CB funds in country i over period t; COBFi,t is the circle of beneficiaries of CB funds in 
 
 
20 
 
country i over period t; CBTLi,t is the type of limits on lending CB funds in country i over period 
t; CLGMi,t is the maturity profile of CB loans in country i over period t; CLRRi,t is the 
restrictions on interest rates in country i over period t. CBPMi,t is the existence of an explicit ban 
on CB participation in primary market for government securities in country i over period t. 
Limits can be in percentage shares of the reference variables or in absolute figures. The CWN 
(1992) index, which we follow, gives more weight to financial CBI.  
To aggregate the CWN index for country i, we multiply each CBI variable by its corresponding 
weight. To get the sample average aggregate legal CWN index, we take a simple average of the 
individual CB average CWN scores. We rank the 20 countries according to the aggregate scores. 
2.3.2 Legal Central Bank Independence Indices: Grilli et al. (1991) Approach 
 
As shown in appendix 2.2, the aggregate GMT legal CBI index has 2 sub-indices. The political 
CBI sub-index has 8 variables. The economic CBI sub-index has 7 variables. The aggregate 
GMT index and the 2 sub-indices are unit-weight indices. Each of the 15 CBI variables takes 
values on a binary scale of 0 (minimum) or 1 (maximum). The aggregate GMT index takes 
values from 0 (minimum) to 16 (maximum). The higher the value of the index, the higher the 
level of CBI, and vice-versa. The fifteenth variable on bank supervision has a maximum score of 
2. We calculate the aggregate GMT index as defined in equation 2.6. 
 
 
GMTi,t is the aggregate GMT legal index in country i over period t. POLCBIi,t is political CBI in 
country i over period t. ECOCBIi,t is economic CBI in country i over period t. Political CBI is 
defined in equation 2.7.  
 
Where  is as defined before; CBGAi,t is that government does not appoint the governor 
in country i over period t; CBGTi,t is that the governor is in office for more than 5 years in 
country i over period t; CBBAi,t is that the government does not appoint the majority of the CB 
board members in country i over period t; CBBTi,t is that the CB board is in office for more than 
5 years in country i over period t; CBBGi,t is that a government representative participates on the 
CB policy board meetings in country i over period t; MPFAi,t is that government does not 
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approve monetary policy in country i over period t; PSSOi,t is that the CB has a legal mandate of 
price stability in country i over period t; and LDCRi,t is that there is a conflict resolution 
mechanism in place to resolve any policy conflict between the CB and government in country i 
over period t. Economic independence is defined in equation 2.8.   
 
Where ECOCBIi,t is as defined before; CLGAi,t is that direct credit to government is not 
automatic in country i over period t; CLGTi,t is that CB credit is granted at full market interest 
rates in country i over period t; CLGLi,t is that there is a temporary limit amount that the CB can 
lend in country i over period t; CLGMi,t is that there is a maturity limit for the CB loans in 
country i over period t; OGDPi,t is that the CB participates on the primary market for government 
securities in country i over period t; DRSAi,t is that the CB sets the discount rate in country i over 
period t. CBSRi,t is that the CB participates in bank supervision in country i over period t.  
 
For the GMT indices, overall GMT, political and economic sub-indices, aggregation involves a 
simple summation of the CBI variables. For ease of comparability among all the CBI indices, we 
standardize the GMT scores by conversion. We divide the individual absolute scores by the 
maximum potential score for each of the 15 CBI variables. The comparable indices are the legal 
CWN and TOR. The standardization technique follows Arnone et al. (2008). After conversion, 
the overall GMT index becomes a simple average of the political and economic sub-indices.  
2.3.3 Factual Central Bank Independence Index: Cukierman et al. (1992) Approach 
 
Legal indicators of CBI may not reflect the true relationship between the CB and the government 
in less developed countries, where the CB laws are least respected, partial and leave some room 
for interpretation spreads (Cukierman (1992); Cukierman et al. (1992); Forder (1996); Mangano 
(1998); Walsh (2005)). To account for potential inadequacies in legal CBI measures as indicators 
of actual CBI practices in less developed countries and to be more robust in the analysis of CBI, 
we develop a behavioural CBI index to reflect factual or effective CBI. This approach follows 
several previous authors (Cukierman (1992); Cukierman et al. (1992); Cukierman and Webb 
(1995); DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Sturm and DeHaan (2001); DeHaan (2001); Dreher et al. 
(2007); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). The study by DeHaan (2001) covers 2 decade-wise periods, 
1980-1989 and 1990-1998. The study by Dreher et al. (2007) covers 137 countries over 1970-
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2004. Generally, factual CBI covers several behavioural aspects. These include the annual 
average TOR of CB governors, their personalities and charisma, their design of monetary policy, 
the political vulnerability of the CB governors and evolved behavioural norms between the CB 
governor and government authorities (Radzyner and Riesinger (1997)). In this study, we restrict 
factual CBI to the actual annual average TOR of governors. The TOR is an informal and indirect 
indicator of actual CBI. We chose the annual average TOR based on (i) its wide recognition in 
the literature and empirical analysis, (ii) data availability and consistency, (iii) ease of calculation 
and (iv) limited subjectivity bias. In addition, hirings and firings are one typical potential avenue 
through which some political authorities exert influence on the CBs in less developed countries. 
Angola and Mauritania are typical examples. However, the TOR index is limited in that low 
turnovers, which imply high factual CBI, may reflect subservience of CB governors. We 
construct a new TOR data set because the commonly used previous data sets by Cukierman et al. 
(1992) and DeHaan and Kooi (2000) are now outdated and do not cover all the countries in our 
sample. We calculate the actual annual average TOR of CB governors in equation 2.9.  
 
 
We use some restrictions in calculating the actual TOR. Firstly, we restrict actual annual average 
TOR of governors to actual practices in CBs, against CB legislation (Acts, Act Amendments and 
country constitutions). Secondly, we count all turnovers of governors, voluntary or compulsory, 
dismissals, resignations and reassignments. Thirdly, we count reappointed governors, who are in 
their 2nd…nth consecutive term of office, only once. Fourthly, we exclude interim governors from 
the total number of governors. The actual TOR scores range from 0 (highest level of CBI) to 1 
(lowest level of CBI). The actual TOR score is the inverse of the actual term of office. The actual 
TOR is high if above the threshold TOR. The threshold TOR is the inverse of the legal term of 
office of the governor. It is the turnover rate, beyond which CBI begins to deteriorate 
(Cukierman et al. (1992)). We calculate the annual average threshold TOR in equation 2.10.  
 
 
 
We get the sample annual average actual TOR and the threshold TOR scores by taking simple 
averages of their individual country scores. We rank countries according to actual TOR scores. 
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We investigate cases of extremely high and extremely low turnovers. We find out possible causal 
factors. We use other qualitative CB information to explain the statistical outcomes. To measure 
changes in factual CBI from 1980-1989 to 1990-2008, we use the 1980-1989 TOR scores in 
Cukierman et al. (1992). For accuracy and consistency, and following Dvorsky (2000), we 
recalculate the Cukierman et al. (1992) figures to ensure that our method is exactly the same as 
the Cukierman et al. (1992) method that we replicate. In addition, we recalculate the 1980-1989 
period TOR scores because 9 of the countries in our sample are not covered in Cukierman et al. 
(1992). We also compare the changes in cross-country TOR rankings over the same periods.  
2.4 Presentation and Analysis of Results 
 
The results confirm the claimed increased move towards enhanced CBI since the early 1990s. 
This finding of improved CBI since the early 1990s is also echoed in various previous studies 
(Cukierman and Webb (1995); Cukierman (1996); Arnone et al. (2008); Daunfeldt and DeLuna 
(2008); Daunfelt et al. (2010)). The results suggest that improvements in CBI in Africa have 
generally been associated with political, economic and historical reasons, among other factors. 
The results suggest that most governments amended their CB Acts, post-1989. By the end of 
2008, only the Reserve Bank of Malawi was still using the 1989 Act, which grants it, low legal 
CBI. For most CBs, CBI is only granted through the CB Act. It is not constitutionally granted. 
This implies that CBI can be easily violated by the political authorities. Out of the 20 CBs, only 
the Bank of Uganda and the South African Reserve Bank were constitutionally granted legal CBI 
in 1993 and 1996, respectively (See Appendix 2.3). The results suggest that most governments 
still need to revise their CB Acts, to further reduce government control over the CBs. The results 
suggest that some governments like the Kenyan one have been revising their CB Acts while 
others like the Malawian government have not been active in trying to move in line with modern-
day CBI requirements. The Central Bank of Nigeria Act has been revised several times but 
without major enhancements in legal CBI. The analysis suggests that the respective CB Acts 
differ in terms of focus, scope, clarity, specificity, amount of detail and presentation.  
Table 2.2 shows the aggregated and disaggregated legal CWN country ratings. The results 
suggest that aggregate legal CBI is low. The sample average is 0.47. The disaggregated legal 
indices suggest that legal CBI frameworks in most CBs, share several common principles. This is 
shown by equal CBI ratings for specific sub-indices for several countries. For example, the 
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general uniformity of CBI ratings for variable numbers 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 16 in table 2.2, 
confirm this outcome. There is more variation in the financial independence variables (9)-(15). 
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2.4.1 Legal Central Bank Independence Outcomes (1990-2008) 
 
Table 2.2: CWN Legal Central Bank Independence Ratings (1990-2008)  
  Term Who  Dis- Other Who Final  Role  Objective (s) Adva- Securi- Terms  Potential  Type  Maturity  Interest  Primary  Aggre- Country 
Country  of Appoints? missal Offices formu- Auth- in Variable nces tised of  Borrowers of of  Rates Market gate CBI 
  Office      lates ority Budget   Lending Lending Limit Loans   CBI  Rank 
CBI Variable 
Number  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) Overall     Rank 
South Africa 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.50 1.00 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.33 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.59 1 
Tanzania 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.00 0.59 1 
Botswana 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.57 2 
Algeria 0.75 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.53 3 
Mozambique 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.80 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.52 4 
Kenya 0.25 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.00 0.51 5 
Nigeria 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.49 6 
Rwanda 0.75 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.75 0.00 0.49 6 
Tunisia 0.75 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.49 6 
Mauritania 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.48 7 
Angola 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.47 8 
Zambia 0.50 0.25 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.47 8 
Ghana 0.25 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.33 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.46 9 
Uganda 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.46 9 
Egypt 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.50 0.00 0.44 10 
Ethiopia 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.67 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.00 0.43 11 
Sudan 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.00 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.00 0.41 12 
Mauritius 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.37 13 
Zimbabwe 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.50 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.25 0.00 0.36 14 
Malawi 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.20 0.00 0.40 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.31 15 
Sample Average        0.50 
               
0.47 
  
Source: Calculated from the respective central bank Acts, Act Amendments and Country Constitutions where applicable. 
 
Notes 
 
The aggregate legal CWN index for each country is a weighted average of the 16 CBI variables that compose the aggregate legal CWN index. The weights are not uniform across the 16 CBI variables. 
The sample average legal CWN index of 0.47 is a simple average of the individual countries’ aggregate legal CWN scores, which are shown in the Aggregate CBI or Overall column.  
The countries are ordered according to their aggregate legal CWN scores, with the highest scoring country ranked as number 1 and most legally independent, and vice-versa. 
The CBI variables (1)-(4) define personal independence of the CB governor, (5)-(7) policy independence of the CB, (8) goal independence of the CB, and (9)-(16) financial or fiscal independence of the CB. 
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Figure 2.1: Cross-Country Variations in CWN Legal Independence (1990-2008)  
 
Source: Calculated from the respective central bank Acts. 
Table 2.3: Changes in Legal Central Bank Independence (1990-2008)  
Economy 
CWN  
(1980-1989) 
CWN 
(1990-2008) 
CBI 
Change 
Egypt 0.49 0.44 -0.05 
Kenya 0.44 0.51 0.07 
Tanzania 0.44 0.59 0.15 
Ethiopia 0.40 0.43 0.03 
Nigeria 0.37 0.49 0.12 
Uganda 0.35 0.46 0.11 
Botswana 0.33 0.57 0.09 
Zambia 0.33 0.47 0.14 
Ghana 0.31 0.46 0.15 
South Africa 0.25 0.59 0.34 
Zimbabwe 0.20 0.36 0.16 
Sample Average  0.36 0.47 0.11 
 
Source: CWN (1980-1989) figures are from Cukierman et al. (1992). CWN (1990-2008) figures were calculated in this paper. 
Both table 2.1 and figure 2.1 suggest that there are considerable cross-country variations in legal 
CBI. Out of the 20 CBs, there are 15 CBI cross-country rankings. Legal CBI ranges from 0.31 
for the Reserve Bank of Malawi to 0.59 for the South African Reserve Bank.  
Table 2.3 shows that legal CBI has improved since the early 1990s. This is because the CWN 
scores are higher over 1990-2008 than over 1980-1989. The sample average increased by 0.11 
points or 30.56% from 0.36 in CWN (1992) to 0.47 in this paper (1990-2008). 10 out of 11 CBs 
improved. This represents 90.91% improvement. Notably, the Bank of Botswana, Bank of 
Zambia and the South African Reserve Bank made significant improvements. The Central Bank 
of Egypt, however, had a decline in overall legal CBI. This is because when the CBE Act was 
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amended in 2003, some legal clauses that had previously enhanced CBI such as in 1993 were 
removed and replaced by others that reduced overall legal CBI. Table 2.4 shows the legal CBI 
ratings for the 6 benchmark CBs in Cukierman et al. (1992) for the period 1980-1989.  
Table 2.4: Legal Independence Ratings for Benchmark Central Banks (1990-2008)  
Country  
Name of 
Central 
Bank 
Legal  
CWN Index  
(1980-1989) 
Germany Bundesbank 0.69 
United States of America Federal Reserve Bank 0.48 
Canada Bank of Canada 0.45 
Australia Reserve Bank of Australia 0.36 
United Kingdom Bank of England 0.27 
New Zealand  Reserve Bank of New Zealand  0.24 
Sample Average  
 
0.42 
   
  Source: Cukierman et al. (1992). 
Table 2.4 suggests that the sample average legal CBI score of 0.47 over 1990-2008 in this study, 
compares with 0.42 for the 6 benchmark CBs over 1980-1989. This outcome implies that 
although still low, on average, legal CBI in Africa has improved to levels slightly above what 
characterized developed countries in the late 1980s (that is 0.47>0.42). This view on the 
improvements in legal CBI in Africa is also echoed in Arnone et al. (2008) results for the African 
countries’ group. The low sample average legal CBI in African countries is explained by various 
factors relating to the sub-components of the aggregate legal indices as we explain below. 
Table 2.2 shows that the sample average legal term of office (TOO) of the CB governor is 0.50, 
implying from appendix 2.1 that the average TOO is 5 years. This outcome implies low legal 
CBI. The range is 4-6 years, with a rating of 0.25-0.75. These outcomes compare with an 
average legal term of 8 years, a range of 5-14 years and a rating of 0.50-1.00 for the 6 benchmark 
CBs over 1990-2008. Our sample legal terms are short but have legal provision for renewal. 
Most, but not all CBs explicitly specify a limit on the number of times a CB governor can be 
reappointed. Most CB Acts provide for a maximum of 2 consecutive terms. The Bank of Sudan 
Act provides for a maximum of 3 terms of 5 years each. Comparatively, for the 6 benchmark 
CBs, the Federal Reserve Bank has the longest, but strictly non-renewable legal term of 14 years. 
The Bundesbank has a non-renewable legal term of 8 years. We do not find strict non-
renewability of legal terms in our sample. The combination of short legal terms and their 
renewability implies easy opportunities for lobbying and soliciting for renewal. This likely 
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erodes personal independence of CB governors, who may likely lobby for reappointment. This 
outcome potentially creates subservient CB governors. In most African countries, the legal terms 
of office of CB governor, averaging 5 years for the sample, commonly overlap with government 
legal terms as shown in table 2.5 and figure 2.2, respectively. 
Table 2.5: Legal Terms of Governors and Terms of Government (1990-2008)  
Economy 
Legal Term  
of CB Governor 
Legal Term  
of Government 
Overlap in  
Legal Terms  
Algeria 6 5 1 
Angola 5 5 0 
Botswana 5 5 0 
Egypt 4 6 -2 
Ethiopia 5 5 0 
Ghana 4 4 0 
Kenya 4 5 -1 
Malawi 5 5 0 
Mauritania 5 6 -1 
Mauritius 5 5 0 
Mozambique 5 5 0 
Nigeria 5 4 1 
Rwanda 6 5 1 
South Africa 5 5 0 
Sudan 5 5 0 
Tanzania 5 5 0 
Tunisia 6 5 1 
Uganda 5 5 0 
Zambia 5 5 0 
Zimbabwe 5 5 0 
  Sample Average  5 5 0 
 
 Source: Central bank databases and respective government publications. 
 
Figure 2.2: Legal Terms of Governors and Terms of Government (1990-2008) 
 
Source: Central bank databases and the respective government publications. 
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Table 2.5 shows that only 4 countries, Algeria, Nigeria, Rwanda and Tunisia have legal terms of 
CB governors that are longer than the term of government or electoral cycle. In Egypt, Kenya 
and Mauritania, the term of government is longer than that of the CB governors. For the other 13 
countries, the 2 terms have an equal life cycle. These outcomes imply potential political 
influence on the respective CB governors, especially if the calendar dates of the terms coincide. 
The combination of short legal terms, provision for renewal and the overlap in governor terms 
with government terms is conducive to potential political influence on the CB governors. 
The sample governors are appointed by the political authorities. Most CBs are rated 0 with the  
exceptions of Bank of Uganda, Bank of Zambia and the Central Bank of Nigeria, with ratings of 
0.50, 0.25 and 0.50, respectively. The appointing authority is the State President. Cross-country 
variations concern the authority that the State President consults in making the appointment and 
the effectiveness of consultation, if done. These include the Prime Minister, Minister of Finance 
and the CB board. The consultations are done for proposals, advice and recommendations. The 
appointment is done with the approval of Cabinet in Uganda, National Assembly in Zambia, 
Senate in Nigeria and the CB board in South Africa. In Nigeria, the appointment has to reflect 
Federal Character. This means that the governor and the Federal Minister of Finance should not 
come from the same State at the same time. This derives from the large size of Nigeria and the 
prominence of the Federal State concept in that country. The Central Bank of Nigeria Act 
provides for this arrangement, which is not common in other countries. For the 6 benchmark 
CBs, most of the governors are also appointed by the Heads of State. In New Zealand, however, 
the CB formally proposes the governor, who is then appointed by the Minister of Finance.  
The sample governors are only dismissed by the State Presidents. Generally, the legal dismissal 
conditions include general and specific policy-related factors. For this sample, the common legal 
dismissal conditions include personal insolvency, bankruptcy, suspension of payment of debt, 
compounding with creditors, gross personal misconduct, body infirmity, unsound mind felony, 
offences involving dishonesty, moral turpitude, imprisonment, conviction to an offence, serious 
dereliction of duties and gross incompetence. Out of the 20 CBs, only the Central Bank of Egypt 
Act does not legally provide for dismissal. This implies complete independence and immunity 
for the governor. In practice, however, governors have been dismissed in Central Bank of Egypt, 
even for policy reasons (See Appendix 2.5), implying divergence between the law and practice. 
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Some CBs state dismissal conditions in rather unclear or vague terms. For example, the Bank of 
Mozambique and the National Bank of Angola Acts state that the governor can only be 
dismissed if he “does something serious”. The Central Bank of Tunisia Act only “partially” 
states the dismissal conditions. The Bank of Algeria Act states that the governor cannot be 
dismissed except for medical reasons or “major errors”. The Act is silent on what the major 
errors are. The South African Reserve Bank Act does not state the conditions explicitly although 
dismissal is mentioned in the Act. The Reserve Bank of Malawi Act is silent on dismissal but 
does not provide legal immunity against unfair dismissal. The Act therefore potentially leaves 
some room for unfair dismissals through undue political influence. Unclear statutes potentially 
compromise CBI practices in African countries, where there are weak legal institutions. 
The CB Acts suggest that most African governments have eschewed the dismissal of governors 
for policy related reasons. This is because the legal dismissal conditions broadly do not relate to 
policy. Possible reasons could be that room for dismissal for policy failure could induce undue 
political pressure from government. In practice, most of the CBs have no potential or history of 
meeting set policy targets. In practice, however, some governors have been dismissed for policy 
failure in some of the CBs (See Appendix 2.5). For some of the 6 benchmark CBs on the other 
hand, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act permits dismissal for policy failure, which is 
defined as missing the set inflation target. For the Bank of England, if the inflation target is not 
met, the governor has to write a public statement, explaining the reasons for failure to meet the 
target and the proposed corrective measures. In practice, however, the Bank of England (BOE) 
target has always been met.  
Actual practices in the CBs suggest that termination of CB governors’ contracts result from 
several factors (See Appendix 2.5). These include undisclosed or unknown reasons, arguably 
associated with political motives, reassignments to alternative government jobs, resignations, 
bank failures (mainly state banks) and failure to rescue them, policy failure, corruption, personal 
insecurity associated with political threats, pursuit of the previous State Presidents’ economic 
policies and failure to take Ministers’ directives, among other reasons. Undisclosed reasons, 
associated with political motives are more common in practice. Unserved CB governor terms 
range from less than 12 months to 4 years. Figure 2.3 shows the cross-country distribution of 
premature terminations of CB governor contracts across the 20 countries over 1990-2008.  
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Premature Terminations of Governors’ Contracts (1990-2008) 
Source: Derived from the respective central bank databases. 
Note: Countries without bars had no terminations of CB governors over the entire study period, 1990-2008. 
 
Out of the 20 countries, premature terminations were reported in 13 countries. These include the 
Mauritania, Botswana, Mauritius, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, Tunisia, Egypt, Kenya, National 
Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Malawi. This represents 65% of the sample. 7 countries had no 
premature terminations. These include Algeria, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda, Nigeria, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. This represents 35% of the sample. As figure 2.3 shows, Mauritania had 
the highest number of premature terminations of 9, followed by Angola with 8. Out of the 85 
governors in the sample, 36 had their contracts prematurely terminated (See Appendix 2.5). This 
represents a 42% termination rate. The terminations in Mauritania and Angola were generally 
politically-motivated. The terminations in Kenya resulted from policy failure, financial 
mismanagement and alleged corruption or abuse of public office by some of the governors. In 
Tanzania, the premature termination was associated with alleged gross financial mismanagement 
through irregular international money transfers. The terminations in Zambia resulted from 
macroeconomic instability in the late 1980s to the early 1990s and political regime change. 
Out of the 36 CB governors whose contracts were terminated, 32 were terminated by the State 
Presidents who appointed them and only 4 were terminated by different State Presidents. This 
analysis is, however, affected by several other reasons. Over the study period, Angola and 
Tunisia had one State President. Mauritania also had a high turnover of State Presidents with 7 
State Presidents over the study period. The turnovers in Mauritania almost amount to each State 
President recruiting his or her own CB governor. Kenya had only 2 State Presidents but Central 
Bank of Kenya’s terminations are associated with both political and economic factors.  
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Most CB Acts suggest that incumbent governors are not allowed to concurrently hold any other 
office in government, regardless of remuneration. Most CB Acts state that the governor can only 
hold another office in government, only with the permission of the country legislature. 
Governors therefore have full time jobs. This condition seeks to rid the governors of conflict of 
interest in discharging CB business. The average CBI rating is 0.50 in this aspect. In practice, 
however, there are some few deviations. In Angola for instance, there are times when the 
governor operates as both the BNA governor and as Minister of Economy, as instructed by the 
State President. This practice diminishes the difference between monetary policy (authority) and 
fiscal policy (authority), a practice which erodes CBI, and is against the principles of CBI.  
Most of the CBs now stipulate price stability as one of the major policy objectives, among other 
either consistent or conflicting objectives. Only the Bank of Sudan Act does not state the price 
stability objective in its mandate. The Reserve Bank of Malawi specifies too many objectives, 
most of which conflict with the price stability objective. A few CBs now state the price stability 
mandate as the primary or the only objective of the CB. For example, the Bank of Mozambique, 
Bank of Tanzania, Bank of Zambia, Central Bank of Kenya and the South African Reserve Bank 
now state the price stability objective as the primary CB objective. In 1996, the BOT Act was 
changed to move away from multiple to a single price stability objective. The sample CBI ratings 
range 0.40-0.80. Notably, the South African Reserve Bank and the Bank of Ghana are already on 
inflation targeting (IT) since 2000 and 2007, respectively. These moves support CBI efforts. 
Most of the CBs formulate monetary policy in consultation with government through the 
Ministry of Finance. The CBI ratings range 0.33-1.00. Some CBs require government approval 
of monetary policy but others do not. For the Bank of Botswana, government approval is not 
required. The South African Reserve Bank has the governor’s committee, which has the final 
authority in the monetary policy formulation process, after consultations have been made with 
key stakeholders. The committee comprises the South African Reserve Bank governor and the 3 
deputy governors. For the Bank of Algeria, the Council of Money and Credit (COMC), 
composed of 3 external members who hold positions in the Bank of Algeria, the governor and 
the 3 deputy governors, have final authority on monetary policy formulation. Most CBs now 
have monetary policy committees (MPCs), which are in charge of formulating monetary policy 
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and setting interest rates on CB credit. The only exception is the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, 
which has no MPC over the study period. 
A number of the CBs now have policy conflict resolution mechanisms but others still do not 
have. The sample average CBI rating is 0.20. Countries whose CBs now have policy conflict 
resolution mechanisms include Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius, Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria and South 
Africa. In South Africa, the Minister of Finance is legally entitled to implement corrective 
measures on the South African Reserve Bank, should the South African Reserve Bank violate 
any rules spelt out in the South African Reserve Bank Act 90. In Kenya, if after consultation 
with the Central Bank of Kenya, the Minister of Finance is of the opinion that the monetary 
policy adopted by the Central Bank of Kenya is inconsistent with the principal objective of the 
Central Bank of Kenya, the Minister of Finance may, upon resolution by the Cabinet, direct the 
Central Bank of Kenya in writing, to adopt such monetary policy as the Minister of Finance may 
specify for a period of 6 months or less as the Minister may specify. Upon receipt of a directive 
under this section, and the Central Bank of Kenya shall, adopt and implement the monetary 
policy so directed notwithstanding any other provision of the Central Bank of Kenya Act (CBK 
(2008)). However, despite the existence of these conflict resolution mechanisms in a number of 
CBs, the reading of the mechanisms seems to be in favour of governments and not the CBs. The 
mechanisms do not seem to strengthen the position of the CB in case of policy conflict. For 
example, the Bank of Botswana has a standing government overriding mechanism, which 
effectively reduces the independence of the Bank of Botswana. The mechanisms are rather still 
insufficient to protect CB policy positions in face of conflict. 
On a comparative basis, some benchmark CBs have explicit policy conflict resolution 
mechanisms. These include the Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of Canada and the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand. In Australia, legislation provides that the Reserve Bank of Australia may 
disclose differences in opinion between the Reserve Bank of Australia and government on policy 
matters by tabling a statement in Parliament. This legal provision has been in place for several 
decades but has never been invoked because such a situation has not yet arisen in practice. There 
are also political costs in invoking the prohibition. In the event of a dispute over monetary 
policy, the government can override the Reserve Bank of Australia by tabling its objections 
before both Houses of Parliament. In Canada, the Minister of Finance may issue a directive to 
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the governor in the event of a difference of opinion over monetary policy to be followed. This is 
done only after consulting the governor and obtaining the approval of the State President. Any 
such directive must be made public, forthwith. In Canada, in the event of disagreement between 
the governor and the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Finance need only give the governor a 
30-day notice in writing of the course of action to be followed. If the governor does not comply, 
he has his walking papers. In England, in face of policy conflict, the direction to be followed is 
given by the King in Council. In this case, the Bank of England is given the opportunity to give 
its opinion before the directing resolution is voted on. In New Zealand, if there is conflict 
between monetary policy targets and other government objectives, the governor may force a 
negotiation of a new agreement. The policy conflict is then made public. If the government 
directive is inconsistent with price stability, the governor may force the Minister of Finance to 
formally override the price stability objective. This is also publicized. For the Bank of England 
where there is close cooperation between the CB and the Treasury, policy conflict is supposed to 
be publicized. In the case of the Bank of England, however, policy conflict is very unlikely. 
Across the sample, the role of the CB in government is generally advisory. The CBs act as 
bankers, fiscal agents and financial advisors for the governments. The CB governors are 
regularly called upon to advise government on monetary policy issues. The respective CBs do 
not have strong influence on the government budget formulation process. The sample CBI 
ratings average 0. In practice, however, some countries do not follow their Act provisions. For 
example, for Angola, there is in practice, no clear separation between the National Bank of 
Angola and the Ministry of Economy in terms of operations and monetary policy conduct. This 
is because the governor sometimes concurrently works as Minister of Economy. There is no 
separation between monetary policy and fiscal policy, a practice which violates CBI principles.  
The CB Acts suggest that CB credit to government is no longer automatic. The sample average 
CBI ratings range 0.33-1.00. The conditions under which CB credit can be granted cover 
temporary accommodation of government to off-set fluctuations between government receipts 
and payments in case of emergencies, unusual and unforeseen circumstances, contingent 
commitments, exceptional and seasonal demands for credit. The advances are normally granted 
for a temporary period. Notably, the Bank of Botswana does not give loans to government but 
states the conditions that would apply if such credit was granted. On the other hand, lending by 
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the Bank of Algeria is heavily influenced by political motives and the historical socialist 
orientation in that economy, which loosen credit conditions. The National Bank of Rwanda also 
mandatorily has to advance credit to government. 
Most CBs place limits on the amount of credit granted to government. For most CBs, the 
reference variable is a fixed percentage of recurrent government revenue. The actual shares range 
5-25%. The limits are thus, only moderately binding. Only a few CBs have low percentages, 
reflecting high stringency. Notably and favourably, the Central Bank of Kenya has a stringent 
limit of not more than 5% of recurrent government revenue. There is another difference across 
countries in terms of the definition of government revenue. Some CBs like the Bank of Botswana 
use ordinary revenues while others like the Central Bank of Kenya use recurrent revenues. Only 
the South African Reserve Bank uses its own liabilities as the reference variable. This is a more 
binding limit variable. None of the CBs in this sample uses absolute quantity limits, which are 
more binding. The sample CBI ratings range 0.33-1.00. On a comparative basis with the 
benchmark CBs, the Bank of Canada uses government expenditure as the reference variable. 
This is considered to be relatively more accommodative to government credit requirements.  
The authority that determines credit terms varies across CBs. For some CBs, the CBs or their 
boards determine the credit terms. In others, the CB and the government agree on the terms. This 
second negotiated arrangement is more common, but it implies low CBI as the negotiated 
interest rates are usually below market interest rates. The CBI ratings range 0.33-1.00. The main 
beneficiaries of CB credit commonly include the government, banks and other financial 
institutions. CBI ratings range 0-0.67. In practice, however, in most CBs that lack actual 
independence, government takes a larger share of CB credit, at the expense of the private sector. 
Credit to banks is usually in the form of temporary liquidity support and it is granted to illiquid, 
but solvent banks. The CB loan duration ranges from 3 months to more than 12 months. The CBI 
ratings range 0.33-1.00. Some CB Acts explicitly state what should happen if there is default on 
repayment, but others do not. The Central Bank of Mauritania Act states that outstanding 
amounts are automatically converted into government securities at market interest rates. For the 
Bank of Mauritius, outstanding amounts are charged interest at the Bank of Mauritius discount 
rate. The restrictions on interest rates on CB credit vary across the CBs. The CBI ratings range 
0.25-0.75. There are CBs that now quote market interest rates. These include the Bank of 
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Mozambique, Bank of Mauritius, Bank of Sudan, Bank of Tanzania, Bank of Uganda, Central 
Bank of Egypt, Central Bank of Kenya and the National Bank of Rwanda. For other CBs, the 
interest rate is agreed on between the CB and government. The Bank of Botswana is a typical 
example of this common scenario. For the South African Reserve Bank, the interest rate is 
determined by the South African Reserve Bank board of directors. On a comparative basis with 
the 6 benchmark CBs, for the Bank of England, the interest rate charged on the government 
overdraft is the Bank of England’s bank rate plus a premium, which is negotiated between the 
Debt Management Office and the Bank of England (Anorne et al. (2008)).  
Most CB Acts have no outright ban on the CB primary market participation in government 
securities.BA notable exception is the Bank of Mauritius, which does not participate in the 
primary market for government securities (BOM (2008)). The sample average CBI rating is 0. 
The typical practice of CB participation is partly explained by shallow domestic capital markets. 
This practice, however, poses inflationary risks. Among the SSA countries and the countries in 
this sample, only South Africa has a well developed capital market. The capital market is almost 
non-existent in Angola. It is poorly developed in most other African countries.  
2.4.2 Political and Economic Central Bank Independence Outcomes (1990-2008) 
 
As shown in tables 2.6 and 2.7, the sample average aggregate legal CBI, as measured by the 
overall GMT index is 0.43. This outcome suggests low legal CBI. The sample range is 0.31-0.59. 
The outcomes compare with a sample average of 0.47 and a range of 0.31-0.59 in our CWN 
index. These outcomes compare with an average overall GMT figure of 0.47 and a range of 0.32-
0.82 in Arnone et al. (2008) results for the African region. The sample average economic CBI is 
high, with an average of 0.61 and a range of 0.56-0.69. These outcomes compare with an average 
economic CBI figure of 0.60 and a range of 0.38-0.75 in Arnone et al. (2008) results for the 
African region. The sample average political CBI is low, with an average of 0.25 and a range of 
0.00-0.50. These outcomes compare with an average political CBI figure of 0.34 and a range of 
0.00-1.00 in Arnone et al. (2008) results for the African region. The Arnone et al. (2008) study 
covers end-2003 for the African region. However, the Arnone et al. (2008) analysis excludes 
Mauritania, which is in our sample. Arnone et al. (2008) have very high ratings for Algeria. We 
do not find the source of this difference because their results only show final ratings without 
individual CBI variable scores.  
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Figure 2.4 shows that political CBI is low but economic CBI is high. It also shows the low cross-
country variations in the GMT sub-indices, political CBI and economic CBI. Table 2.6 shows the 
GMT index country ratings and cross-country rankings for the overall index and its sub-indices. 
The original or unconverted GMT indices are shown in appendix 2.4. 
Figure 2.4: Political and Economic Independence Cross-Country Variations (1990-2008) 
 
Source: Calculated from the respective central bank Acts. 
 
Table 2.6: Political and Economic Independence Ratings and Rankings (1990-2008) 
Country  
GMT 
Overall  
Index 
Country  
CBI 
Rank 
Political 
Independence 
Index 
Country  
CBI 
Rank 
Economic 
Independence 
Index 
Country  
CBI 
Rank 
South Africa 0.59 1 0.50 1 0.69 1 
Botswana 0.53 2 0.50 1 0.56 2 
Kenya 0.53 2 0.38 2 0.69 1 
Ghana 0.47 3 0.38 2 0.56 2 
Mauritius  0.47 3 0.38 2 0.56 2 
Tanzania 0.47 3 0.25 3 0.69 1 
Tunisia 0.47 3 0.25 3 0.69 1 
Uganda 0.47 3 0.25 3 0.69 1 
Algeria 0.41 4 0.25 3 0.56 2 
Ethiopia 0.41 4 0.13 4 0.69 1 
Mozambique 0.41 4 0.25 3 0.56 2 
Nigeria 0.41 4 0.25 3 0.56 2 
Rwanda 0.41 4 0.25 3 0.56 2 
Zimbabwe 0.41 4 0.25 3 0.56 2 
Zambia 0.41 4 0.25 3 0.56 2 
Angola 0.34 5 0.13 4 0.56 2 
Egypt 0.34 5 0.13 4 0.56 2 
Malawi 0.34 5 0.13 4 0.56 2 
Mauritania 0.34 5 0.13 4 0.56 2 
Sudan 0.34 5 0.00 5 0.69 1 
Sample Average  0.43 
 
0.25 
 
0.61 
 
       Source: Calculated from respective central bank Acts. 
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Table 2.6 suggests that the GMT index ratings and rankings imply that legal CBI frameworks 
across CBs, share several common principles. Several CBs have equal ratings on specific CBI 
aspects. Most countries have the same rating on economic CBI, which has the least variation 
across countries. Because of the original binary nature of the GMT indices, the scores are 
concentrated, with very limited variation across the countries. Although not shown in these 
results, which are cross-sectional over 1990-2008, the GMT indices also have little variation 
within individual countries, over time. This is shown by our annualized indices in chapter 4.  
Tables 2.2 and 2.7 suggest that the outcomes of the GMT and the CWN legal indices are similar 
for most CBI aspects that are shared between the 2 indices. The additional CBI variables in the 
GMT indices, which are not covered in the CWN legal index include the (i) difference in the 
legal term of office of the governor rating criteria, (ii) legal term of office and the authority that 
appoints the other CB board members, (iii) government participation in CB meetings, (iv) 
authority that sets the CB discount rate, and the (v) role of the CB in bank supervision. Our 
analysis of the GMT indices only covers the CBI aspects that are not covered in the CWN index.  
With respect to the legal term of office of the governor, only 3 CBs have high CBI with a rating 
of 1. These include the Bank of Algeria, Central Bank of Tunisia and National Bank of Rwanda, 
which have legal terms of 6 years. In most CBs, the government appoints the majority of the 
members of the CB board of directors. This outcome suggests low CBI with a sample average 
rating of 0. Under CWN, this rating would be 0.75. The fact that CB board members are 
appointed by government creates personal dependence of the CB governor and other board of 
directors on political authorities. Politicians may tend to use this to their own advantage. 
For most CBs, the board of directors is only in office for less than 5 years. The cross-country 
board terms of office range 3-5 years. This implies low CBI, with a sample average rating of 0. 
For some CBs, the terms are staggered but in most others, they are not. Only the Central Bank of 
Kenya, Bank of Tanzania and the Bank of Uganda have staggered board of directors’ terms of 
office. In practice, board term staggering fosters continuity and renewal. It can be used to reduce 
short-term political influence on the CB while permitting change if there are prolonged and 
fundamental differences in policy views between the CB and government. For the 6 benchmarks 
on the other hand, the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve Bank have staggered board of 
directors’ terms of office.  
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  Table 2.7: Political and Economic Independence Ratings (1990-2008) 
Country  C
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Index of Political Independence POLCBI 0.50 0.50 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.25 
Government does not appoint the CB governor CBGA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CB governor is in office for more than 5 years CBGT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 
Government does not appoint CB board members CBBA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CB board is in office for more than 5 years CBBT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Government participation in CB board meetings CBBG 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.45 
Government does not approve monetary policy MPFA 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 
Legal mandate of price stability primary PSSO 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.95 
Conflict resolution mechanism exists LDCR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 
Index of Economic Independence ECOCBI 0.69 0.56 0.69 0.56 0.56 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.56 0.69 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.69 0.61 
Direct CB credit not automatic CLGA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 
Market interest rates are charged CLGI 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.35 
Temporary limited amount on CB credit CLGL 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Maturity of loans restricted CLGM 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Primary market participation by the CB OGDP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Discount rate set by the central bank alone DRSA 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Banking supervision responsibility of the CB CBSR 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Aggregate GMT Legal Index GMT 0.59 0.53 0.53 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.43 
         
 
             Country CBI Rank  
 
(1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5) 
  Source: Calculated from the respective central bank Acts. 
Notes 
The GMT index scores were converted by dividing each CBI score by the maximum possible score per CBI aspect.  
This conversion was done for ease of comparability among the indices. These include the CWN, the GMT and the TOR indices. The overall GMT index is further split into its POLCBI and ECOCBI sub- indices. 
After conversion, the aggregate GMT index becomes a simple average of the Political Independence Sub-Index and the Economic Independence Sub-Index. 
The countries are arranged according to the overall GMT scores, with the most independent country as the first and the least independent as the last. 
The figures in parentheses are the cross-country CBI rankings according to the aggregate GMT index scores.  
   The sample average legal CBI according to the overall GMT index is 0.43. This figure compares with 0.47 using the CWN index. The difference is attributed to the different weights attached to the indices.  
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For most CBs, there is a mandatory government representative on the CB board. For most CBs, 
the Treasury Secretary is an ex-officio member. The Treasury Secretary attends and participates 
in CB policy board meetings but does not count in constituting the quorum and has no voting 
powers. In most cases, in his or her absence, the Treasury Secretary, in writing, nominates 
another government representative to attend meetings on his behalf. However, for a few CBs like 
the National Bank of Angola, the Treasury Secretary has voting powers. In Ethiopia, 3 Ministers 
are part of the National Bank of Ethiopia Bank although they do not have voting powers. In our 
view, this still likely has potential political influence because the Ministers are not technocrates, 
but politicians. Some CBs do not have the Treasury Secretary as a board member. These include 
the Bank of Algeria, Bank of Mozambique, South African Reserve Bank and the Reserve Bank 
of Zimbabwe. Other government representatives on the CB board commonly include 
representatives from the Ministries of Finance, Finance and Development Planning, and Industry 
and Trade. Other outside board members appointed by government constitute high ranking 
officials representing key economic sectors. These commonly include Agriculture, Commerce, 
Finance, Banking and Industry, among others. Interestingly, for Nigeria, board representation at 
Central Bank of Nigeria has to reflect Federal Character, which the CBN Act legally provides 
for. Actual practices, however, suggest that the mere presence of a government representative in 
CB policy meetings does not necessarily reduce CBI. In our view, the representation is still, 
however, important in keeping government updated on monetary policy developments and to 
avoid public disagreements between the CB and the Treasury on monetary policy stance.  
All the sampled CBs have full independence in setting the key CB policy rate. This refers to the 
CB discount rate or bank rate. The sample average CBI rating is 1. This outcome allows CBs to 
influence money market interest rates. In terms of bank supervision, all the CBs are still key 
bank supervisors. However, the Bank of Algeria and the Central Bank of Tunisia share bank 
supervision with other institutions. For the Bank of Algeria, bank supervision is shared among 3 
institutions. In most other countries, the CB is the sole bank supervisor. Bank supervision is still 
regarded as a core function of the CB in most African countries. The results suggest that most 
African countries are still lagging behind most DCs that have now transferred bank supervision 
to other independent institutions. For the benchmark CBs on the other hand, the Bank of England 
transferred the bank supervision role to a new regulator for financial services.  
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2.4.3 Factual Central Bank Independence Outcomes (1990-2008) 
 
Table 2.8 shows the factual CBI country ratings, cross-country rankings and the changes in 
factual CBI from 1980-1989 to 1990-2008. Figure 2.5 shows the cross-country variations in 
factual CBI over 1990-2008. Table 2.9 shows the benchmarking against the developed countries. 
Table 2.8: Factual Independence Ratings and Rankings (1980-2008) 
Country Actual TOR Country Rank Actual TOR  Threshold TOR Country Rank Actual TOR 
 (1980-1989)  (1980-1989)   (1990-2008)  (1990-2008) (1990-2008) Change 
South Africa 0.20 2 0.05 0.20 1 -0.15 
Algeria 0.40 4 0.11 0.17 2 -0.29 
Botswana 0.40 4 0.11 0.20 2 -0.29 
Egypt 0.30 3 0.11 0.25 2 -0.19 
Ghana 0.20 2 0.11 0.25 2 -0.09 
Mozambique 0.20 2 0.11 0.20 2 -0.09 
Tunisia 0.40 4 0.11 0.17 2 -0.29 
Uganda 0.20 2 0.11 0.20 2 -0.09 
Zimbabwe 0.10 1 0.11 0.20 2 0.01 
Ethiopia 0.10 1 0.16 0.20 3 0.06 
Nigeria 0.10 1 0.16 0.20 3 0.06 
Tanzania 0.10 1 0.16 0.20 3 0.06 
Zambia 0.50 5 0.16 0.20 3 -0.34 
Kenya 0.20 2 0.21 0.25 4 0.01 
Malawi 0.30 3 0.21 0.20 4 -0.09 
Mauritius 0.40 4 0.21 0.20 4 -0.19 
Rwanda 0.20 2 0.21 0.17 4 0.01 
Sudan 0.30 3 0.21 0.20 4 -0.09 
Angola 0.30 3 0.42 0.20 5 0.12 
Mauritania 0.40 4 0.47 0.20 6 0.07 
Average 0.27  0.18 0.20  -0.09 
 
  Sources: Cukierman et al. (1992) and our calculations for 1980-1989 figures. Our calculations for the 1990-2008 figures.  
  
Figure 2.5: Factual Independence Cross-Country Variations (1990-2008) 
 
 Source: Calculated from central bank databases. 
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Table 2.9: Factual Independence Ratings for Benchmark Central Banks (1980-2008) 
Country Name of  
Central Bank 
Actual TOR  
(1980-1989) 
Actual TOR  
(1990-2008) 
Change in  
Actual TOR  
Australia Reserve Bank of Australia 0.10 0.16   0.06 
Canada Bank of Canada 0.10 0.16   0.06 
Germany Bundesbank 0.10 0.26   0.16 
New Zealand Reserve Bank of New Zealand 0.30 0.11  -0.19 
United Kingdom Bank of England  0.10 0.16    0.06 
United States of America Federal Reserve Bank  0.10 0.11    0.01 
Sample Average   0.13 0.16    0.03 
 
    Sources: Cukierman et al. (1992) for 1980-1989 figures and own calculations for the 1990-2008 figures. 
Table 2.8 suggests that average factual CBI is high over 1990-2008. The sample annual average 
actual TOR of 0.18, against the average threshold TOR of 0.20 suggests high factual CBI. Over 
1980-1989, actual TOR is greater than the threshold TOR, implying low factual CBI. Over 1990-
2008, actual TOR is less than the threshold TOR, implying high CBI. Factual CBI improved 
from 1980-1989 to 1990-2008. The decline in TOR by 0.09 points or 33.33%, from 0.27 over 
1980-1989 to 0.18 over 1990-2008 suggests improvement in factual CBI. Out of the 20 CBs, 12 
improved. This represents 60% improvement in factual CBI. The annual average TOR declined 
for most African countries, except for the National Bank of Angola and the Central Bank of 
Mauritania. The decline in TOR is consistent with findings in Dreher et al. (2007), which suggest 
that actual TOR declined in the last years of the study period, 1970-2005, for the group of SSA 
countries. DeHaan and Klomp (2010) show that for the African region in their sample (1980s-
2000s), the average TOR was 0.22 in the 1980s, 0.16 in the 1990s and 0.13 in the 2000s. This 
further suggests a general decline in TOR or improvement in factual CBI over the years. The 
general improvement in factual CBI is attributed to significant declines in TOR in specific CBs. 
For example, Zambia had the largest decline in TOR of 0.34 points or 68%. The TOR at the 
Bank of Zambia declined from 0.50 over 1980-1989, to 0.16 over 1990-2008. The Bank of 
Zambia country rank moved from 5 out of 5 cross-country ranks over 1980-1989, to 3 out of 6 
ranks over 1990-2008. Poor macroeconomic conditions in Zambia in the late 1980s were 
associated with high turnovers of the Bank of Zambia governors, who were dismissed for various 
political and economic reasons. These included unfavourable economic policy outcomes, failure 
of some domestic banks (public and private) and inability of the CB governors to rescue them, 
high inflation outcomes, poor monetary policy strategies, political regime change and alleged 
political influence on the Bank of Zambia (See Appendix 2.5). The high TOR in Zambia in the 
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1980s, which was associated with adverse economic conditions over 1980-1989, declined with 
improvements in macroeconomic conditions since the late 1990s. Other countries with 
significant declines in TOR include Algeria, Botswana, Egypt and Mauritius. 
The low sample average TOR is explained by several factors. These include low terminations 
and renewability of legal terms of office of the CB governors. Renewability is legally provided 
for in most CB Acts. As a result, most governors have effectively served 2 full consecutive 
terms. This implies a governor being in office for 8-10 years for most CBs and 12 years for the 
Bank of Algeria, Central Bank of Tunisia and the National Bank of Rwanda. Few governors 
voluntarily resign before the end of their legal term. The sample effective term ranges from less 
than one year to 15 years. The 15-year actual term was served at the Bank of Mozambique over 
1991-2006. The effective average term is 5.2 years and ranges 2-10 years. Over 1990-2008, the 
number of governors per CB ranges 2-11. The Central Bank of Mauritania had the highest 
number of governors of 11. The South African Reserve Bank only had 2. The South African 
Reserve Bank had no terminations and renewed terms. The low sample TOR could also imply 
subservience of some governors. Given that 36 governors had contracts terminated out of the 85 
that served over 1990-2008, the turnover rate is 42%. This is high and differs from TOR results.  
Figure 2.5 shows that the actual annual average TOR scores vary considerably across countries 
from 0.05 (highest factual CBI) in South Africa to 0.47 (lowest factual CBI) in Mauritania. The 
South African Reserve Bank has exceptionally low TOR of 0.05. Over 1980-1989, the sample 
average TOR ranged from 0.10 to 0.40. Over 1990-2008, TOR ranged from 0.05 to 0.47. The 
actual sample TOR range is 0.05-0.47, against the average TOR threshold of 0.17-0.25. The 
range is considerably wide. The range of 0.05-0.47 over 1990-2008 for this sample compares 
with 0.16-0.26 for the 6 benchmark CBs over 1990-2008. The wide range reflects considerable 
cross-country variations in political, economic and legal conditions. The wide cross-country 
variations in actual TOR is also echoed in Cukierman et al. (1992) for less developed countries. 
Only 6 CBs in the sample have low factual CBI, as reflected in the actual TOR that is higher than 
the threshold TOR. These include the Central Bank of Mauritania, Bank of Mauritius, Bank of 
Sudan, National Bank of Angola, National Bank of Rwanda and the Reserve bank of Malawi. In 
these CBs with high actual TOR, the results imply that the actual term served by the governor is 
less than the electoral cycle. This outcome makes governors susceptible to political influence. In 
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such cases, the governor may not be able to program long-term monetary policy strategies. In 
addition, a longer term enables governors to build their personal reputation in conducting 
monetary policy and CB credibility. The other 14 CBs have high factual CBI, with the actual 
TOR that is lower than the threshold TOR. The 6 CBs with low factual CBI over 1990-2008, 
compare with 10 CBs over 1980-1989. This outcome suggests significant improvements in 
factual CBI. The South African Reserve Bank has a low average TOR of 0.05. It is considered 
stable. The Central Bank of Mauritania and National Bank of Angola have extreme TOR values 
of 0.47 and 0.42, respectively. These suggest considerable lack of factual CBI. 
Table 2.8 shows that the sample annual average TOR of 0.18 over 1990-2008 in this paper, 
compares with 0.13 for the 6 benchmark CBs over 1980-1989, and 0.16 over 1990-2008 for the 6 
benchmark CBs. The comparative analysis with the 6 benchmark CBs suggests that factual CBI 
in Africa is still slightly lower than what attains in developed countries over both 1990-2008 and 
1980-1989. This outcome confirms the findings in Cukierman et al. (1992). The actual TOR of 
0.18 compares with 0.21 in CWN (1992) over 1980-1989, 0.21 in DeHaan (2001) over 1980-
1989, 0.21 in DeHaan (2001) over 1990-1998, and 0.18 in Dreher et al. (2007) over 1970-2004 
for the countries in our sample. However, the comparative analysis with these studies excludes 
Angola, Mauritania and Rwanda, which have high TOR in our sample. These 3 countries are not 
covered in previous studies. Comparatively, the Bundesbank, one of the most highly legally 
independent CBs with a legal term of office of the governor of 8 years, has the highest TOR over 
1990-2008. This implies a wide gap between legal and factual CBI. Our sample annual average 
TOR of 0.18 implies that every 6.5 years, a governor is replaced. Given the average term of 4-6 
years, this means most CB governors serve one actual term or do not complete the second term. 
The high TOR at the National Bank of Angola is explained by a combination of political and 
economic factors. These include excessive State Presidential control of the National Bank of 
Angola, high turnover of Ministers of Economy, passive role and weakened powers of the 
Ministry of Economy, high government need for monetization of fiscal deficits, lack of a clear 
separation of the role of the National Bank of Angola governors, who sometimes concurrently 
work as governors and Ministers of Economy, political dictatorship, governors who are made to 
by-pass the Minister of Economy and take instructions directly from the State President and 
general lack of coherence in banking. Angola has no clear separation between monetary and 
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fiscal policies. Hiring and firing is one important way in which the State President interferes with 
monetary policy operations. For example, between 1992 and 2002, Angola had 8 governors and 
8 Ministers of Economy. There is a high turnover of both governors and Ministers of Economy. 
Banking in Angola has been under too much government control. The capital markets are not 
developed. Consequently, there is high monetization of fiscal deficits. At the National Bank of 
Angola, actual terms of office are too short for effective implementation of monetary policy.  
Analysis of background literature on the CBs suggests that some African political authorities do 
not exert political influence through dismissals of governors, except in countries like Mauritania 
and Angola. They tend to avoid dismissals and use other less obvious and indirect means of 
exerting political influence. Some political authorities are reluctant to dismiss governors. The 
low sample average TOR in this case may indicate subservient governors in most CBs in Africa. 
Angola and Mauritania have a history of excessive political influence on their CBs. Their cases 
do not allow for policy consistency and long-term stability in monetary policy programming. 
Table 2.10: Legal and Factual Central Bank Independence Indices (1990-2008) 
Country  
CWN 
Legal 
Index 
 Country 
CBI 
Rank 
GMT 
Overall 
Index 
Country 
CBI 
Rank 
   Political 
   CBI 
   Index 
Country 
 CBI  
 Rank 
     Economic            
CBI 
   Index 
Country 
CBI 
Rank 
  Factual  
  CBI Index       
(TOR) 
 Country 
  CBI 
  Rank 
South Africa 0.59 1 0.59 1 0.50 1     0.69 1    0.05 1 
Tanzania 0.59 1 0.47 3 0.25 3     0.69 1    0.16 3 
Botswana 0.57 2 0.53 2 0.50 1     0.56 2    0.11 2 
Algeria 0.53 3 0.41 4 0.25 3     0.56 2    0.11 2 
Mozambique 0.52 4 0.41 4 0.25 3     0.56 2    0.11 2 
Kenya 0.51 5 0.53 2 0.38 2     0.69 1    0.21 4 
Nigeria 0.49 6 0.41 4 0.25 3     0.56 2    0.16 3 
Rwanda 0.49 6 0.41 4 0.25 3     0.56 2    0.21 4 
Tunisia 0.49 6 0.47 3 0.25 3     0.69 1    0.11 3 
Mauritania 0.48 7 0.34 5 0.13 4     0.56 2    0.47 6 
Angola 0.47 8 0.34 5 0.13 4     0.56 2    0.42 5 
Zambia 0.47 8 0.41 4 0.25 3     0.56 2    0.16 3 
Ghana 0.46 9 0.47 3 0.38 2     0.56 2    0.11 2 
Uganda 0.46 9 0.47 3 0.25 3     0.69 1    0.11 2 
Egypt 0.44 10 0.34 5 0.13 4     0.56 2    0.11 2 
Ethiopia 0.43 11 0.41 4 0.13 4     0.69 1    0.16 3 
Sudan 0.41 12 0.34 5 0.00 5     0.69 1    0.21 4 
Mauritius 0.37 13 0.47 3 0.38 2     0.56 2    0.21 4 
Zimbabwe 0.36 14 0.41 4 0.25 3     0.56 2    0.11 2 
Malawi 0.31 15 0.34 5 0.13 4     0.56 2    0.21 4 
Average  0.47 
 
0.43 
 
0.25 
 
    0.61 
 
   0.18 
   Source: Calculated from central bank Acts and other central bank databases. 
  Table 2.10 suggests that CBI ratings vary per index. There are also differences between legal and 
factual CBI. For example, the South African Reserve Bank has the highest levels of both legal 
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and factual CBI while the National Bank of Angola lacks both legal and factual CBI. Low 
factual CBI at the Central Bank of Mauritania is associated with high turnovers of State 
Presidents, who each somewhat hires his or her own CB governor. The National Bank of Angola 
has high turnovers despite that there is one State President over 1990-2008. The turnover of 
Ministers of Economy is high in Angola. The variations in CBI across countries reflects different 
political, economic and legal conditions. The difference between legal and actual terms of office 
for CB governors suggests a gap between the law and actual practices in the CBs. Political 
authorities seem to use CB Acts, CB terms of credit to government, hiring and firing of CB 
governors, to influence CBI. The TOR is affected by various factors, other than legal terms of 
office. Despite high legal and factual CBI, the South African Reserve Bank still needs to further 
improve legal CBI. The South African Reserve Bank Act needs to strengthen the conflict 
resolution mechanism between the South African Reserve Bank and government, further clarify 
restrictions on South African Reserve Bank credit terms to government in terms of the repayment 
schedule and maturity profile. Zimbabwe has high factual CBI as indicated by the TOR figures, 
which seems anomalous. It largely reflects potential subservience of the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe governors and political dictatorship. Some of the political and economic problems 
that Zimbabwe has experienced should have led to some dismissals. These include absence of 
rule of law, change of political regime, poor economic policies, high inflation, foreign and 
domestic currency shortages and pressures from the IMF and other international organizations. 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
We measured the degree of CBI in 20 African countries over 1990-2008. The results suggest that 
legal CBI is low but factual CBI is high. Political CBI is low but economic CBI is high. Both 
legal and factual CBI have improved since the early 1990s. Legal CBI has improved to levels 
slightly above what attained in developed countries in late 1980s. Factual CBI has improved, but 
it varies considerably across countries. To some extent, factual CBI seems to reflect subservience 
of governors in some of the African countries. We find a need for African governments to grant 
their CBs, more CBI. There is still room for some improvements. Specifically, we find a need for 
African governments to consider constitutionalizing CBI so that it is not easily violated by some 
political authorities. However, the effectiveness of the proposed constitutionalization of CBI 
would partly depend on how much the political authorities respect their national constitutions.   
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2.6 Appendices  
 
Appendix 2.1: CWN Legal Index Code Table 
Description of  CBI Variable Weight Code  
1.      Central Bank Governor (CBGC). 0.20 
 (a)   Term of Office (GTOF). 
  Over 8 years. 
 
1.00 
6-8 years. 
 
0.75 
5 years. 
 
0.50 
4 years. 
 
0.25 
<4 years. 
 
0.00 
(b)   Who appoints the central bank governor? (GAAT). 
  Governor appointed by the central bank board. 
 
1.00 
Governor appointed by the council of the central bank, executive branch and legislative branch. 
 
0.75 
Governor appointed by the Legislative body. 
 
0.50 
Governor appointed by the Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers). 
 
0.25 
Governor appointed by 1 or 2 members of executive branch. 
 
0.00 
(c)    Dismissal of the central bank governor (GDAT). 
  No provision for dismissal. 
 
1.00 
Only for reasons not related to policy or violation of law. 
 
0.83 
At the discretion of the central bank board. 
 
0.67 
At the discretion of the legislature. 
 
0.50 
Unconditional dismissal possible by the legislature. 
 
0.33 
Dismissal for policy reasons at executive branch’s discretion. 
 
0.17 
 Unconditional dismissal possible at executive branch’s discretion. 
 
0.00 
(d)   May central bank governor hold other positions in government (GOOF). 
  Governor prohibited by law from holding any other office in government. 
 
1.00 
Governor can hold another office only with permission of executive branch. 
 
0.50 
No rule against central bank governor holding another office. 
 
0.00 
2.     Policy Formulation (PFAA). 0.15 
 (a) Who formulates monetary policy? (MPFA). 
  Central bank alone. 
 
1.00 
Central bank participates but has little influence. 
 
0.67 
Central bank only advises government. 
 
0.33 
Central bank has no say. 
 
0.00 
(b) Who has final word in the resolution of conflict? (CFRM). 
  The central bank has final authority in issues clearly defined in the law as its objectives. 
 
1.00 
Government in issues not clearly defined in the law as the central bank’s goals or in case of conflict within the central bank. 0.80 
A council of central bank, executive branch and legislative branch. 
 
0.67 
The legislature, on policy issues. 
 
0.40 
The executive branch on policy issues, subject to due process and possible protest by the central bank. 0.20 
The executive branch has unconditional priority. 
 
0.00 
(c) Role in the government’s budgetary process (CBBG). 
  Central bank active. 
 
1.00 
Central bank has no influence. 
 
0.00 
3.      Legal Objectives of the Central Bank (CBPO). 0.15 
 Price stability is the major or only objective in the Act and the CB has the final word in case of conflict with other government objectives. 1.00 
Price stability is the only objective. 
 
0.80 
Price stability is one goal, with other compatible objectives such as a stable banking system. 
 
0.60 
Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting objectives, such as full employment. 
 
0.40 
No objectives stated in the banking charter. 
 
0.20 
Stated objectives do not include price stability. 
 
0.00 
                        (Appendix 2.1 continues on the following page) 
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Appendix 2.1 Continued:  CWN Legal Index Code Table  
Description of  CBI Variable Weight Code  
4.      Limitations on the Central Bank Lending to the Government (CBLC). 
  (a)   Advances -Limitations on securitized lending (CLGA). 0.15 
 No advances permitted. 
 
1.00 
Advances permitted but with strict limits (e.g. up to 15% of government revenue). 
 
0.67 
Advances permitted but limitations are loose (e.g. more than 15% of government revenue). 
 
0.33 
No legal limits on advances. Their quantity subject to periodic negotiations between government and central bank. 0.00 
(b)   Securitized lending (CLGL). 0.10 
 Not permitted. 
 
1.00 
Permitted but with strict limits (e.g. up to 15% of government revenue). 
 
0.67 
Permitted but with loose limitations (e.g. over 15% of government revenue). 
 
0.33 
No legal limits on lending. 
 
0.00 
(c) Terms of lending-maturity, interest and amount (CLGT). 0.10 
 Controlled by the central bank. 
 
1.00 
Specified by the central bank charter. 
 
0.67 
Agreed between the central bank and the executive. 
 
0.33 
Decided by the executive branch alone. 
 
0.00 
(d )Potential borrowers from the central bank (COBF). 0.05 
 Only the central government. 
 
1.00 
All levels of government (state as well as central). 
 
0.67 
Those mentioned above and the public enterprises. 
 
0.33 
Public and private sector. 
 
0.00 
(e)    Limits on central bank lending defined in (CBTL). 0.025 
 Currency amounts. 
 
1.00 
Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital. 
 
0.67 
Shares of government revenue. 
 
0.33 
Shares of government expenditures. 
 
0.00 
(f)    Maturity of loans (CLGM). 0.025 
 Within 6 months. 
 
1.00 
Within 1 year. 
 
0.67 
More than a year. 
 
0.33 
No mention of maturity in the law. 
 
0.00 
(g)   Level of interest on loans (CLRR). 0.025 
  Above minimum lending rates. 
 
1.00 
At market rates. 
 
0.75 
Below maximum rates. 
 
0.50 
Interest rate is not mentioned. 
 
0.25 
No interest on government borrowing from the central bank. 
 
0.00 
(h)   CB prohibited from buying or selling government securities in the primary market (CBPM). 0.025 
 Yes. 
 
1.00 
No.   0.00 
   Source: Cukierman et al. (1992)1.                                                                                                                    (Appendix 2.1 continued from the previous page) 
Notes 
The code table was reproduced from the Cukierman et al. (1992) paper. We only added the 4-letter code acronyms for CBI variables.  
We took the CBI variables, codes and weights as given by Cukierman et al. (1992), without modifications or extensions. 
                                                          
  1   Measuring the Independence of Central Banks and Its Effects on Policy Outcomes, The World Bank Economic Review, 6 (3): pp. 353-398. 
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Appendix 2.2: GMT Index Code Table  
Description of  CBI Variable CBI Variable Coding Criteria 
Political Independence  Variables 
CB governor appointment conditions. 
 
1 if not appointed by government, 0 otherwise. 
CB governor term(s) of office. 1 if explicitly appointed for more than 5 years, 0 otherwise. 
CB board of directors appointment conditions. 1 if majority of CB board members not appointed by govt, 0 otherwise. 
CB board members term (s) of office. 1 if all CB board members are appointed for more than 5 years, 0 otherwise. 
CB government representative. 1 if presence not compulsory, 0 otherwise. 
Price stability as statutory objective of the CB. 1 if at least among statutory objectives, 0 otherwise. 
Monetary policy formulation authority. 1 if no government approval required, 0 otherwise. 
Legal directives for policy conflict resolution. 1 if it strengthens the CB position, 0 otherwise. 
Economic Independence Variables 
CB lending to government (availability). 
 
1 if not automatic, 0 otherwise. 
CB lending to government (interest rate). 1 if at market interest rate or if lending not available, 0 otherwise. 
CB lending to government (limit amount). 1 if the amount is explicitly limited or if lending not available, 0 otherwise. 
CB lending to government (maturity profile). 1 if explicitly limited to one year or less, 0 otherwise. 
Purchase of government debt on the primary market. 1 if the CB is not allowed to participate, 0 otherwise. 
Discount rate setting authority. 1 if only the CB can set discount rate, 0 otherwise. 
CB bank supervisory role. 
Aggregate GMT Index  
2 if the CB not involved in bank supervision, 1 if responsibility is shared. 
Simple Average of Political Independence and Economic Independence Sub-Indices. 
 
Source: Derived from various studies on the Grilli et al. (1991) index and Grilli et al. (1991)2. 
 
Appendix 2.3: Latest Central Bank Acts 
Economy  CB 
Acronym Latest Central Bank  Act 
Where is CBI 
 Entrenched?  
Algeria BOA Ordinance No. 03-11 of 26 August 2003. CB Act only 
Angola BNA National Assembly Law No. 6/97 of 11 July 1997.  CB Act only 
Botswana BOB Bank of Botswana Act of 31 December 1996. CB Act only 
Egypt CBE Presidential Decree No. 64 of 2004.   CB Act only 
Ethiopia NBE National Bank of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 591 of 2008. CB Act only 
Ghana BOG Bank of Ghana Act 612 of 2002. CB Act only 
Kenya CBK Central Bank of Kenya Act (491) of April 1997. CB Act only 
Malawi BM Reserve Bank of Malawi Act of 1989; Chapter 44:02 of 2002. CB Act only 
Mauritania BCM Law No.73-113. The Bank of Mauritania Act No. 34 of 2004. CB Act only 
Mauritius  BOM Bank of Mauritius Act No. 34 of 2004. CB Act only 
Mozambique BM Bank of Mozambique Law No. 1/92 of January 3, 1992. CB Act only 
Nigeria CBN Central Bank of Nigeria Act No.7 of 25 May 1997. CB Act only 
Rwanda NBR Law No. 11/97 of 26 July 1997. CB Act only 
South Africa SARB  South African Reserve Bank Act of 1996 and Amendment Act 57 of 2000. National Constitution and CB Act 
Sudan BOS New Bank of Sudan Act of 2002. CB Act only 
Tanzania BOT Bank of Tanzania Act No. 3 Vol. 87 of  8th June, 2006.  CB Act only 
Tunisia BCT Central Bank of Tunisia Law No. 2006-26 of 15 May, 2006. CB Act only 
Uganda BOU Bank of Uganda Act of 14 May 1993 (Chapter 51).  National Constitution and CB Act 
Zambia BOZ Bank of Zambia Act No. 43 of 1996. CB Act only 
Zimbabwe RBZ Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act [Chapter 22:15], Acts 5/1999, 22/2001. CB Act only 
   
   Sources: Central bank databases and Arnone et al. (2008) database on central bank laws, http://marco.arnone.googlepages.com/central bank laws. 
                       
Notes  
     The respective central bank Acts are as at the last day of 2008 or 31 December 2008. 
                                                          
2 Grilli, V., Masciandaro, D., Tabellini, G., (1991), Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,   
Economic Policy,13, pp. 341-392. 
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                   Appendix 2.4: Original GMT Ratings (1990-2008) 
 C
ou
nt
ry
  
C
B
I  
V
ar
ia
bl
e 
A
cr
on
ym
 
So
ut
h 
A
fr
ic
a 
B
ot
sw
an
a 
K
en
ya
 
G
ha
na
 
M
au
rit
iu
s 
Ta
nz
an
ia
 
Tu
ni
si
a 
U
ga
nd
a 
Za
m
bi
a 
A
lg
er
ia
 
Et
hi
op
ia
 
M
oz
am
bi
qu
e 
N
ig
er
ia
 
R
w
an
da
 
Zi
m
ba
bw
e 
A
ng
ol
a 
Eg
yp
t 
M
al
aw
i 
M
au
rit
an
ia
 
Su
da
n 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
Index of Political Independence POLCBI 4 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 
Government does not appoint the CB governor 
CBGA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CB governor in office is more than 5 years CBGT 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government does not appoint CB board members 
CBBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CB board members in office for more than 5 years CBBT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government participation in CB board meetings CBBG 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Government does not approve monetary policy MPFA 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Legal mandate of price stability primary PSSO 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Conflict resolution mechanism exists LDCR 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Index of Economic Independence ECOCBI 6 5 6 5 5 6 6 6 5 5 6 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 5 
Direct CB credit not automatic 
CLGA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Market interest rates are charged on CB credit CLGI 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Temporary limited amount on CB credit CLGL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maturity of loans restricted CLGM 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Primary market participation by CB  OGDP 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Discount rate set by the central bank alone DRSA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Banking supervision responsibility of the CB CBSR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
GMT  Aggregate Legal Index GMT 10 9 9 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 7 
                       Country CBI Rank   (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (3) (3) (3) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (4) (5) (5) (5) (5) (5)   
                   Source: Calculated from latest central bank Acts.  
        
                   Notes 
                   The figures in parentheses are the CBI cross-country rankings. 
                   The cross-country rankings are done according to the aggregate GMT index scores.  
                   The discount rate is the central bank’s “Bank Rate” or the rate at which the central bank discounts first class bills.  
                We developed the 4-letter CBI variable acronyms in this study.  
                    In this table, with original GMT scores, the aggregate GMT index is a simple summation of the Political Independence Sub-Index and the Economic Independence Sub-Index. 
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             Appendix 2.5: Reason (s) for Premature Termination of CB Governors’ Contracts (1990-2008) 
Name of  
CB Governor      Period  
Name of  
Central Bank 
CB 
Acronym 
Termination  
Status 
Reasons for Premature 
Termination of Contract 
Pedro de Cunha Neto 1990-1990 National Bank of Angola  BNA Dismissed Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Fernando de Graca Teixeira 1990-1990 National Bank of Angola  BNA Dismissed Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Sebastiao Bastos Lavrador 1992-1993 National Bank of Angola  BNA Reassigned Reassigned to a government Ministerial post. 
Generoso de Almeida 1993-1995 National Bank of Angola  BNA Dismissed Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Antonio Gomes Furtado 1995-1996 National Bank of Angola  BNA Dismissed Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Sebastiao B Lavrador 1996-1999 National Bank of Angola  BNA Dismissed Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Aguinaldo Jaime 1999-2003 National Bank of Angola  BNA Reassigned Reassigned to a government Ministerial post. 
Amadeu de Jesus C Mauricio  3003-2008 National Bank of Angola  BNA Dismissed Dismissed. 
Mr B Gaolathe 1997-1998 Bank of Botswana  BOB Reassigned Reassigned to a government Ministerial post. 
Mahdi Elfaky Elshaikh 1988-1990 Bank of Sudan  BOS Resigned Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Sabir Mohammed Hassan 1990-1993 Bank of Sudan  BOS Reassignment Reassigned to a government Ministerial post. 
Elshaik SidAhmed Elshaikh 1993-1996 Bank of Sudan  BOS Dismissed Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Abdalla Hassan Ahmed 1996-1998 Bank of Sudan  BOS Reassignment Reassigned to a government Ministerial post 
Mahmoud Abul-Ayoun 2001-2003 Central Bank of Egypt  CBE Dismissed Failed to deliver on inflation targeting policy as stated in the CBE Act. 
Mr Ato Sufian Ahmed 1997-1997 National Bank of Ethiopia  NBE Reassigned Reassigned to a government Ministerial post. 
Mr Eric Kotut 1989-1993 Central Bank of Kenya  CBK Resigned Collapse of several commercial banks, high inflation and corruption scandal. 
M Cheserem 1993-2001 Central Bank of Kenya  CBK Dismissed Undisclosed reasons and fell out favour with the State President. 
N N Nyagah 2001-2003 Central Bank of Kenya  CBK Resigned Failed to rescue investments in pension funds deposited with a failing bank. 
A K Mullei 2003-2006 Central Bank of Kenya  CBK Dismissed Corruption, improper tendering and abuse of office. 
F Z Pelekamoyo 1992-1995 Reserve Bank of Malawi  RBM Resigned Failure to take a government Minister's directive, which was financially unsound. 
Moustapha O Abeiderrahmane 1992-1993 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Undisclosed reasons Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Mohamedou Ould Michel 1993-1997 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Undisclosed reasons Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Mahfoudh Ould Mahamed Aly 1997-2001 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Undisclosed reasons Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Sid’E L Moctoar Ould Nagi 2001-2002 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Undisclosed reasons Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Yahya Ould Athighe 2002-2003 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Undisclosed reasons Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
B A Seydou Moussa 2003-2003 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Undisclosed reasons Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Ahmed Salem Ould Tebakh 2003-2004 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Undisclosed reasons Undisclosed (unknown)  reasons 
Z O M O Zeidane 2004-2006 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Resigned Resigned to take up State Presidential candidacy in national elections. 
Kane Ousmane 2006-2008 Central Bank of Mauritania BCM Resigned Resigned to take up major mine post. 
M D Maraye 1996-1998 Reserve Bank of Mauritius  BOM Resigned Undisclosed (unknown) reasons. 
Gerard Niyitegeka 1994-1995 National Bank of Rwanda  NBR Resigned Personal insecurity and state army security threats. 
D T S Ballali 1998-2008 Bank of Tanzania  BOT Dismissed Improper payment of funds from EPA account to 22 dubious companies. 
Mohamed Ali Daouas 2001-2004 Bank of Tunisia  BCT Dismissed Leaked a paper with list of most indebted business people, linked to politicians. 
Jacques Bussieres 1990-1992 Bank of Zambia  BOZ Dismissed Accused of pursuing previous State President's economic policies. 
Dominic Mulaisho 1992-1995 Bank of Zambia  BOZ Dismissed Accused of the depreciation of the Kwacha and failed to rescue failing banks. 
Jacob Mwanza  1995-2002 Bank of Zambia  BOZ Dismissed Undisclosed reasons and fell out of favour with new State President. 
Source: Central bank databases and IMF databases.  
   Note: In some cases, there is no clear distinction between a resignation and a dismissal. Some CB governors are diplomatically asked to resign, when the circumstances warranted a dismissal.  
             In some cases, reassignments may be politically motivated. They are not always for good cause.  
             Undisclosed reasons do not necessarily imply no reasons for dismissal but that the actual reasons are not disclosed because most likely they are politically motivated.
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           Appendix 2.6: Central Bank Governors and the Periods Served (1990-2008) 
Name of 
CB Governor    Country  
      Period 
      Served 
  Name of  
  CB Governor        Country  
 Period 
Served 
Hadj Nasser Algeria  1990-1996 I Ramphul Mauritius 1982-1996 
Abdelouahab Keramane Algeria  1996-2001 M D Maraye Mauritius 1996-1998 
Mohammed Laksaci Algeria   2002-date* R B Roi G C K Mauritius 1998-2006 
A G Furtado Angola 1990-1990 R Bheenick Mauritius 2007-date* 
Pedro de Cunha Neto Angola 1990-1990 E Comiche Mozambique 1986-1991 
S B Lavrador Angola 1992-1992 A Maleiane Mozambique 1991-2006 
Generoso de Almeida Angola 1993-1993 E Gouveia Mozambique 2006-date* 
A G Furtado Angola 1995-1995 A A Ahmed Nigeria 1982-1993 
S B Lavrador Angola 1996-1999 P Ogwuma OFR Nigeria 1993-1999 
Aguinaldo Jaime Angola 1999-2003 Chief (DR) jo Sanusi CON Nigeria 1999-2004 
Amadeu C Mauricio  Angola  2002-date* C C Soludo, CFR Nigeria 2004-date* 
H C  L Hermans  Botswana 1987-1997 A Rundizana  Rwanda 1985-1991 
B Gaolathe  Botswana 1997-1999 D Ntirugirimbabazi Rwanda 1991-1994 
L K Mohohlo  Botswana 1999-date* G Niyitegeka Rwanda 1994-1995 
Hamed Egypt 1986-1993 F Mutemberezi Rwanda 1996-2002 
Hassan Egypt 1993-2001 F  Kanimba Rwanda 2002-date* 
M Abul-Ayoun Egypt 2001-2003 C Lodewyk Stals South Africa 1989-1999 
F A El B El Okdah Egypt 2003-date* T T  Mboweni South Africa 1999-date* 
T Degefe Ethiopia 1990-1996 M  E  Elshaikh Sudan 1988-1990 
A S Ahmed Ethiopia 1997-1997 E SidA  Elshaikh Sudan 1990-1993 
A T Atinafu Ethiopia 1998-date* S M Hassan Sudan 1993-1996 
G K Agama                                Ghana 1988-1997 A  H  Ahmed Sudan 1996-1998 
K Duffuor                           Ghana 1997-2001 Sabir M Hassan Sudan 1998-date* 
P A Acquah                            Ghana 2001-date* G  Rutihinda Tanzania 1989-1993 
E Kotut Kenya 1989-1993 I M Rashidi Tanzania 1993-1998 
M Cheserem Kenya 1993-2001 D Ballali Tanzania 1998-2008 
N N Nyagah Kenya 2001-2003 B Ndulo Tanzania 2008-date* 
A K Mullei Kenya 2003-2006 M El Beji Hamda Tunisia 1990-2001 
N Ndung'u Kenya  2006-date* M Ali Daouas Tunisia 2001-2004 
Hans J Lesshafft Malawi 1988-1992 T Baccar Tunisia 2005-date* 
F Z Pelekamoyo Malawi 1992-1995 S Kiggundu Uganda 1986-1990 
M A P Chikaonda Malawi 1995-2000 C N Kikonyogo Uganda 1990-2000 
E Ngalande Malawi 2000-2005 E TMutebile Uganda 2001-date* 
V Mbewe Malawi  2005-date*  J A Bussieres Zambia 1990-1992 
A O Zein Mauritania 1988-1992 D Mulaisho  Zambia 1992-1995 
M O Abeiderrahmane Mauritania 1992-1993 J  Mwanza Zambia 1995-2002 
M O Michel  Mauritania 1993-1997 C M Fundanga  Zambia 2002-date* 
M O M Aly Mauritania 1997-2001 K Moyana Zimbabwe 1983-1993 
Sid'EL M O Nagi Mauritania 2001-2002 L L Tsumba Zimbabwe 1993-2003 
Y O Athighe Mauritania 2002-2003 G G Gono Zimbabwe 2003-date*  
B A S Moussa Mauritania 2003-2003 
   A S O Tebakh Mauritania 2003-2004 
   Z O Zeidane  Mauritania 2004-2006 
   K Ousmane  Mauritania 2006-2008 
   S Benhameyda Mauritania  2008-date* 
                               Source: Compiled from central bank databases and various other authentic databases. 
   
          Notes 
            *To-date refers to CB governors who were in post up to the end of the study period, 31 December 2008.  
             Their actual end of term of office date was therefore not yet known by the end of the study period, 31 December 2008. 
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             Appendix 2.7: Definition of Variables Used to Calculate CBI Indices 
Variable  
Acronym 
Variable 
 Definition  
Variable  
Type  
CB                    Central bank 
 CBI Central bank independence  
 CWN Cukierman, Webb  and  Neyapti index Overall legal index 
CBGC Central bank governor characteristics Sub-index 
CBPO Legal central bank policy objective  Sub-index 
PFAA Monetary policy formulating authority  Sub-index 
CBLC Restrictions on central bank lending to government  Sub-index 
GTOF Central bank governor’s legal term of office  Sub-index 
GAAT Authority that appoints the governor Sub-index 
GDAT Authority that can dismiss the governor Sub-index 
GOOF Other offices that the governor can hold in government  Sub-index 
PSOB Central bank price stability objective  Sub-index 
CFRM Existence of a policy conflict resolution mechanism  Sub-index 
CBBG Central bank role in government budget making process Sub-index 
CBGA Stringency of limits in central bank advances to government Sub-index 
CLGL Stringency of limits in central bank loans to government Sub-index 
CLGT Authority that determines the terms of lending central bank funds Sub-index 
COBF Circle of beneficiaries of central bank funds Sub-index 
CBTL Type of limits on lending central bank funds Sub-index 
CLGM Maturity profile of central bank loans Sub-index 
CLRR Restrictions on interest rates on central bank credit Sub-index 
CBPM Explicit ban on CB participation in primary market for government securities  Sub-index 
GMT Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini index Overall legal index  
POLCBI Political independence index Sub-index 
ECOCBI Economic independence index Sub-index 
CBGA Government does not appoint the central bank governor  Sub-index 
CBGT Central bank governor is in office for more than 5 years  Sub-index 
CBBA Government does not appoint the majority of the central bank board members Sub-index 
CBBT Central bank board members is in office for more than 5 years Sub-index 
CBBG Government representative participates on the CB policy meetings  Sub-index 
MPFA Government does not approve monetary policy Sub-index 
PSSO Central bank has a legal mandate of price stability Sub-index 
LDCR Existence of a conflict resolution mechanism in place Sub-index 
CLGA Direct credit to government is not automatic Sub-index 
CLGT Central bank credit is granted at full market interest rates Sub-index 
CLGL Temporary limit amount that the central bank can lend Sub-index 
CLGM Maturity limit for the central bank loans  Sub-index 
OGDP Central bank participates on the primary market for government securities Sub-index 
DRSA Central bank sets the discount rate Sub-index 
CBSR Central bank participates in bank supervision  Sub-index 
TOR Turnover rate of central bank governors Factual index 
TOO Legal term of office of the central bank governor 
 
                Source:  Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman et al. (1992).
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CHAPTER 3: EFFECTS OF CBI ON MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE  
3.1 Introduction  
 
A considerable amount of literature suggests that central bank independence (CBI) may enhance 
macroeconomic performance. This is because there are claims that CBI can assist countries 
achieve lower average inflation and reduce its variability, reduce the impact of political cycles on 
the economy (Nordhaus (1975)), foster fiscal discipline and enhance financial stability without 
any real additional costs or sacrifices in terms of reduced average output growth or an increase in 
output variability (Arnone et al. (2008)). This literature is broadly based on the time 
inconsistency theory of monetary policy (Kydland and Prescott (1977); Barro and Gordon 
(1983); and Rogoff (1985)), which suggests that independent central banks (CBs) are better in 
achieving lower and more stable inflation rates because they can resist political pressure.  
 
Despite the good attributes that some authors associate with CBI, however, there are counter 
claims that high CBI might not improve macroeconomic performance as it is commonly claimed. 
For instance, DeBelle and Fischer (1994) argue that monetary policy might not stabilize real 
output if the degree of CBI is excessive. The inflation-output trade-off may be widened by high 
CBI. DeBelle and Fischer (1994) claim that the sacrifice ratio could be high with CBI. There is 
still lack of consensus on the potential positive effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance.  
 
We measure the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance, which we define by the means 
and the standard deviations in inflation, economic growth and interest rates. We ask whether CBI 
matters for macroeconomic performance. We do the investigation for 20 African countries over 
1990-2008. The countries are Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We use the difference-in-difference (DID) method of 
estimation. This approach follows Ball and Sheridan (2005), who use the DID method to 
investigate the effects of inflation targeting (IT) on the means and standard deviations of 
inflation, economic growth and interest rates for 20 OECD countries over the 1990s. Ball and 
Sheridan (2005) find that IT improves macroeconomic performance, but that once they control 
for the regression to the mean (RTM), their results do not support the hypothesis that IT matters 
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for macroeconomic performance. Instead of IT targeters and non-targeters in Ball and Sheridan 
(2005), we focus on CBI reformers and non-reformers. Instead of IT, we focus on CBI. We go 
beyond the 1990s and include the 2000s, up to 2008. We use several descriptive DID statistics. 
The study is motivated by several factors. Firstly, there is conflicting empirical evidence on the 
effect of CBI on macroeconomic performance. Secondly, not much investigation has been done 
for African countries in the post-1989 period, which is associated with enhanced CBI. Thirdly, 
we take account that previous empirical findings have been plagued by several estimation 
problems, which partly make evidence inconclusive. These include endogeneity bias among 
variables, omitted variable bias associated with bivariate equations linking CBI index ratings in 
levels with macroeconomic variables of choice in levels (Posen (1995); Campillo and Miron 
(1997); DeJong (2002)), simultaneity bias, measurement error, reverse causality running from 
macroeconomic variables in levels to CBI ratings in levels (Posen (1993, 1995); Hayo (1998)) 
and subjectivity bias associated with CBI indices in levels (Forder (1996, 1998); Mangano 
(1998)). Subjectivity bias is associated with CBI variable choice, weights and codes.  
We make several contributions to the literature. Firstly, we use a new method of investigating the 
effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance, which is the DID method. This method enables 
us to avoid measuring CBI indices in levels. Instead, we use actual changes in legal CBI. We 
take this approach to reduce subjectivity bias, endogeneity and measurement error associated 
with CBI indices in levels. Secondly, we use a recent data set covering 1990-2008. Thirdly, we 
investigate the effects of CBI on 6 key macroeconomic variables. Fourthly, we explore the idea 
that the efficiency of CBI may depend on recent pre-reform period macroeconomic performance. 
Fifthly, we focus on African countries, where the institutional reform of CBs is not yet complete.  
The results suggest that CBI does not matter for macroeconomic performance. The observed 
improvements in macroeconomic performance over the study period are attributed to factors, 
other than CBI reform. We find that the recent past pre-reform and initial macroeconomic 
performance matter during reform. This is because pre-reform poor performers perform better 
than pre-reform high performers during reform. The results suggest some effect of the regression 
to the mean for inflation and interest rates. We conclude that governments in Africa need to do 
broader macroeconomic reforms, beyond and alongside CBI reforms. Institutional CBI per se 
does not seem to guarantee improved macroeconomic performance. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the measurement of the effects 
of CBI. Section 3.3 presents related empirical literature. Section 3.4 presents the methodology 
and sample data. Section 3.5 presents empirical findings. Finally, section 3.6 concludes. 
 
3.2 Measurement of the Effects of CBI on Macroeconomic Performance 
 
We use the DID method of estimation for several reasons. Firstly, it reduces subjectivity bias 
associated with CBI indices in levels (Forder (1996, 1998); Mangano (1998); Daunfeldt and 
DeLuna (2008)). Subjectivity bias is associated with the choice of CBI variables, their 
corresponding weights and codes. Secondly, it uses period average differences in 
macroeconomic variables, instead of their levels. The period averages have merit in that they 
reduce the unobservable time-invariant and country-specific fixed effects associated with 
macroeconomic variables in levels. Following Ball and Sheridan (2005), we presume that the 
behaviour of macroeconomic variables depends on country effects, period effects, country-period 
effects, and possibly on CBI status in our case. Thirdly, it reduces endogeneity bias associated 
with the relationship between CBI indices and macroeconomic variables if they are all measured 
in levels. Fourthly, it reduces endogeneity bias associated with the comparison of a heterogenous 
group of institutions like CBs across 20 African countries. Fifthly, it assesses the causal 
relationship between CBI and macroeconomic variables. This is better than simple correlation 
analysis, which some previous studies used and acknowledged the inadequacies. Sixthly, it is a 
simple application in impact assessment of public policy interventions like CBI. It is more 
accurate in measuring CBI because it considers actual CBI changes that have been implemented.  
We use the DID method mainly to avoid CBI indices in levels. Firstly, CBI indices in levels have 
the disadvantage that one CB can be ranked higher than another according to one criterion of 
CBI, but lower according to another criterion (Daunfeldt and DeLuna (2008)). As a result, 
aggregate ratings depend on the weights assigned to each criterion. CBI indices may rank equally 
independent CBs, differently. A particular CB can have different ratings, depending on the 
specific index used (Daunfeldt and DeLuna (2008)). Secondly, it is difficult to measure legal 
CBI in levels. Thirdly, the choice of CBI variables is unavoidably subjective and arbitrary 
(Cukierman et al. (1992); Forder (1996, 1998); Mangano (1998)). In measuring CBI by the DID 
method in this study, we do not attach quantitative scores as in most previous studies (DeHaan 
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and Van’t Hag (1995); Cukierman and Webb (1995); DeHaan and Siermann (1996); Bagheri and 
Habib (1998)). We only establish an authentic qualitative change in legal CBI status. We do not 
determine the magnitude of CBI. This approach therefore reduces CBI rating inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies associated with the legal indices in levels. 
The DID method has been used previously to investigate the effect of institutional changes on 
macroeconomic variables (Meyer (1995) and Ball and Sheridan (2005)). However, this method is 
conditional on time and group effects. It depends on the accurate determination of a CBI change 
and its effective date of implementation. These factors determine the extent to which the DID 
method reduces subjectivity bias in CBI analysis. It reduces, but does not completely eliminate 
subjectivity because the qualitative establishment of a CBI change is also, somewhat subjective. 
3.3 Related Empirical Literature  
 
There are some empirical studies that claim potential benefits of CBI for macroeconomic 
performance. These studies are based on empirical evidence suggesting that, on average, 
countries with highly independent CBs have lower inflation rates (Alesina (1988); Burdekin and 
Willett (1991); Grilli et al. (1991); Cukierman et al. (1992); Alesina and Summers (1993); 
Masciandaro and Spinelli (1993); Roll et al. (1995); Banaian (1995, 1997); Jonsson (1995); 
Posen (1995,1998); Campillo and Miron (1997); Fuhrer (1997); Crosby (1998); Eijffinger et al. 
(1998); Daunfeldt and Luna (2003); Gutierrez (2003); Jacome and Vasquez (2005); De Klomp 
and DeHaan (2007); Arnone et al. (2008); Cukierman (2008)). Alesina and Summers (1993) do 
not find any correlation between CBI and unemployment, real economic growth and real interest 
rates. Roll et al. (1995) support Alesina and Summers (1993) that low inflation can be achieved 
without real economic costs (Fujiki (1996)). These studies claim that CBI improves the 
likelihood of achieving a low inflation goal at no real economic costs in terms of output losses. 
However, despite the claims of beneficial effects of CBI, some authors have found little or no 
evidence on the macroeconomic benefits of CBI (Banaian et al. (1995); Posen (1995, 1998); 
Campillo and Miron (1997); Fuhrer (1997); Crosby (1998)). In a study of 70 less developed 
countries, Cukierman et al. (1993) find no correlation between CBI and inflation. In a study of 
26 former socialist countries in transition to market economies, Cukierman et al. (2002) do not 
find the hypothesized negative correlation between CBI and inflation, especially in the early 
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stages of economic liberalization. Posen (1993) argues that the observed negative correlation 
between the degree of CBI and inflation is illusionary because inflation and CBI are primarily 
determined by financial opposition to inflation. This finding suggests that CBI changes are 
implemented in countries where the financial sector is relatively influential. CBI change is more 
likely to be implemented in countries where public opposition to inflation is relatively strong 
(Posen (1993)). Some countries have improved macroeconomic performance before CBI reform.  
There is some empirical evidence suggesting that CBI and the commitment to a low inflation 
rule are jointly determined by social attitudes (Posen (1993); Forder (1996); Hayo (1998)). This 
suggests that CBI is an endogenously determined variable. It implies that independent CBs are 
successful in implementing low and stable inflation because their CBI reflects social attitudes, 
which support low inflation. Cukierman (1994) suggests that CBI change may be implemented to 
maintain low inflation and as a committing device against future uncareful policy makers. This 
implies that political policy makers implement CBI changes when they already have achieved 
low and stable inflation. In comparing implementation dates of CBI change with the long-term 
inflation trends for 29 OECD countries, Daunfeldt and DeLuna (2008) find that price stability 
was achieved in most countries before their CBs became more independent. Cukierman (1994) 
finds that CBI change can be used as an instrument against future uncareful policy makers. 
Empirical evidence on the hypothesized improved macroeconomic performance associated with 
CBI, is mixed and inconclusive. Empirical results vary with countries, study periods, CBI indices 
and methods of analysis used (Banaian and Willett (1983); Bade and Parkin (1985); Alesina 
(1988); Grilli et al. (1991); Cukierman (1992); Cukierman et al. (1992); Alesina and Summers 
(1993); Cukierman and Webb (1995); Eijffinger and DeHaan (1996); Dolmas et al. (2000); 
Neyapti (2003); Diana and Sidiropoulos (2003); Down and Siklos (2004)). Studies that confirm 
the negative relationship between CBI and inflation do so using legal indices for developed 
countries and factual indices for less developed countries (Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et 
al. (1992)). This suggests that legal indices are appropriate in developed countries and factual 
indices are appropriate in less developed countries. None of these previous studies uses the DID 
method for the investigations. It is therefore difficult for us to compare the results from this study 
to these previous studies, which are based on different methods of investigation. However, the 
previous studies still give us some important insights on the key issues being investigated. 
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3.4 Methodology and Sample Data 
 
We test the null hypothesis that CBI does not matter for macroeconomic performance. The 
alternative hypothesis is that CBI matters for macroeconomic performance. Our sample is 
limited to 20 African countries for several reasons. Firstly, we exclude countries that belong to 
monetary unions or arrangements, except lead countries like South Africa in the CMA region of 
Southern Africa. This is because in a monetary union or arrangement, the broad monetary policy 
stance is determined by the monetary grouping as opposed to individual countries. Secondly, we 
exclude countries that are not strategic in CBI analysis. Thirdly, we considered data availability 
and consistency. Our analysis starts from 1990 for several reasons. Firstly, by 1990, all the 
selected CBs were already operating. Secondly, CBI became more topical in the 1990s. Thirdly, 
before the 1990s, some of the countries had dictatorships. The concept of CBI is less plausible 
under dictatorship. The end of the study period, 2008, was determined by data availability on the 
macroeconomic variables of choice, which include inflation, economic growth and interest rates. 
To determine the CBI status for each country, we use the CB Acts, Act amendments, CB official 
publications and country constitutions covering 1990-2008. The cited Acts are those that grant 
CBs, more CBI. We use country constitutions because in some countries, CBI is constitutionally 
granted. The effective CBI dates for each country are shown in appendix 3.1. The main sources 
of the Acts include CB databases and the Arnone et al. (2008) database on CB laws. This is 
available on http://marco.arnone.googlepages.com/centralbanklaws. The 20 CBs are listed in the 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter Central Bank Directory (2004). We filled the data gaps on the legal 
changes in CBI through e-mail correspondence with the CBs. We used a questionnaire to obtain 
the missing information and to get some clarifications on some CBs. We directed the 
questionnaire to monetary policy and legal experts in the respective CBs. We only asked 4 key 
questions (See Appendix 3.4). These related to whether a legal institutional change that granted 
the CB, more CBI was made or not, effective date of implementation, nature of the legislative 
change and its sources for reference. For additional information on CBI status, we also consulted 
the Daunfeldt et al. (2008) database on the CBI classification of 132 countries over 1980-2005. 
For the key macroeconomic variables, we measure inflation by the annualized change in the 
consumer price index (CPI). Although narrowly defined, the CPI is a common measure of prices 
that has been used in most previous studies. We measure the rate of real economic growth by the 
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annualized change in the real gross domestic product (GDP). We define the interest rate by the 
annual nominal lending rate. We measure variability in macroeconomic variables by the standard 
deviation of the respective macroeconomic variables. The data frequency is annual. We calculate 
period averages in macroeconomic variables as simple averages. We use the Bank of Ghana 
databases and linear interpolation to close interest rate data gaps for Ghana. The main sources for 
macroeconomic data are the respective CBs, African Development Bank (AfDB), International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) databases.  
We establish the effective date of implementation of a major legal CBI change in each country. 
The effective date marks the legal granting of more CBI by the legislature. Following Ball and 
Sheridan (2005), we use the effective date of implementation as opposed to the announcement 
date. This is because implementation can still be delayed after announcement. We depart from 
the approach by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Scheater et al. (2000), who use the announcement 
date. We use the long date, which includes the effective month of the CBI change. We do this to 
ascertain the actual CBI implementation dates. We define the effective date as not less than a full 
quarter (3 months) from the end of the effective implementation year. This implies that countries 
that reformed from October to December are considered as having effectively reformed the 
following calendar year. This is because a late reform, say in December may only have impact in 
the following calendar year. This also depends on the specific macroeconomic variables of 
choice. The speed of impact may likely differ among inflation, interest rates and economic 
growth variables. The impact may also depend on the exact nature of the CBI change. Some 
changes do not have much impact, while others have significant impact. Some impacts take time 
to be realized in the general economy, while others may be realized within a short period.  
We only consider legal institutional changes in CBs, which are implemented to enhance legal 
CBI. The relevant changes reduce the dynamic inconsistency of monetary policy and inflation 
bias. They formally decrease the influence of elected political authorities on the conduct of 
monetary policy. We focus on effective CBI changes as opposed to the probability of occurrence 
of such changes. This is because it is the actual change in CBI, as opposed to the probability of 
change that should matter for macroeconomic performance. The reforms are measured as 
changes in CBI as opposed to CBI index ratings in levels, which are prone to subjectivity bias 
and arbitrariness (Forder (1996, 1998) and Mangano (1998)). We do not consider the magnitude 
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of change. We only establish a reasonable and authentic claim of a change in CBI, using the 
established criteria. The relevant CBI changes are irreversible or only reversible with difficulty 
(Daunfeldt et al. (2008)). We denote the change by a qualitative CBI dummy variable (Di). We 
identify CBI changes through reading of CB Acts, Act amendments, CB official publications and 
country constitutions over 1990-2008. To identify the actual CBI changes, we use the 15 CBI 
variables in Grilli et al. (1991) and the 16 CBI variables in Cukierman et al. (1992) as guidelines 
in reading the statutes. Among other CBI aspects, the relevant legal change:   
• Safeguards the low inflation goal or price stability objective in CB legislation;  
• Reduces the possibility for government to over-ride CB decisions on its operating targets; 
• Restricts government opportunities to use CB credit to finance fiscal deficits;  
• Reduces the powers and possibilities of political authorities to dismiss CB governors; and 
• Increases the terms in office of the CB governors and the number of members of the CB’s 
governing body, which is responsible for monetary policy.  
We divide the sample into reformers (1) and non-reformers (0). We divide the study period into 
pre-reform and post-reform periods. The reformers are the policy intervention group. The non-
reformers are the control group. CBI is the policy intervention. We identify CBI reform status by 
Di for country i, where i=1,2,3…20. Di is a binary variable, which takes value 1 if country i is a 
reformer and 0 if country i is a non-reformer. We assume that the accorded CBI status and the 
composition of reformers and non-reformers are stable throughout the study period, 1990-2008.  
We make additional restrictions in the determination of CBI reform status. We classify early 
reformers as reformers and extend backwards, their pre-reform period by some years, to create a 
reasonable number of pre-reform observations. We define the cut-off year for early reformers as 
2 years from the start of the study period. This implies that countries that reformed from 1990 to 
1992 are classified as early reformers. We classify late reformers as non-reformers. We define 
the cut-off date for late reformers as 2 years before the end of the study period (2008). This 
implies that countries that reformed from the last quarter of 2006 to 2008 are treated as non-
reformers. The 2-year cut-off date follows Ball and Sheridan (2005), who reclassify as non-
targeters, 2 countries that implemented IT in 1999 and 2000, respectively when the end of the 
study period was 2001. We confirmed the exact implementation dates with the respective CBs.  
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We divide the study period into pre-reform and post-reform periods, for both reformers and non-
reformers. We define the pre-reform period as the period before a major CBI change. We define 
the post-reform period as from the year in which the CBI change is implemented. The reform 
period starts from the implementation date of the CBI change. We establish a break year to 
divide the study period into pre-reform and post-reform periods. We define the break year as 
beginning from the year when a major CBI change was effectively made. For reformers, the 
break year is the year when CBI change was effectively implemented. For non-reformers, we 
calculate the break year as a simple average of the effective implementation years for the 
reformers. Accordingly, non-reformers have the same break year. For reformers, the pre-reform 
period starts from 1990 to the year before the effective reform year and the post-reform period 
starts from the year of reform for each country and ends in 2008. For non-reformers, the pre-
reform period starts from 1990 to the year before the calculated non-reform break year and the 
post-reform period starts from the effective calculated break year and ends in 2008.  
Preliminarily and for the derivation of some of the key descriptive statistics, we use the DID 
estimate to measure the effect of CBI change on macroeconomic performance. The DID estimate 
identifies the impact of CBI from the differential change in average macroeconomic performance 
between (i) reformers and non-reformers and between the (ii) pre-reform and the post-reform 
periods, in absolute and in percentage terms. We define the DID estimate in equation 3.1.  
  
Where  is the DID estimate, X is the period annual simple average macroeconomic variable 
of choice. The macroeconomic variables are the means and standard deviations in inflation, 
economic growth and interest rates.  is the average performance of reformers in the 
post-reform period,  is the average performance of reformers in the pre-reform period, 
is the average performance of non-reformers in the post-reform period and 
is the average performance of non-reformers in the pre-reform period. In 
percentage terms, if the DID estimate is positive, reformers perform better than non-reformers. If 
negative, non-reformers perform better. If 0, reformers and non-reformers perform equally the 
same. We calculate DID estimates for high and low pre-reform performers as part of the country 
sensitivity analysis, which controls for the RTM. We report the outcomes in tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
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3.4.1 Empirical Regression Equations 
We measure the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance in equations 3.2-3.5b. The target 
explanatory variable is Di, with the target coefficient, α1. We estimate equations 3.2-3.4 for the 
whole sample, equation 3.5a for low performers and equation 3.5b for high performers. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Where  is pre-reform annual average macroeconomic performance in country i, is 
post-reform annual average macroeconomic performance in country i, Di is the CBI dummy 
variable for country i and  is the error term. Xi0 is the sample average first year value of X. L 
and H represent low and high performers, respectively.  is the post-reform average 
macroeconomic performance in country i where i is a low performer.  is the pre-reform 
average macroeconomic performance in country i where i is a low performer.  is the post-
reform average macroeconomic performance in country i where i is a high performer.  is the 
pre-reform average macroeconomic performance in country i is a high performer. α0 and α1 are 
the equation parameters. The coefficient on Di (α1) measures the effect of CBI on average 
macroeconomic performance (Xi). The null hypothesis that CBI does not matter for 
macroeconomic performance is rejected if  is significantly different from 0. Apriori, α1>0. If, 
the null hypothesis (H0) is rejected, then CBI matters for macroeconomic performance.  
The coefficient on Di (α1) in equation 3.2, might be spurious, produce biased parameter estimates 
and give an impression that CBI matters for macroeconomic performance. This is because 
equation 3.2 does not control for the regression to the mean (RTM), which is potentially likely 
because there is considerable cross-country variation in inflation and interest rate data. In this 
case, values above average may pull values close to the average. In addition, during CBI reform, 
low performers might improve macroeconomic performance by more than high performers, 
regardless of their current macroeconomic policies. To control for the RTM, and following Ball 
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and Sheridan (2005), we add Xipre as an additional explanatory variable in equation 3.3, where 
the coefficient on Di (α1), now measures the effect of CBI, given Xipre. The null hypothesis that 
CBI does not matter for macroeconomic performance is rejected if α1 is significantly different 
from 0. Apriori, α1>0. If α1 is significant, then a reformer with pre-reform poor macroeconomic 
performance improves more than a non-reformer with equally poor pre-reform performance. 
This difference measures the true effect of CBI on macroeconomic performance.  
Equation 3.3 may be affected by endogeneity bias. This is because Xipre, which appears in the 
dependent variable, Xipre-Xipost, and is also an independent variable, might be correlated with the 
error term ( . To reduce potential endogeneity associated with Xipre in equation 3.3, we use 
country i’s macroeconomic performance in the first year (Xi0) instead of Xipre. This is because it 
is likely that some countries might have been able to improve on initial macroeconomic 
performance already in the later years of the pre-reform period. Unlike Ball and Sheridan (2005), 
we account for initial macroeconomic performance (Xi0). We use Xi0 to account for transitory 
factors on macroeconomic performance. Transitory effects disappear over time. We measure the 
effect of CBI on macroeconomic performance, given Xi0 in equation 3.4, where the coefficient 
on Di (α1) now measures the effect of CBI on macroeconomic performance, given Xi0. The first 
year is the initial year of the study period, 1990. The null hypothesis that CBI does not matter for 
macroeconomic performance is rejected if  is significantly different from 0. Apriori, α1>0. 
Notably, Xi0 may also not adequately control for the RTM. This is because some countries might 
have been able to improve on initial macroeconomic performance already in the later years of the 
pre-reform period. We go a step further in controlling for the RTM. We account for the 
possibility that recent pre-reform macroeconomic performance could affect the impact of CBI. 
Unlike Ball and Sheridan (2005), we do a country sensitivity analysis. We divide the sample into 
low and high performers. We reclassify countries using Xipre. We remove outliers first. We use 
Xipre to determine cut-off points. We characterize low performers by pre-reform high inflation 
and its variability, low growth and high growth variability, high interest rate and its variability. 
We characterize high performers by pre-reform low inflation and its variability, high growth and 
low growth variability, low interest rates and its variability. We now identify countries by their 
CBI status and pre-reform macroeconomic performance status. We regress Di on Xipre-Xipost. We 
estimate equations 3.5a and 3.5b for low and high performers, respectively. The null hypothesis 
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that CBI does not matter for macroeconomic performance is rejected if  is significantly 
different from 0. Apriori, α1>0. This measures the efficiency of CBI in the different countries. 
Some literature suggests that the decision to reform a CB is potentially endogenous (Cukierman 
et al. (1992); Daunfeldt et al. (2008); Daunfeldt and DeLuna (2008)). Thus, the CBI dummy 
variable (Di) in our regression estimations, might also be endogenous, resulting in biased 
parameter estimates. This is because the probability of a CBI reform might generally increase 
with pre-reform macroeconomic performance (Xipre), causing correlation with the error term ( . 
To reduce potential endogeneity bias associated with Di, in place of Di, we could alternatively 
use (i) instrumental variables for Di, (ii) predicted values of Di ( i) or (iii) past legal CBI scores, 
CBIpre (Willard (2006)). However, we do not find appropriate instrumental variables for Di. 
Following Daunfeldt et al. (2008), we experiment with the English language dummy variable 
(Ei), which takes value 1 if English is the main official language in country i, and 0 otherwise. Ei 
is appropriate because macroeconomic performance is unlikely to be affected by language. 
However, we subsequently drop Ei in our regression estimations because the classification of our 
sampled countries according to Ei gives almost the same average value as with Di. The sample 
average of Di is 0.70 and the sample average of Ei is 0.72. We get almost similar results and 
conclusions as with Di. Past CBI scores are endogenous, subjective and arbitrarily determined 
(Mangano (1998)). We initially avoided these problems by using Di instead of legal CBI scores 
in levels. Predicted values of Di imply future changes in CBI, as opposed to what has already 
occurred as we initially set to do. Our focus is on actual CBI changes. Given the constraints 
cited, we therefore do not control for Di’s own potential endogeneity bias in this study. We only 
indicate its possible effects on our results. We leave the exploration of the suggested alternative 
possibilities for any further research on the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance.  
3.4.2 Regression Estimation Technique  
 
We estimate cross-country regression equations. We use period average macroeconomic 
variables, denoted by, Xi. These include the means and standard deviations in inflation, real 
economic growth and interest rates. The original data frequency is annual. The length of the 
average periods depends on the pre-reform and post-reform periods for each country. We 
estimate average inflation (and its variability), average interest rate (and its variability) and 
economic growth variability equations with the dependent variable defined by Xipre-Xipost.  
 
 
66 
 
We estimate the average economic growth equation with the dependent variable defined by 
Xipost-Xipre. We do the estimations in these formats in accordance with what the sample data 
suggests. For our sample data, inflation (and its variability), interest rate (and its variability) and 
economic growth variability are higher in the pre-reform period than in the post-reform period. 
Average economic growth is higher in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period.  
Given the constraints in identifying suitable instrumental variables to control for potential 
endogeneity of Di in the regression estimations, we then treat Di as exogenous. In the regression 
equations in table 3.7, we do not use other covariates in addition to Di, Xipre and Xi0. We follow 
Daunfeldt et al. (2008), who argue that other covariates are potentially plagued by a number of 
estimation problems. These include measurement error, missing data, outliers and endogeneity 
bias, which are common in such data for African countries. In addition to our small samples, we 
limit estimations to univariate and bivariate regressions. While Ball and Sheridan (2005) use the 
both Ordinary Least Squares and Weighted Least Squares, and weighted average macroeconomic 
variables, we use Ordinary Least Squares and simple averages of the macroeconomic variables. 
3.5 Presentation and Analysis of Results 
 
Out of the 20 countries, we identify 14 reformers (70%) and 6 non-reformers (30%). The 
reformers are Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The non-reformers are Angola, 
Ethiopia, Malawi, Mauritania, Rwanda and Sudan. The calculated break year for non-reformers, 
which coincides with the sample median year and the sample break year, is 1998. These 
outcomes hold, with and without the outliers. Some countries had once-off institutional changes 
while others had several. For example, Kenya and Nigeria had several legislative reforms. We 
only report major ones. Notably, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe was granted financial or fiscal 
independence in 1995. It was given its own budget and independence to manage it. The Bank of 
Uganda and the South African Reserve Bank were granted constitutional CBI in 1993 and 1996, 
respectively. In most other countries, CBI is not constitutionally granted, posing risk of potential 
violation. In a related previous study, Daunfeldt et al. (2008) find that 89 out of 132 CBs 
(64.42%) implemented CBI reforms in the period 1980-2005. This outcome confirms our finding 
of wide-spread CBI reforms in recent years (Arnone et al. (2008)). Table 3.1 shows the effective 
CBI reform years for the 20 countries and the detailed legislation is cited in appendix 3.1. 
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                  Table 3.1: Central Bank Independence Effective Reform Calendar (1990-2008) 
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                    Sources: Central bank Acts, Act amendments, country constitutions, e-mails to central banks and other relevant central bank publications.    
            Notes      
            *** denotes the effective date of a major CBI change.  1998 ### denotes the sample break year. 
            The sample break year is 1998, where the sample mean year coincides with the sample median year. 
To adjust for the difference between the announcement and the effective dates of CBI change, 
we shift the effective implementation dates for Botswana from 1996 to 1997, Mauritius from 
2004 to 2005, Nigeria from 1998 to 1999 and Zambia from 1996 to 1997. In addition, some CBI 
classifications require some qualifications. We still classify Tunisia that reformed at the 
beginning of 2006 as a reformer. This is because the CBI change became effective in May 2006. 
This was before the last quarter of 2006 according to the criteria defined in this paper. We 
classify Tunisia as a late reformer. We classify Algeria as an early reformer because the CBI 
change was effected in April 1990. Accordingly, we extend the pre-reform period for Algeria 
backwards to 1984. We do the backward extension to generate a reasonable number of 
observations for the pre-reform period. However, we exclude the Algeria pre-1990 observations 
from the graphical illustrations because we do not include pre-1990 observations for the other 
countries. The classification of countries into reformers and non-reformers is shown in appendix 
3.3. Table 3.2 shows the pre-reform and post-reform periods for the 20 countries. 
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Table 3.2: Pre-Reform and Post-Reform Periods (1990-2008) 
Country  
Effective  
CBI Reform Year 
Pre-Reform 
 Period 
Post-Reform  
Period  
   CBI Reform  
                  Status 
Algeria  1990 1984-1989 1990-2008 Reformer 
Uganda  1993 1990-1993 1994-2008 Reformer 
Tanzania  1995 1990-1994 1995-2008 Reformer 
Zimbabwe  1995 1990-1994 1995-2008 Reformer 
Kenya 1996 1990-1995 1996-2008 Reformer 
South Africa 1996 1990-1995 1996-2008 Reformer 
Zambia  1997 1990-1996 1997-2008 Reformer 
Botswana 1997 1990-1997 1998-2008 Reformer 
Angola 1998 1990-1997 1998-2008        Non-Reformer 
Ethiopia 1998 1990-1997 1998-2008        Non-Reformer 
Malawi 1998 1990-1997 1998-2008        Non-Reformer 
Mauritania 1998 1990-1997 1998-2008        Non-Reformer 
Rwanda 1998 1990-1997 1998-2008        Non-Reformer 
Sudan 1998 1990-1997 1998-2008        Non-Reformer 
Nigeria 1999 1990-1998 1999-2008 Reformer 
Ghana 2002 1990-2001 2002-2008 Reformer 
Egypt 2003 1990-2002 2003-2008 Reformer 
Mozambique 2003 1990-2002 2003-2008 Reformer 
Mauritius 2005 1990-2004 2004-2008 Reformer 
Tunisia 2006 1990-2005 2006-2008 Reformer 
   Sample Average=Sample Median       1998 
   Source: Derived from central bank Acts, Act amendments, country constitutions and other central bank publications.  
Table 3.2 shows that non-reformers have an equal post-reform period, 1998-2008. This is 
because they have the same individual break year, 1998. However, one major drawback 
associated with the DID method of measuring CBI is that the CBI dummy variable (Di) classifies 
2 very different forms of CBI change and assigns them the same value 1, and thus treats them as 
being equal in the estimations. We note that in practice, CBI changes vary in terms of magnitude 
and dimension. Some such changes are likely to be more effective than others in influencing 
macroeconomic performance, although they are all classified as major CBI changes. The 
variations in the dimensions of change potentially matter. Some CBI changes, though 
legislatively major, may not have much economic impact. As noted by Daunfeldt and DeLuna 
(2008), in a study of 29 OECD countries, there is still some element of subjectivity involved in 
the dating of the relevant CBI reforms. The effectiveness of CBI reforms may also partly depend 
on the design of the reform, its management, competence of the CB board of directors, quality of 
the CB economic research department, external shocks to the economy and the CB’s reactions to 
them and the strength of respect of the CB laws by the political authorities. CBI reform and its 
management may not be adequate in tackling the underlying causes of macroeconomic 
performance like unsustainable fiscal deficits, which are prevalent in most African countries.  
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3.5.1 Key Descriptive Statistics (1990-2008) 
 
In terms of inflation, economic growth and interest rates, we identified 2 outliers, Zimbabwe and 
Angola. Zimbabwe had negative annual average real economic growth for the entire study 
period. Both countries had outlying inflation and interest rate figures. They had 3-digit annual 
average levels, which could distort analysis if included in the estimations. We excluded the 2 
outliers from the key descriptive statistics and the regression estimations. The exclusion of the 
outliers reduced the total sample size to 18 countries, 13 reformers and 5 non-reformers. Table 
3.3 shows the classification criteria for high and low macroeconomic performers for the 
macroeconomic variables of choice after dropping the outliers. Since dropping the 2 outliers does 
not completely eliminate the wide cross-country variations in inflation and interest rate data, we 
expect the regression estimations to be affected by regression to the mean (RTM), where values 
above average tend to pull values close to the average. Accordingly, we control for the RTM. 
Table 3.3: Classification Criteria for High and Low Pre-Reform Performers (1990-2008) 
Macroeconomic  
Variable of 
Choice 
Pre- 
Reform  
Average (Xpre)  
High 
Macroeconomic 
Performers 
Low  
Macroeconomic 
Performers 
Average inflation  27.0%                        <27.0%                      ≥27.0% 
Inflation variability  10.0%   <10.0%   ≥10.0% 
Average economic growth   3.0%    ≥3.0%     <3.0% 
Economic growth variability   2.7%    <2.7%     ≥2.7% 
Average interest rate  23.0%   <23.0%    ≥23.0% 
Interest rate variability   3.4%    <3.4%     ≥3.4% 
Source: Derived from sample data. 
Although not shown in table 3.3, the classification of countries into high or low macroeconomic 
performers varies across the macroeconomic variables of choice. However, there are some 
countries that are either high or low macroeconomic performers consistently across all the 
macroeconomic variables of choice.  
Table 3.4 shows macroeconomic performance for (i) all the countries, (ii) reformers and (iii) 
non-reformers, for the pre-reform and the post-reform periods. We also show the first year 
macroeconomic performance for all the variables. We show the changes in macroeconomic 
performance in absolute and in percentage terms. We define macroeconomic performance by the 
means and the standard deviations in the macroeconomic variables of choice. These include 
inflation, real economic growth and interest rates. We compare macroeconomic performance 
between the sub-groups of the countries and the sub-periods of the study period.   
 
 
70 
 
                   Table 3.4: Means and Standard Deviations of Macroeconomic Variables of Choice (1990-2008) 
Macroeconomic  
 
All Countries 
  
   Reformers 
   
Non-Reformers 
 Variable of Choice Overall  Percentage Percentage Reform Percentage 
 
Percentage Non-Reform  Percentage Percentage 
 
Mean Change  s.d. Change  Mean Change  s.d. Change Mean Change  s.d. Change 
Pre-reform inflation  26.60 
 
10.05   25.13 
 
8.79   27.36 
 
10.58   
Post-reform inflation 10.16 -61.82 6.39 -36.44  9.57 -61.92 5.56 -36.71         9.29 -66.06  9.06 -14.33 
Average inflation performance 16.60 
 
4.94   15.48 
 
7.09   17.85 
 
 9.78   
First year inflation 65.00 
 
16.60   27.92 
 
10.28   18.60 
 
 5.60   
Pre-reform economic growth  3.25 
 
2.72    3.84 
 
1.50    2.67 
 
 4.98   
Post-reform economic growth  5.73 76.65 1.72 -36.82  5.35 39.51 1.18 -21.14  6.97 161.38  2.87 -42.32 
Average economic growth performance  4.73 
 
2.14    4.62 
 
2.72    4.93 
 
 3.87   
First year economic growth  2.89 
 
2.25    4.23 
 
1.47    0.00 
 
 3.93   
Pre-reform interest rate 23.01 
 
3.82   24.86 
 
3.42   18.52 
 
 2.20   
Post-reform interest rate 19.39 -15.77 2.70 -29.29 19.02 -23.49 2.79 -18.43 20.33 9.76  1.91 -12.99 
Average interest rate performance 20.72 
 
3.01   21.09 
 
3.09   19.56 
 
 2.05   
First year interest rate 20.24 
 
4.66   20.04 
 
4.32   14.03 
 
 2.66   
Average CBI Dummy Variable (Di)  0.70 
 
0.30     
  
    
  
  
Number of countries (n) 18       13       5       
                                            Source: Calculated from the sample data. 
                            
                               Notes 
                                 s.d. is the standard deviation of the macroeconomic variable of choice. 
                               The standard deviation measures the variability in the macroeconomic variable of choice, namely inflation, economic growth and interest rates.  
                               The first year is 1990.  It is the first year of the study period. 
                               The averages are calculated as simple averages, without weighting.  
  All countries exclude the 2 extreme outliers, Angola and Zimbabwe.  
  The overall mean is the mean for all the countries included in the calculations, after removing the 2 outliers, Angola and Zimbabwe. 
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Table 3.4 shows that all the countries, reformers and non-reformers, reduced average inflation 
(and its variability), increased average economic growth (and reduced its variability), reduced 
average interest rate (and its variability). Non-reformers performed better than reformers in 
reducing average inflation, in increasing economic growth and reducing its variability. 
Reformers performed better than non-reformers in reducing variability in inflation and interest 
rates. Average interest rates declined for reformers but they increased for non-reformers. In 
overall terms, macroeconomic performance improved because it is higher in the post-reform 
period than in the pre-reform period. This outcome gives an impression that CBI matters for 
macroeconomic performance. In a related previous study, Daunfeldt et al. (2010) find that CBI 
reform reduced average inflation by 3.95% to 4.68% in 89 out of 132 countries over 1980-2005. 
Panels 3A-3F show trends in macroeconomic performance for all the countries for the whole 
study period. The dotted line in panels 3A-3F is the trend line. The solid vertical line is the 
sample break year, 1998. Panels 3G-3R show the changes in macroeconomic performance for 
the (i) reformers and non-reformers and for the (ii) high and low pre-reform performers, for the 
pre-reform and the post-reform sub-periods. The solid vertical line in panels 3G-3R is the sample 
break year, 1998. At the break year, the sample mean year and the sample median year coincide. 
For each reformer, the individual break year is either before or after the sample break year. For 
the each non-reformer, the individual break year coincides with the sample break year.  
For robustness checks on the determination of the sample break year, we follow the rule of 
thumb by Daunfeldt et al. (2008), who suggest that the median sample year could alternatively 
be used as an additional sample break year. For our data, since the sample mean and median 
coincide, this takes account of the robustness check concerns. In this case, the mean and the 
median are systematically determined by the sample data (See panels 3A-3R). We avoided 
picking the break year randomly because CBI reform dates are not randomly determined figures. 
In addition, given our relatively small sample size, it is not feasible to establish several plausible 
sample break years because the break year determines the length of both the pre-reform and post-
reform periods. The established sub-periods have to be of reasonable length for meaningful 
analysis of the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance. The sub-periods have to qualify 
the reform criteria that we established for the analysis. Given the sample data features, we 
therefore present the results using one break year, 1998.  
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3A: Average Inflation                                   3B: Inflation Variability  
 
3C: Average Economic Growth                    3D: Economic Growth Variability  
 
   3E: Average Interest Rate                       3F: Interest Rate Variability  
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3G: Average Inflation (%)                                  3H: High and Low Average Inflation (%) 
  
3I: Average Inflation Variability (%)            3J: High and Low Inflation Variability (%) 
 
3K: Average Economic Growth (%)              3 L: High and Low Average Growth (%) 
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3M: Average Growth Variability (%)              3N: High and Low Growth Variability (%) 
  
3O: Average Interest Rate (%)                          3P: High and Low Average Interest (%) 
  
3Q: Average Interest Variability (%)              3R: High and Low Interest Variability (%) 
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Panels 3A-3R and tables 3.4 and 3.6 show that all the countries reduced average inflation and its 
variability, increased average economic growth and reduced its variability, reduced average 
interest rate and its variability. Generally, (i) non-reformers performed better than reformers and 
(ii) low pre-reform performers performed better than pre-reform high performers. Reformers 
reduced average interest rates while interest rates increased for non-reformers. High interest rate 
countries performed better than low interest rate countries in reducing average interest rates and 
its variability. For inflation and interest rates, there is a clearer difference in macroeconomic 
performance between low and high performers than between reformers and non-reformers. This 
difference is reduced for economic growth variables and is possibly explained by wide cross-
country variations in inflation and interest rate variables. The graphs suggest improvements in 
macroeconomic performance, which is higher in the post-reform period for most countries and 
for most macroeconomic variables. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the performance of reformers 
against non-reformers and low performers against high performers, respectively. 
Table 3.5: DID Estimates for Reformers and Non-Reformers (1990-2008) 
 Macroeconomic   Reformers     Non-Reformers Absolute 
 Variable of Choice (%) 
Post- 
Reform 
Pre- 
Reform 
Absolute 
Difference 
Post- 
Reform 
Pre-
Reform 
Absolute 
Difference 
DID Estimate 
( ) 
Average inflation 10.0 25.0 -15.0 (60%)  9.0  27.0   -18.0 (67%) 3.0 (-7%) 
Inflation variability  6.0  9.0  -3.0 (33%)  9.0  11.0     -2.0 (18%) -1.0 (15%) 
Average economic growth  5.0  4.0   1.0 (25%)  7.0   3.0     4.0 (133%) -3.0 (-108%) 
Economic growth variability  1.0  1.0   0.0 (0%)  3.0   5.0 -2.0 (40%) 2.0 (-40%) 
Average interest rate        19.0 21.0  -2.0 (10%) 20.0  19.0 1.0 (-5%) -3.0 (15%) 
Interest rate variability  2.8  3.4  -0.6 (18%)  1.9   2.2 -0.3 (14%) -0.3 (4%) 
Average in percentage terms   Improvement 
 
(24%) Improvement 
 
(44%)   (-20%) 
        Source: Calculated from sample data using equation 3.1.   
Table 3.6: DID Estimates for High and Low Pre-Reform Performers (1990-2008) 
 Macroeconomic    
High Pre-Reform 
Performers    
Low Pre-Reform 
 Performers  Absolute 
 Variable of Choice (%) 
Post- 
Reform 
Pre- 
Reform 
Absolute 
Difference 
Post- 
Reform 
Pre-
Reform 
Absolute 
Difference 
DID Estimate 
  )  
Average inflation 8.0 10.0 -2.0 (20%)  13.0 47.0  -34.0 (72%)    32.0 (-52%) 
Inflation variability 3.0 4.0 -1.0 (25%)  12.0 22.0  -10.0 (45%)     9.0 (-20%) 
Average economic growth 6.0 5.0  1.0 (20%)   5.0  2.0   3.0 (150%)      -2.0 (-130%) 
Economic growth variability 1.0 2.0 -1.0 (50%)   3.0  6.0   -3.0 (50%)   2.0 (0%) 
Average interest rate       14.0       16.0 -2.0 (13%) 26.0 34.0  -8.0 (24%)      6.0 (-11%) 
Interest rate variability         5.0 6.0 -1.0 (17%)  2.0  2.0 - 0.0 (0%)    -1.0 (17%) 
Average in percentage terms Improvement 
 
(24%) Improvement 
 
     (57%)    (-33%) 
        Source: Calculated from sample data using equation 3.1.  
Notes: Percentage changes (improvements) in macroeconomic performances are shown in parenthesis for both tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
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Table 3.5 shows that reformers performed better than non-reformers in reducing inflation 
variability, average interest rate and its variability. Non-reformers performed better than 
reformers in reducing average inflation, increasing economic growth and reducing its variability. 
In overall terms, non-reformers performed better than reformers. Non-reformers improved 
macroeconomic performance by larger magnitudes. This outcome suggests that CBI does not 
matter for macroeconomic performance. It gives an impression that non-reformers may have 
been more aggressive in taking strategies, policies or programmes that improved macroeconomic 
performance over the relevant period, than reformers did. This implies that improved 
macroeconomic performance could have resulted from factors, other than CBI. 
Table 3.6 shows that low pre-reform performers performed better than high pre-reform 
performers in reducing average inflation and its variability, in reducing average interest rates and 
in increasing economic growth. Low and high pre-reform performers did equally well in 
reducing growth variability. High pre-reform performers performed better in reducing interest 
rate variability than low pre-reform performers. In overall terms, low pre-reform performers 
performed better than high pre-reform performers. They improved macroeconomic performance 
by larger magnitudes. This outcome suggests that pre-reform macroeconomic performance 
matters for macroeconomic performance during reform. It gives an impression that low 
performers may have been more aggressive in taking strategies, policies or programmes that 
improved macroeconomic performance over the relevant period than did pre-reform high 
macroeconomic performers. The results suggest that pre-reform performance matters in this case.  
The key descriptive statistics suggest that macroeconomic performance improved over the study 
period in all the countries. We use regression analysis to measure the contribution of CBI change 
to macroeconomic performance, if any. Table 3.7 shows the regression results. In table 3.7, 
equation 3.2 measures the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance without controlling for 
the RTM. Equation 3.3 measures the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance, given pre-
reform macroeconomic performance (Xipre). Thus, in equation 3.3, we use Xipre to control for the 
RTM. Equation 3.4 measures the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance, given first year 
macroeconomic performance (Xi0). Thus, in equation 3.4, we use Xi0 to control for the RTM. We 
investigate whether CBI matters for macroeconomic performance. We examine the influence of 
past and initial macroeconomic performance on performance during CBI reform.  
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 3.5.2 Regression Results on Effects of CBI on Macroeconomic Performance (1990-2008) 
 
                     Table 3.7: Effects of CBI on Macroeconomic Performance (1990-2008) 
Equation Target Estimate Di  
 
Xpre X0  
  Average Inflation  Equation 3.2 
 
Equation 3.3 Equation 3.4 
  Intercept (α0) 19.8 (1.68) 
 
3.32 (0.62) -8.19***(-4.18) 
  CBI dummy variable (α1) -4.64 (-0.33) 
 
-12.36*(-2.07) 0.25 (0.13) 
  Pre-reform average  (α2) 
  
0.89*(8.54) 
   First year (1990) average inflation (α3) 
  
 0.92***(27.75) 
  R-Squared  0.01 
 
0.98 0.83 
  Adjusted R-Squared -0.06 
 
0.98 0.81 
  Inflation Variability  Equation 3. 2 
 
Equation 3.3 Equation 3.4 
  Intercept (β0) 2.22 (0.89) 
 
-0.57 (-0.43) -2.83**(-2.39) 
  CBI dummy variable (β1) 1.99 (0.68) 
 
-0.31 (-0.21) 2.67**(2.19) 
  Pre-reform inflation variability  (β2) 
  
0.50***(6.91) 
   First year (1990) inflation variability  (β3) 
  
 0.45***(8.79) 
  R-Squared  0.03 
 
0.84 0.77 
  Adjusted R-Squared -0.03 
 
0.82 0.74 
  Average Economic Growth Equation 3.2 
 
Equation 3.3 Equation 3.4 
  Intercept (λ0) 4.05***(4.16) 
 
4.05***(4.13) 5.82***(5.93) 
  CBI dummy variable (λ1) -2.27 (-1.93) 
 
-1.59 (-1.13) -1.50 (-1.50) 
  Pre-reform average economic growth (λ2) 
  
-0.16 (-0.90) 
   First year (1990) economic growth (λ3) 
  
 -0.71***(-3.08) 
  R-Squared 0.18 
 
0.49 0.22 
  Adjusted R-Squared 0.13 
 
0.42 0.12 
  Economic Growth Variability  Equation 3.2 
 
Equation 3.3 Equation 3.4 
  Intercept (γ0) 2.45***(3.53) 
 
1.61 (1.23) -1.93***(-2.90) 
  CBI dummy variable (γ1) -2.12**(-2.53) 
 
-1.58 (-1.43) 0.93 (1.64) 
  Pre-reform average growth variability  (γ2) 
  
0.21 (0.76) 
   First year (1990) growth variability  (γ3) 
  
 0.84***(7.59) 
  R-Squared 0.29 
 
0.91 0.32 
  Adjusted R-Squared 0.25 
 
0.90 0.23 
  Average Interest Rate  Equation 3.2 
 
Equation 3.3 Equation 3.4 
  Intercept (τ0) -1.82 (-0.57) 
 
-8.48**(-2.35) -9.06***(-2.75) 
  CBI dummy variable (τ1) 7.54*(2.01) 
 
3.46 (0.99) 5.10 (1.69) 
  Pre-reform average interest rate  (τ2) 
  
0.47***(2.75) 
   First year (1990) average interest rate  (τ3) 
  
 0.39*** (3.36) 
  R-Squared 0.21 
 
0.54 0.47 
  Adjusted R-Squared 0.15 
 
0.48 0.40 
  Interest Rate Variability Equation 3.2 
 
Equation 3.3 Equation 3.4 
  Intercept (μ0) 0.92 (0.86) 
 
-1.74 (-1.37) -0.87 (-1.24) 
  CBI dummy variable (μ1) 0.28 (0.22) 
 
0.87 (0.82) -0.07 (-1.00) 
  Pre-reform interest rate variability  (μ2) 
  
0.48***(2.91) 
   First year (1990) interest rate variability  (μ3) 
  
 0.54***(5.60) 
  R-Squared  0.00 
 
0.68 0.37 
  Adjusted R-Squared -0.06 
 
0.63 0.28 
  Number of countries (n= 18) 
  
 
     Source: Calculated by author. 
   The t-values are in parenthesis. *, ** and ** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.  X0 is 1990 average performance. 
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Equation 3.2 in table 3.7 shows that the coefficient on the CBI dummy (α1) is statistically 
insignificant for most of the variables. Equation 3.2 is not robust partly because it does not 
control for the RTM. Equation 3.2 shows that CBI is only significant in showing that CBI 
improved economic growth for non-reformers and reduced average interest rates for reformers. 
In equation 3.3, CBI is only significant in showing that non-reformers reduced average inflation, 
given pre-reform average inflation (Xipre). In equation 3.4, CBI is only significant in showing that 
reformers reduced inflation variability, given first year performance (Xi0).  
Equations 3.3 and 3.4, which control for the RTM, suggest some effect of the RTM in the 
inflation and interest rate variables. The equations show that while the coefficient on the CBI 
dummy variable is statistically insignificant, the coefficients on the pre-reform average and the 
first year values are statistically significant. The equations improve with the addition of control 
variables for the RTM, namely Xipre and Xi0. Equation 3.3 suggests the effect of the RTM on 
inflation and interest rates. The economic growth equations do not suggest much effect of the 
RTM. The cross-country variations in economic growth are lower than for inflation and interest 
rates. Generally, the results suggest that CBI does not matter for macroeconomic performance. 
Instead, pre-reform and initial macroeconomic performances seem more important.  
Table 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis for Low and High Pre-Reform Performers (1990-2008) 
Country Macroeconomic 
Performance Status  
Pre-Reform Macroeconomic  
Performance Status  
CBI Dummy Variable 
Estimate  
Average Inflation  ( ) 
High performers   Low average inflation countries 1.74 (0.50) 
Low performers   High average inflation countries -19.15 (-0.75) 
Inflation Variability  ( ) 
High performers  Low inflation variability countries 1.50 (1.09) 
Low performers  High inflation variability countries 4.50 (0.97) 
Average Economic Growth  ( ) 
High performers High average economic growth countries  -3.57*(-2.24) 
Low performers  Low average economic growth countries 0.85 (0.99) 
Economic Growth Variability  ( ) 
High performers Low growth variability countries -0.06 (-0.11) 
Low performers High growth variability countries -1.25 (-0.29) 
Average Interest Rate  ( ) 
High performers  Low average interest rate countries 1.65 (0.60) 
Low performers  High average interest rate countries   21.30*(2.32) 
Interest Rate Variability   ( ) 
High performers Low interest rate variability countries -0.99***(-4.71) 
Low performers   High interest variability countries  2.52 (0.63) 
 Source: Calculated from the sample data. The t-values are in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%,   
respectively. 
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Table 3.8 suggests that CBI only had significant positive effect in high average interest rate 
countries. Generally, the results suggest that CBI does not matter for macroeconomic 
performance. On average, pre-reform poor performers improved macroeconomic performance by 
larger magnitudes than pre-reform high performers.  
The overall results suggest that macroeconomic performance improved over the study period. 
The key descriptive statistics suggest that on average, (i) non-reformers did better than reformers 
and (ii) low pre-reform performers did better than high pre-reform performers in improving 
macroeconomic performance. The results suggest that CBI does not matter for macroeconomic 
performance. The improvements in macroeconomic performance seem to have resulted from 
factors, other than CBI. In some countries, macroeconomic performance improved well before 
the reforms and even began deteriorating in the later years of the reform, for some of the 
macroeconomic variables. The results suggest that past pre-reform period and initial 
macroeconomic performance have impact on macroeconomic performance during reform. The 
general improvement in macroeconomic performance may have possibly resulted from a number 
of macroeconomic convergence and stabilization programmes, which promote reductions in 
inflation and fiscal deficits, among other macroeconomic objectives. For example, the Bank of 
Ghana and the South African Reserve Bank are already inflation targeters, which support CBI 
objectives like price stability. These programmes and institutional arrangements like IT may 
have complemented CBI efforts. In addition, CBI is slow-moving process, some of its benefits 
may be realized over longer periods of time. CBI is generally considered less plausible where CB 
laws are weak. As pointed out by Cukierman et al. (1992), institutional CBI may not guarantee 
independent monetary policy in practice. The legal CBI status of the CBs, which we link to the 
macroeconomic variables of choice, may differ significantly from actual practices, resulting in an 
unsystematic and insignificant link between CBI and the macroeconomic variables.  
3.6  Conclusion 
 
We measured the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance in 20 selected African 
countries over 1990-2008 using the DID method. The results suggest that CBI does not matter 
for macroeconomic performance. We conclude that African governments need to do broader 
macroeconomic reforms, alongside and beyond CBI reforms. Other possible factors that could be 
explaining the trends in macroeconomic performance need investigation in future research.  
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3.7  Appendices  
 
Appendix 3.1: Major Central Bank Independence Reform Legislation  
Country  Acronym Year  Sources of CBI Reform Legislation Major CBI Reform Legislation 
Algeria BOA 1990 (http://www.bank-of-algeria.dz) and e-mail  Bank of Algeria Act of April 1990 
Uganda BOU 1993 (http://www.bou.or.ug) and e-mail Bank of Uganda Statute of May 1993 
Tanzania BOT 1995 (http://www.bot-tz.org) and e-mail Bank of Tanzania Act of February 1995 
Zimbabwe RBZ 1995 (http://www.rbz.co.zw) and e-mail Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Act of January 1995 
Botswana BOB 1996 (http://www.bankofbotswana.bw) and e-mail Bank of Botswana Act of December 1996 
Kenya CBK 1996 (http://www.centralbank.go.ke) and e-mail Central Bank of Kenya Act of 14 April 1996 
South Africa SARB 1996 (http://www.reservebank.co.za) and e-mail Act  No. 108 of March 1996 
Zambia BOZ 1996 (http://www:boz.zm) and e-mail Bank of Zambia Act No. 43 of December 1996 
Nigeria CBN 1998 (http://www.cenbank.org) and e-mail Decree No. 38 of 1998 and Decree no.37 of Dec. 1998 
Ghana BOG 2002 (http://www.bog.gov.gh) and e-mail Bank of Ghana Act of January 2002 (Act 612) 
Egypt CBE 2003 (http://www.cbe.org.eg) and e-mail Law No. 88 of July 2003 
Mozambique BM 2003 (http://www.bancomc.mz) and e-mail Law No. 1/92 of January 2003   
Mauritius BOM 2004 (http://www.bom.intnet.mu) and e-mail Bank of Mauritius Act of October 2004 
Tunisia BCT 2006 (http://www.bct.gov.tn) and e-mail  Law No. 2006-26 of 15 May 2006 
Angola BNA None (http://www.bna.ao) and e-mail None  (Non-reformer) 
Ethiopia NBE None (http://www.nbe.gov.net) and e-mail None  (Non-reformer) 
Malawi RBM None (http://www.rbm.mw) and e-mail None  (Non-reformer) 
Mauritania BCM None (http://www.bcm.mr) and e-mail None  (Non-reformer) 
Rwanda NBR None (http://www.bnr.rw) and e-mail None  (Non-reformer) 
Sudan BOS None (http://www.bankofsudan.org) and e-mail None  (Non-reformer) 
Sources: Central banks databases and e-mail correspondence.  
Notes 
We only report the major CBI-enhancing legislation.  Over the study period, even some of the non-reformers changed CB legislation, but some of 
the changes were not related to CBI or were not CBI-enhancing and are therefore not reported for this purpose. For countries that implemented 
several CBI changes, we reported the instrumental changes.  
 
Appendix 3.2: Effective Central Bank Independence Change Dates  
Country  
Year of 
Announcement 
Quarterly 
Date 
Full Date of 
Announcement  
Effective 
Year of CBI Reform 
Algeria 1990 1990:2 14-Apr-1990 1990 
Uganda 1993 1993:2 14-May-1993 1993 
Tanzania 1995 1995:1 17-Feb-1995 1995 
Zimbabwe 1995 1995:1 Jan-1995 1995 
Botswana 1996 1996:4 19-Dec-1996 1997 
Kenya 1996 1996:2 14-Apr-1996 1996 
South Africa 1996 1996:1 15-Mar-1996 1996 
Zambia 1996 1996:4 12-Dec-1996 1997 
Nigeria 1998 1998:4 Dec-1998 1999 
Ghana 2002 2002:1 24-Jan-2002 2002 
Egypt 2003 2003:3 16-Jul-2003 2003 
Mozambique 2003 2003:1 Jan-2003 2003 
Mauritius 2004 2004:4 10-Oct-2004 2005 
Tunisia 2006 2006:2 15-May-2006 2006 
  Sources: Central bank Acts, Act amendments, country constitutions and e-mail correspondence. 
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Appendix 3.3: List of Reformers and Non-Reformers (1990-2008) 
Country  
Name of 
Central   
Bank                           
    Central  
    Bank      
    Acronym 
   CBI 
    Dummy 
       Variable (Di) 
    CBI 
 Reform 
 Status 
 
Algeria Bank of Algeria                               BOA 1     Reformer  
Angola National Bank of Angola                BNA 0      Non-reformer  
Botswana Bank of Botswana                           BOB 1 Reformer  
Egypt National Bank of Egypt                 NBE 1 Reformer  
Ethiopia Central Bank of Ethiopia               CBE 0        Non-reformer  
Ghana Bank of Ghana                                 BOG 1 Reformer  
Kenya Central Bank of Kenya                   CBK 1 Reformer  
Malawi Reserve Bank of Malawi                RBM 0       Non-reformer  
Mauritania Central Bank of Mauritania            BCM 0       Non-reformer  
Mauritius Bank of Mauritius                            BOM 1 Reformer  
Mozambique Bank of Mozambique                       BM 1 Reformer  
Nigeria Central Bank of Nigeria                   CBN 1 Reformer  
Rwanda National Bank of Rwanda                NBR 0       Non-reformer  
South Africa South African Reserve Bank            SARB 1 Reformer  
Sudan Bank of Sudan                                   BOS 0       Non-reformer  
Tanzania Bank of Tanzania                             BOT 1 Reformer  
Tunisia Bank of Tunisia                                BCT 1 Reformer  
Uganda Bank of Uganda                                 BOU 1 Reformer  
Zambia Bank of Zambia                                BOZ 1 Reformer  
Zimbabwe Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe              RBZ 1 Reformer  
Sample Average  
 
  0.70   
 
Sources: Central bank Acts, Act amendments, country constitutions and e-mail correspondence. 
Notes 
Following literature we assume that the CBI reform status remains stable throughout the study period, 1990-2008 (See Daunfeldt  et al. (2008)). 
 
Appendix 3.4: Questionnaire to Central Banks  
 
Q1: Did your government make any central bank legislative (institutional) change (s) that granted your central bank, more legal independence in 
the period 1990-2008?  
      Answer: Yes                      or No   
      (Please tick the applicable                            Option). 
Q2: If the answer to Q1 is yes, in which year was the legislative change effectively implemented? Give the date in full using the format      
DD/MM/YYYY. 
Q3: If the answer to Q1 is yes, what was the exact nature of the central bank legislative change? 
Q4: If the answer to Q1 is yes, give us the sources of this information.  
Q5: You are free to provide any details on the issues covered in questions, Q1-Q4.  
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CHAPTER 4: FISCAL DOMINANCE AND CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE  
4.1 Introduction  
 
The relationship between monetary and fiscal policies is key in the conduct of monetary policy. 
This is because monetary and fiscal authorities operationally can compete for dominance, a 
practice which can easily result in sub-optimal monetary policy outcomes (Alesina (1988, 1989) 
and Forder (1998)). In some African countries, this relationship is argued to be commonly 
characterized by fiscal dominance (FD) of monetary policy. FD seems to be a key policy theme 
in the conduct of monetary policy in most African countries (Fry (1998)). FD refers to the extent 
to which fiscal deficits condition the rate of growth of money supply (Fischer (1998)). FD 
implies the subordination of monetary policy to fiscal policy (Fry (1998)). This is because under 
FD, monetary policy is largely driven by fiscal policy requirements (King and Plosser (1985)). 
The FD hypothesis implies that any arbitrary fiscal policy has to be accommodated by monetary 
policy, to ensure the solvency of the public sector (Grilli et al. (1991)).  
 
FD is generally considered to be high in Africa. This practice is explained by several factors. 
Firstly, the ability to obtain government revenues through the fiscal system is generally weak. 
Secondly, domestic financial markets are typically shallow. Thirdly, access to international credit 
lines is limited by low international credit ratings (Maxfield (1997)). As a result of these 
constraints, the financing of fiscal deficits is partly done through money creation by the central 
bank (CB). Some governments in Africa use their CBs as fiscal milk cows (Chandavarkar 
(1996)). Consequently, seigniorage revenue requirements tend to rise with growing fiscal 
deficits. Following Sargent and Wallace (1981), there has been debate that even an independent 
CB can be overwhelmed by excessive fiscal policies into monetization of fiscal deficits (Grilli et 
al. (1991)). Fiscal deficits are considered unfavourable for monetary policy. This is because it is 
generally understood that sooner or later the government will resort to money creation to finance 
the growing fiscal deficits (Miller (1983); Neyapti (2003); Mukhatar and Muhammad (2010)). 
There are claims that money creation can distort the distinction between monetary and fiscal 
policies, increase average inflation and its variability, increase average interest rate and its 
variability, reduce average economic growth and increase its variability (Neyapti (2003)). There 
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are also contrary claims that this may not always be the case (Burdekin and Wohar (1990)). 
These conflicting claims are subject to our investigation in the case of Africa. 
There are empirical studies that find that fiscal deficits are indeed monetized and have effect on 
macroeconomic variables (Dornbusch and Fischer (1981); Demopoulos et al. (1987); Burdekin 
and Laney (1988); DeHaan and Zelhorst (1990); Edwards and Tabellini (1991); Shabbir and 
Ahmed (1994); Metin (1998)). There are also studies that find that fiscal deficits are not 
monetized or find very little evidence of monetization of fiscal deficits. Such studies find that 
fiscal deficits do not have effect on macroeconomic variables (Joines (1985); King and Plosser 
(1985); Giannaros and Kolluri (1985); Protopapadakis and Siegil (1987); Banhart and Darrat 
(1988); Bilquees (1988); Burdekin and Wohar (1990); DeHaan and Zelhorst (1990); Karass 
(1994); Brown and Yousefi (1996); Sikken and Haan (1998)). Miller (1983) argues that even if 
not monetized, fiscal deficits are still bad for macroeconomic performance through crowding out 
of private investment. Empirical evidence on the monetization of fiscal deficits is mixed and 
inconclusive (Gordon (1977); King and Plosser (1985); Burdekin (1987); Demopoulos et al. 
(1987); Protoprapapadikis and Siegel (1987); Banhart and Darrat (1988); Willet et al. (1988); 
Burdekin (1989)). Empirical evidence on the degree of FD and its effects on CBI and 
macroeconomic performance is also mixed and inconclusive (Neyapti (2003)). Much of the 
evidence is from developed countries. Evidence from Africa only may differ to some extent.  
We investigate 3 main FD issues in this study. Firstly, we measure the degree of FD in 20 
African countries, over 1990-2008. The selected countries are Algeria, Angola, Botswana, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sudan, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. We benchmark against 
15 Asian and 11 Latin American countries. Secondly, we measure the effect of FD on CBI. 
Thirdly, we measure the effect of FD on macroeconomic performance. We measure 
macroeconomic performance by the means and standard deviations in inflation, real economic 
growth and interest rates. We argue that CBI may not be sustained if FD prevails. This is because 
of potential government pressure on the CB, to monetize the fiscal deficits (Cukierman et al. 
(1992); DeHaan and Sturm (1992); Pollard (1993); Fry (1998)).  
This study is motivated by several factors. Firstly, there is mixed and inconclusive evidence on 
the degree of FD in Africa, its effects on CBI and macroeconomic performance (Neyapti (2003)). 
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Secondly, since the early 1990s, most African countries have reformed their CBs in a bid to 
boost legal CBI. High CBI may not be sustained if FD prevails. This is because dependent CBs 
may not be able to resist government pressure to monetize fiscal deficits (Grilli et al. (1991)). If 
governments realize that there are only loose limits on their ability to monetize fiscal deficits, 
they may not limit fiscal deficit spending (Pollard(1993)). Thirdly, a number of African countries 
are muting inflation targeting (IT) as part of the disinflationary institutional arrangements. IT 
may not be feasible if FD prevails. Fourthly, in investigating the relationship between FD and 
macroeconomic variables, previous studies have not focused much on the role of institutional 
variables like CBI (Neyapti (2003)). Fifthly, previous studies have not focused much on African 
countries, which have relatively high fiscal deficits. Previous studies have focused more on 
developed countries, particularly OECD countries (Dwyer (1982); Giannaros and Kolluri (1985); 
Darrat (1985); Ahking and Miller (1986)). We seek to close some of these gaps in the literature.  
We make several empirical contributions to the literature. Firstly, we use recent data covering 
1990-2008. Secondly, we use an updated comprehensive set of 5 CBI indices to investigate the 
relationship between FD and CBI. Following Grilli et al. (1991), we measure CBI in political and 
in economic terms. Following Cukierman et al. (1992), we measure CBI in legal (de jure) and in 
factual (de facto) terms. In this case, CBI accounts for the institutional aspects of a CB. Thirdly, 
we use 6 key measures of macroeconomic performance. Fourthly, we use the 2-step system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) in dynamic panel data (DPD) for the regression 
estimations. This method is associated with Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). System GMM has several merits in this case. This method controls for unobserved 
country-specific fixed effects, controls for endogeneity bias among variables, persistence in 
variables, serial autocorrelation and heteroscadasticity of an unknown form, among other 
advantages (Roodman (2009)). Fifthly, we use multivariate, instead of bivariate regressions, 
which are prone to omitted variable bias, among other estimation problems.  
The results suggest that on average, fiscal deficits are prevalent in Africa. They are relatively 
higher than what attains in Asian and Latin American countries. There are wide cross-country 
variations, however. We do not find evidence that fiscal deficits are monetized over the study 
period. FD does not have significant effects on CBI and macroeconomic performance. It seems 
that CBI and macroeconomic performance are affected by factors, other than FD.  
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents common measures of FD. 
Section 4.3 presents related literature. Section 4.4 presents the methodology and sample data. 
Section 4.5 presents empirical findings. Finally, section 4.6 concludes with some policy remarks. 
4.2 Common Measures of Fiscal Dominance  
 
Common measures of FD include the (i) fiscal balance in percent of GDP, (ii) seigniorage 
revenue in percent of GDP, (iii) net CB credit to government in percent of GDP, and (iv) 
inflation tax (Fry (1998)). The FD hypothesis is premised on that both the size of the fiscal 
deficit and its financing methods, determine the degree of CBI in most less developed countries 
(Fry (1998)). FD can be indicated by evidence of monetization of fiscal deficits through a strict 
causal link running from the fiscal deficit measure to base money (Fry (1998)). This is because 
CBs commonly finance fiscal deficits by expanding base money. Fiscal deficits are more likely 
to have impact on CBI and macroeconomic performance if they are monetized (Fry (1998)).  
The first measure of FD is the fiscal balance, measured in percent of GDP. This measure is 
commonly used for several reasons. Firstly, it measures the size of the fiscal position. It reflects 
fiscal policy stance and fiscal discipline. Secondly, the fiscal balance generates a requirement for 
financing government expenditure. This is because permanent fiscal deficits have to be financed. 
This measure therefore reflects the public sector borrowing requirement (PSBR). In most African 
countries, the overall balance is a fiscal deficit. Although there is no standard rule, in general, the 
fiscal deficit-to-GDP ratio is considered high if it is more than 5% of GDP (Gupta (1992)).  
The second measure of FD is seigniorage revenue, measured in percent of GDP. Seigniorage 
revenue is generated by the creation of money. It is measured as the change in base money in 
percent of GDP (Masson et al. (1997)). Base money is the sum of currency in circulation (C) and 
total reserves (R) held by banks at the CB. The higher the level of seigniorage revenue, the 
higher the level of FD, and the lower the degree of CBI (Cukierman et al. (1992) and Fry 
(1998)). In practice, seigniorage revenue generation occurs because base money costs only a 
small fraction of its face value to produce. Alternative sources of implicit fiscal deficit financing 
are not easy to measure in most African countries. They are usually relatively too small to 
finance growing fiscal deficits. The alternatives include revenues and operating profits of CBs. 
The link between the inability of government to raise required revenue from conventional 
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sources and its recourse to seigniorage is prevalent in most African countries (Cukierman et al. 
(1992)). This practice is linked to the weak structural features of most African countries. These 
include concentrated and unstable sources of tax revenue, poor tax collection procedures, skewed 
income distribution, shallow domestic financial markets and the tendency to abuse seigniorage 
revenue, particularly in times of economic crisis (DeBelle et al. (1998)). There is general 
consensus that high inflation is often caused by government requirements to raise seigniorage 
revenue to finance growing fiscal deficits (Sargent (1982); Dornbusch and Fischer (1986); Van 
Wijnbergen (1989); Buiter (1990); Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994)).  
The third measure of FD is the increased net CB credit to government. African countries with 
high FD tend to rely more on their CBs for financing fiscal deficits (Chandavarkar (1996)). This 
is because CB financing of fiscal deficits is relatively cheaper than market-based financing 
methods. Most CB governors in Africa are subservient. Subservience implies that the CB can 
easily extend cheap credit to the Treasury. Interest rates charged are generally lower than market 
interest rates. To avoid expensive credit, the Treasury of a less developed country will usually 
put pressure on the interest rate setting monetary policy board of the CB or MPC not to raise 
interest rates, but instead print money and buy Treasury bills with printed money (Fry (1998)). 
The fourth measure of FD is inflation tax. Inflation tax is the reduction in the real value of the 
stock of base money, due to inflation. It is the product of the growth rate of base money and real 
money balances, in percent of GDP. Real money balances are base money in constant prices. 
Inflation tax is a cheap tax to collect. It is prone to misuse by fiscally-indisciplined governments. 
Fiscal deficits are financed in several ways. The government can (i) borrow from the CB at no 
cost, (ii) obtain finance from the CB at a cost below market interest rates, (iii) obtain finance 
from abroad in foreign currencies, or (iv) borrow from the domestic private sector at market 
interest rates. If FD is high, there is general tendency for the government to rely more on the CB 
to finance the deficits cheaply (Sargent (1982); Dornbusch and Fischer (1986); Van Wijnbergen 
(1989); Buiter (1990); Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994); Fry (1998)). Literature suggests that 
even where the size of the fiscal deficit is modest, its financing can be crucial (Fry (1998)). In 
addition, each method of financing the fiscal deficit has economic implications. CB financing 
involves printing of money, which expands base money, increases the growth rate of money 
supply and inflation, and distorts the distinction between monetary policy and fiscal policy. 
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Domestic bond issues increase money market interest rates. With the exception of South Africa, 
most SSAs have thin domestic bond markets. They cannot continuously issue bonds to finance 
growing fiscal deficits. In addition, the public may not be able or willing to buy government 
bonds. Foreign financing increases the external debt burden. Lastly, some financing sources are 
only available under certain conditions, which some African countries may not always satisfy.  
4.3 Related Theoretical and Empirical Literature  
 
The dynamic inconsistency theory of monetary policy explains why at times, decisions about the 
monetary base could be dominated by fiscal authorities instead of monetary authorities. The FD 
hypothesis is based on the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy as well as their 
effects on price stability and other macroeconomic variables. The FD hypothesis is associated 
with the quantity theory of money (QTM) and the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). The 
QTM is associated with Sargent and Wallace (1981)’s Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic. 
The FTPL is associated with Woodford (2001). These theories suggest that inflation and other 
macroeconomic variables are determined by both monetary and fiscal policies. In the monetarist 
framework, fiscal deficits are inflationary only to the extent that they are monetized. According to 
the FTPL, money creation may not be the only channel through which fiscal policy becomes 
dominant and the fiscal deficit causes inflation. Fiscal policy may directly jeopardize the price 
stability objective even when there is a strongly committed CB that does not accommodate the 
government financing requirements or employment objectives through the printing of money. 
The QTM argues that the monetarist arithmetic might be misleading because it ignores the fact 
that governments are constrained by their inter-temporal budget. According to the QTM tight 
money may lead to an unsustainable debt financing process and thus, higher inflation in the long-
run. In the FTPL, there is virtually no role for money in the determination of prices in a non-
Ricardian world. Inflation is a fiscally-driven monetary phenomenon and nominal monetary 
growth is endogenously determined by the need to finance an exogenously given fiscal deficit to 
satisfy the budget constraint. According to the FTPL, prices adjust to the increases in nominal 
private sector wealth resulting from bond-financed deficits. In this non-Ricardian world, inflation 
is a symptom of too much nominal wealth chasing too few goods. The FTPL does not deny the 
possibility that fiscal disturbances may affect money supply. As noted by Woodford (2001), the 
monetary accommodation of inflation, resulting from fiscal deficits is a story that is consistent 
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with the FTPL. That is, the causality is not from the fiscal deficit to money supply and then from 
money supply to prices as in Sargent and Wallace (1981), but instead it is from to prices and then 
from prices to money supply in the FTPL. 
In terms of empirical literature, there are studies that confirm the negative relationship between 
fiscal deficits and CBI (Bade and Parkin (1987); Burdekin and Laney (1988); Cukierman (1992); 
Cukierman et al. (1992); DeHaan and Sturm (1992); Lucotte (2009)). There are also studies that 
refute the hypothesized negative relationship (Masciandaro and Tabellini (1988); Grilli et al. 
(1991); Fry (1998); Sikken and DeHaan (1998)). The effect of fiscal policy on CBI and 
macroeconomic variables is argued to be more magnified in developing and transitional 
economies (Fry (1998)). Table 4.1 summarizes some of the related previous empirical evidence 
on the relationship between FD and CBI. The different studies have used different methods of 
analysis as indicated in table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 suggests that the hypothesis that fiscal deficits result in low CBI is weakly supported 
by empirical evidence. Some of the results are ambiguous or statistically insignificant. Possible 
reasons for the weak outcomes include endogeneity bias in variables, which some previous 
authors do not control for (Lucottee (2009)). The results seem to depend on specific CBI indices 
used, methodology of analysis, countries investigated and study periods. Table 4.1 shows that the 
most commonly used indices are the aggregate GMT index, following Grill et al. (1991) and the 
legal CWN index, following Cukierman et al. (1992). LL is a sub-index of both legal CWN and 
aggregate GMT indices, which focuses on CB lending restrictions to government. The VUL 
index refers to the annual average turnover rate of CB governors, which occur within 6 months 
after a major political change. Such changes include the change of the State President, Minister 
of Finance, Cabinet or the government. Empirically, the LL, TOR and VUL indices have been 
used least. Notably, the TOR index has been used mostly in studies which include less developed 
countries, where it is generally found to be more appropriate (Cukierman et al. (1992); DeHaan 
(2001); Dreher et al. (2007); DeHaan and Klomp (2010)). The TOR and VUL are factual indices. 
LL is a legal index. Table 4.1 shows that most empirical studies have focused more on developed 
countries, particularly the OECD countries. Empirical evidence from Africa only may differ to 
some extent because both the macroeconomic policy environment and the status of CBI are 
different from what is common in developed countries or other regions.  
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                   Table 4.1: Empirical Literature on Fiscal Deficits and Central Bank Independence 
  Author (s) and  
  Year of Study 
Number and Group of 
Countries 
Study Period CBI Index Methodology of 
Analysis 
Relation between CBI and Fiscal Deficits 
Lucottee (2009) 78 less developed 
countries 
 
1995-2004 CWN & TOR Indices 
 
Panel data regression analysis 
HT and FE models 
Negative and insignificant for CWN in LDCs. 
Negative and significant for TOR in LDCs. 
D’Amato et al. (2009) 55 countries  
23 OECD & 
32 non-OECD  
1980-1989 CWN (1992)  
de jure index 
OLS regression 
analysis 
Weakly negatively significant for the whole sample.  
Negatively significant for non-OECD countries. 
Negatively insignificant for OECD countries. 
Sikken and DeHaan (1998) 30 less developed 
countries 
1950-1994 
& sub-periods 
TOR, LL &VUL Indices Regression analysis Ambigous and insignificant results. Establish that 
CBI has no link with the size of the fiscal deficit.  
Benassy-Quere and Psani-Ferry (1994) 20 OECD countries 1978-1992 CWN & GMT Indices 
  
Correlation analysis Negative and not econometrically assessed.  
Pollard (1993) 16 OECD countries 1973-1989 Alesina and Summers  
(1993) Index 
Correlation analysis Negative and insignificant results. 
Alesina and Summers (1993) 16 countries 1973-1989 GMT Index Correlation analysis Negative and insignificant results. 
  DeHaan and Sturm (1992) 18 OECD countries 1961-1987  
& sub-periods 
5 Legal CBI Indices Correlation analysis Negative. Significance depends on CBI index.  
DeLong and Summers (1992) 16 countries 1973-1989 GMT Index Correlation analysis Negative and insignificant results. 
Cukierman et al.(1992) 72 countries 
(less developed & 
developed countries) 
1950-1989 CWN &TOR Indices Panel data regression 
analysis 
Negative and significant, especially TOR 
Grill et al.(1991) 18 OECD countries  1950-1989  
& sub-periods 
GMT Index Cross-sectional regressions Negative and insignificant results. 
Burdekin and Laney (1988) 12 OECD countries 1960-1983  
& sub-periods 
Dummy Variable Correlation analysis Negative and significant results. 
Bade and Parkin (1987) 
 
12 industrial countries 1955-1983 GMT Index Correlation analysis Negative and significant results. 
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1987) 5 industrial countries 1970-1985 GMT Index Correlation analysis Negative and not statistically measured. 
                              Source: Compiled from the various empirical papers and Lucotte (2009).  
 
 
 Notes 
 
 
 HT is Haussmann-Taylor models. 
 FE is fixed effects models.   
 The rest of the variables are as previously defined.  
 GMT is the overall legal index, following Grilli et al. (1991).  The GMT overall index has political and economic sub-indices, POLCBI and ECOCBI, respectively. 
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There is some evidence suggesting that fiscal deficits increase inflation (Allen and Smith (1983); 
Edwards and Tabellini (1991); Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1997); McMillin (1986); Neyapti 
(2003)). There is also some evidence suggesting that the positive relationship between fiscal 
deficits and inflation is not easily found in the data (Barro (1987); Blanchard and Fischer (1989); 
Burdekin and Wohar (1990); Smithin (1994); King (1995); Abizadeh and Yousefi (1998)). On 
the contrary, there is some evidence suggesting that fiscal deficits reduce inflation in LDCs 
(Choudary and Parai (1991) and Metin (1998)). Using simple correlations and bivariate 
regression analysis, Baldini and Ribeiro (2008) find a negative relationship between fiscal 
deficits and inflation in 22 SSA countries over 1980-2004. There is evidence that fiscal deficits 
are inflationary in high-inflation countries but that this evidence is weak if low-inflation 
countries are included in the samples (Fischer et al. (2003); Catao and Terrones (2005)). There is 
some evidence suggesting that fiscal deficits are driven by, and do not drive inflation (Montiel 
(1989) and Dornbusch et al. (1990)). Dwyer (1982) and Joines (1985) find that high inflation 
contributes to large fiscal deficits. Gavin and Perotti (1997) suggest that FD can aggravate 
macroeconomic instability, reduce the effectiveness monetary policy and increase inflation.  
There is considerable empirical literature that examines the relationship between fiscal policy 
and economic growth (Kormendi and Meguire (1985); Landau (1986); Skinner (1987); Ram 
(1986); Koester and Kormendi (1989); Grier and Tullock (1989); Barro (1989, 1991); Levine 
and Renelt (1992); Engen and Skinner (1992); Easterly and Rebelo (1993); Easterly, et al. 
(1993); Lin (1994)). Fiscal policies may explain the observed differences in growth rates across 
countries (Barro (1990); King and Rebelo (1990); Rebelo (1991); Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992); Mendoza et al. (1995)). Authors use different fiscal variables to measure fiscal policy 
stance in aggregated and disaggregated terms. Gupta et al. (2005) find that on average, fiscal 
adjustments have not been harmful to economic growth. Their evidence suggests that in low-
income countries, fiscal consolidations are not harmful for either long-run or short-run economic 
growth. 
There are studies that confirm that fiscal deficits increase interest rates (Wachtel and Young 
(1987); Miller and Russek (1990); Gupta (1992); Elmendorf (1993); Kuehlwein and Samalapa 
(1999); Canzoneri et al. (2002); Gale and Orszag (2003); Laubach (2003); Shapiro (2004); Dai 
and Phillipon (2004); Dellas et al. (2005); Aisen and Hauner (2008)). Aisen and Hauner (2008) 
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find that the increase in interest rates due to fiscal deficits is higher if financial markets are 
shallow, financial depth is low, capital markets are not fully liberalized, fiscal deficits are high 
and are mostly domestically-financed or interact with high domestic debt, financial openness is 
low and interest rates are liberalized. Dellas et al. (2005) find that the effect of fiscal deficits on 
interest rates increases with financial openness. There are also studies that refute that fiscal 
deficits increase interest rates (Evans (1987); Plosser (1987); Barth et al. (1991); Anyawu 
(1998); Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999); Chakraborty (2002); Kirchner (2007)). Goyal (2004) 
finds feed-back relationships between fiscal deficits and interest rates. Bhalla (1995) finds that 
causation runs from interest rates to fiscal deficits. Anyawu (1998) finds that fiscal deficits do 
not increase interest rates, but that financing methods increase interest rates, leading to his 
conclusion that focus should be on financing methods, rather than the size of the fiscal deficits. 
4.4 Methodology and Sample Data 
 
In this chapter, we develop 2 hypotheses, namely 4.1 and 4.2.  
Hypothesis 4.1 is on the effect of fiscal dominance on central bank independence. 
H0: Fiscal dominance does not matter central bank independence. 
H1: Fiscal dominance matters for central bank independence. 
 
Hypothesis 4.2 is on the effect of fiscal dominance on macroeconomic performance. 
H0: Fiscal dominance does not matter for macroeconomic performance. 
H1: Fiscal dominance matters for macroeconomic performance. 
The sample is limited to 20 African countries for several reasons. Firstly, we exclude countries 
that belong to monetary unions or arrangements, except the lead countries like South Africa in 
the CMA region of Southern Africa. This is because in such arrangements, the broad monetary 
policy stance is determined by the grouping as opposed to the individual countries. Secondly, we 
exclude countries that are not strategic in CBI analysis. Thirdly, we considered data availability 
and consistency. Analysis starts from 1990 for several reasons. Firstly, by 1990, all the selected 
CBs were already operating. Secondly, CBI became more topical in the 1990s. Thirdly, before 
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the 1990s, some of the countries had dictatorships. CBI is less plausible under dictatorship. The 
end of the study period (2008) was determined by data availability on macroeconomic variables. 
In terms of data, we use CBI indices, the FD measure and the macroeconomic variables of 
choice. We use annual panel data. The main data sources for the key macroeconomic variables 
include the AfDB, IFS, WDI and the respective CB databases. We annualize the CBI indices to 
generate their time series data. We measure FD by the fiscal balance in percent of GDP. This 
approach follows several authors (Darrat (1985); Easterly and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994) Burdekin 
and Wohar (1990); Choudhary and Parai (1991); Grilli et al. (1991); DeHaan and Sturm (1992); 
Alesina and Summers (1993); Pollard (1993); Bhalla (1995); Metin (1998); Sikken and DeHaan 
(1998); Chakraborty (2002); Neyapti (2003); Catao and Terrones (2005); Aisen and Hauner 
(2007, 2008); and D’Amato et al. (2009)).  
Our choice of the fiscal balance to measure FD was determined by several factors. Firstly, data 
on this measure is available from the AfDB databases. Secondly, data constraints on alternative 
measures of FD limited choice to this measure. The data constraints limited the use of 
seigniorage revenue, net CB credit to government and inflation tax. The data constraints include 
lack of consistent GDP data for Ghana and Uganda, 4-digit outliers in base money and net CB 
credit to government for Nigeria and Rwanda, data gaps in base money for most countries as the 
series start late in the study period. Data on domestic debt, a common robustness check measure 
of FD, is not available for most countries. Excluding countries with these data constraints would 
have further reduced the sample size. Instead, we decided to drop these alternative FD measures.  
Despite its availability, the fiscal balance measure is not without some limitations. Firstly, the 
fiscal balance only measures the size of the fiscal position. It does not indicate how the fiscal 
deficit is financed. A fiscal deficit can exist but it can be financed in ways that are harmful or not 
harmful to CBI or macroeconomic performance. Secondly, countries finance fiscal deficits in 
different ways. Measures that indicate the nature of financing would have been more informative 
if data were available. Thirdly, the fiscal balance measure is prone to potential measurement 
error. This is because countries measure fiscal deficits in different ways. In some African 
countries, the central government fiscal deficit figure excludes quasi-fiscal deficits, which can be 
substantial in some of the countries. Quasi fiscal deficits include CB losses, local government 
and public enterprise deficits. The exclusion of quasi-fiscal deficits understates the actual size of 
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the overall fiscal deficit. Quasi-fiscal deficits have the same effects on CBI and macroeconomic 
variables as the central government fiscal deficits. These measurement errors may result in a lack 
of a systematic relationship among fiscal deficits, CBI indices and macroeconomic variables. 
The overall fiscal balance, which we use instead of the primary balance, is prone to endogeneity 
bias because the overall fiscal deficit includes interest payments, which link past to current fiscal 
deficits. This tends to create serial correlation in the errors terms. Data on the most appropriate 
variable, the primary balance, measured on a cash basis, is not available for most of the selected 
countries. The primary balance has less endogeneity (Benassy-Quere and Psani-Ferry (1994) and 
Neyapti (2003)). Because of these data problems, we interpret the results with some caution. 
We test if the fiscal deficits are monetized. This is because fiscal deficits are more likely to have 
impact on CBI and macroeconomic performance if they are monetized (Fry (1998)). In the 
monetarist framework, fiscal deficits are inflationary only to the extent that they are monetized. 
They proxy FD more closely, if monetized. We use indicative statistics. Firstly, we correlate the 
FD measure with the monetary aggregate, M. A high positive correlation between FD and M 
suggests monetization, a negative correlation suggests lack of monetization and a zero 
correlation suggests that FD and M are independent. Secondly, we use contemporaneous Granger 
causality tests between FD and M. Because of the limited sample size, we do not use the inter-
temporal Granger causality tests. The lags would further reduce the sample size and the degrees 
of freedom. Monetization implies that changes in the monetary aggregate have to react to the FD 
measure (Fry (1998) and Fischer (1998)). The test follows Sargent and Wallace (1981)’s Some 
Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic, which suggests that FD implies a positive correlation between 
the fiscal deficit and the rate of growth of M. This relationship assumes that the fiscal shock 
precedes the monetary aggregate shock. It assumes that the government projects the size of the 
fiscal deficit and then requests the CB to monetize the fiscal deficit. The most appropriate 
monetary aggregate is the Treasury component of base money (Fry (1998)). We use the growth 
rate of money supply, M because of data gaps in the Treasury component of base money for 
most countries. A strict Granger-causal link from FD to M suggests monetization, dual causation 
does not necessarily suggest monetization and lack of a causal link from either direction suggests 
that FD and M are independent. According to the monetary accommodation hypothesis, not only 
are the fiscal deficit and the growth rate of money positively correlated, but the higher fiscal 
deficits also unidirectionally causes higher monetary growth and generates inflation, high interest 
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rates and low economic growth. However, Miller (1983) argues that fiscal deficits can cause 
inflation, whether or not they are monetized. They will increase inflation through crowding out 
of private investment due to high interest rates associated with the deficits.  
Following Arellano and Bond (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), we measure the effects of 
FD on CBI and macroeconomic performance in equation 4.1. The target explanatory variable is 
the FD measure with coefficient α1. We measure the effects in country i, where i=1, 2, 3...20 in 
period t, where t=1990-2008.  
 
 
Where are independent of each other. Yi,t is the macroeconomic 
variable or CBI index of choice for country i at time t, FDi,t is the fiscal dominance measure for 
country i at time t, Yi, t-1 is the first-period lagged value of the dependent variable with unknown 
coefficient β1. Yi,t-n is the n-period lagged value of the dependent variable with an unknown 
coefficient βn. Yi,t is persistent and partly depends on its past levels.  is an autoregressive 
parameter with  X i,t is a set of non-fiscal variables in country i at time t and µi,t is the 
error term for country i at time t. X i,t variables are the observed part of heterogeneity. We 
assume that variables in X i,t are weakly exogenous because X i,t may contain strictly exogenous, 
endogenous and predetermined explanatory variables. Variables in X i,t variables are uncorrelated 
with future realization of the error term. In equation 4.2, we decompose the error term (µi,t) into 
unobserved country-specific fixed effects (vi) and observation-specific errors ( i,t). vi contains 
omitted variables, which are constant over time for country i. vi captures country-specific fixed 
effects, which induce unobserved heterogeneity, is unobservable, not directly measurable and 
time-invariant. i,t captures the remaining omitted variables and is assumed homoscadastic.  
The null hypothesis that FD does not matter for CBI and macroeconomic performance is rejected 
if the coefficient on the FD measure (α1) is significantly different from 0. For average inflation 
and its variability, average interest rate and its variability, apriori α1>0. For average economic 
growth, apriori α1<0. For economic growth variability, apriori α1>0. For the legal CBI indices, 
apriori α1<0. For the factual CBI index, the annual average TOR of CB governors, apriori α1>0.   
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For the CBI dependent variable in equation 4.1, we use the updated comprehensive set of 5 CBI 
indices we developed in chapter 2. These include the CWN, GMT, TOR, POLCBI and ECOCBI 
indices, as previously described. Our choice of the CBI indices follows empirical literature that 
investigates the relationship between fiscal deficits and CBI indices (Masciandaro and Tabellini 
(1987); Bade and Parkin (1988); Burdekin and Laney (1988); Grilli et al. (1991); DeLong and 
Summers (1992); DeHaan and Sturm (1992); Alesina and Summers (1993); Benassy-Quere and 
Psani-Ferry (1994); Sikken and DeHaan (1998); D’Amato et al. (2009); Lucottee (2009)). We go 
beyond previous studies by disaggregating the overall GMT index into its political and economic 
sub-indices. We use multiple indices as a robustness check on the results because each index is a 
noisy indicator of actual CBI. The multiple indices enable us to account for the multidimensional 
aspect of CBI, minimize measurement error and possible bias associated with each index 
(Cukierman et al. (1992); Neyapti (2003); Jacome and Vazquez (2008); and Lucottee (2009)). 
Since the macroeconomic variables have an annual time series frequency, we annualize the CBI 
indices by generating their annual time series data. We identify years in which there were 
significant actual changes in CBI legislation in each country through reading CB Acts, Act 
amendments and country constitutions over 1990-2008. We recalculate legal CBI whenever there 
is a major change in CBI legislation and carry over the same figure till there is a new change. We 
repeat the TOR figure for each year over the periods in which it was originally reported till there 
is a new turnover in each country. This procedure follows previous authors (DeHaan and Sturm 
(2000); Neyapti (2003); Dreher et al. (2007); Arnone et al. (2008)). We run the CBI regression 5 
times, with 1 CBI index each time. Firstly, we seek to avoid potential multicollinearity among 
the indices. Secondly, we examine how each index reacts to FD changes. The impact may differ 
per index because they each measure a different aspect of CBI. This approach follows previous 
studies (Neyapti (2003); Arnone et al. (2008)); Jacome and Vazquez (2008) and Lucotte (2009)).  
For the CBI dependent variable in equation 4.1, the non-fiscal determinants of CBI include 
political instability, level of economic development, openness of the economy and past inflation. 
Following D’Amato et al. (2009), we measure the level of economic development by the growth 
rate of real GDP. We define political instability by a combination of political events that 
potentially affect the commitment of monetary authorities to the price stability objective of the 
CB. It is a dummy variable with value 1 for years with CBI relevant political disturbances and 0, 
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otherwise. Following Dreher et al. (2007), we measure openness of the economy by the sum of 
exports and imports, in percent of GDP. For the non-fiscal determinants of CBI, we use some of 
the 8 variables in D’Amato et al. (2009), who investigate 55 countries, OECD and non-OECD, 
over 1980-1989. We use only those of their variables that are relevant, available or measurable 
for our sample. We use variables in D’Amato et al. (2009) because it is a recent comprehensive 
study that links CBI to its potential determinants, which include fiscal deficits.  
For the inflation dependent variable in equation 4.1, we measure inflation by the annualized 
consumer price index (CPI). As a robustness check on the regular inflation variable, we use 
transformed inflation to reduce heteroscadasticity of the error term and to increase the efficiency 
of the estimators. This is because regular inflation may give undue weight to inflationary outliers 
in the sample (Cukierman et al. (1992); DeHaan and Kooi (2000); Neyapti (2003); Jacome and 
Vazquez (2008); Arnone et al. (2008)). We define transformed inflation (D) by the regular 
inflation rate, divided by one plus the regular inflation rate, D=π/(1+π). Transformed inflation 
measures the real rate of depreciation in money balances. Its values range 0-1. The non-fiscal 
determinants of inflation in this study include past inflation, international inflation, rate of 
growth of broad money supply, rate of growth of real GDP, exchange rate depreciation against 
the US dollar and the CBI indicator. We use the US CPI inflation rate to proxy international 
inflation. For regression estimations, we use the broad definition of money (M2) only because 
the narrow definition of money (M1) has extreme outliers. Removing outliers would reduce the 
sample size and the degrees of freedom. We run the inflation regression with the FD measure 
and the monetary aggregate separately because these variables are potentially collinear. We do 
not follow any specific study to define inflation variables. We only report robust results.  
For the real economic growth rate dependent variable in equation 4.1, we measure average 
economic growth by the annualized growth rate of real GDP. The non-fiscal variables are 
derived from general empirical literature on economic growth (Barro (1991, 1995, 1996, 2003); 
Mankiw et al. (1992); Levine and Renelt (1992); Fischer (1993); Easterly and Rebelo (1993); 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994); Borensztein et al. (1995); Easterly and Bruno (1995); Easterly and 
Levine (1997); Sala-i-Martin (1997)). The non-fiscal determinants of real economic growth 
include past real economic growth, inflation, rate of growth of broad money (M2), foreign direct 
investment in percent of GDP, gross fixed capital information in percent of GDP and changes in 
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terms of trade. We proxy domestic investment by gross fixed capital formation, in percent of 
GDP. As a robustness check, we use transformed inflation in place of regular inflation, as 
explained before. Because of too many data gaps on primary and secondary education enrollment 
rates in percent of GDP figures for the selected countries, we fail to use these variables to 
account for human capital development in economic growth. We only report the robust results. 
For the interest rate dependent variable in equation 4.1, we measure interest rate by the 
annualized nominal and real lending rates. We use short-term interest rates. Our choice was 
determined by data availability. The non-fiscal determinants of interest rates include past interest 
rate, international interest rate, expected domestic inflation, expected exchange rate depreciation 
against the US dollar, rate of growth of broad money supply (M2) and real GDP growth. We 
proxy international interest rates by the US interest rate. We close the interest rate data gaps for 
Ghana through linear interpolation. Because of data constraints on expected values in these 
variables, we use actual values of FD, inflation and exchange rate depreciation in place of their 
expected values as suggested by theory and empirical literature. This creates expectational errors, 
but system the GMM estimator controls for such errors. We run the regression with the FD 
measure and the monetary aggregate separately to avoid potential collinearity. For the non-fiscal 
determinants, we use most of the variables in Aisen and Hauner (2008), which is a recent similar 
study that uses the same estimation technique, system GMM in panel data. Because of data 
constraints, we do not include the fiscal deficit financing interaction variables that they use.  
4.4.1 Regression Estimation Technique 
 
Following Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), we use the 2-step system 
generalized method of moments (GMM) in dynamic panel data (DPD). We estimate 2 equations, 
one in levels and the other in first differences. Each equation has specific instrumental variables 
(IVs). Recently, GMM estimators have been used in previous related studies. Neyapti (2003) 
uses difference GMM in DPD to investigate effects of fiscal deficits on inflation in 54 countries 
over 1970-1989. Aisen and Hauner (2008) use system GMM to investigate effects of fiscal 
deficits on interest rates in 60 countries over 1970-2006. Several other authors have used the 
GMM estimator to examine effects of fiscal deficits on economic growth (Anshasy et al. (2005); 
Gupta et al. (2005); Afonso and Juan (2008); Anshasy (2008); Abdullah et al. (2009)). The 
GMM estimator is a recent movement away from correlation analysis and VAR models. 
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Given our sample, panel data regression estimation has several merits. Firstly, it reduces 
endogeneity bias. Secondly, it is suitable for our small sample size as it generates more data 
through NxT, where N is the number of cross-sections and T is the study period. After dropping 
outliers, Angola and Zimbabwe, we use 18 cross-sections over 19 years, which generates 342 
total annual panel observations. The sample is characterized by T>N, which is suitable for 
macroeconomic panel data models. We dropped the outliers because panel data models perform 
badly in their presence. Thirdly, by combining time series and cross-sectional data, it gives the 
data more variation, less collinearity, more degrees of freedom, improves data quality, provides 
better prediction of the behaviour of variables, has more reliable and more efficient parameter 
estimates. Fourthly, it enables analysis of dynamic adjustments, allows for testing of common 
dynamic trends, which cannot be done in cross-sectional data. It is better than cross-sectional 
data in analysing dynamics of change in short time series data, which characterises our sample. 
Fifthly, panel data can take explicit account of country-specific heterogeneity in data (Arellano 
and Bover (1995); Balgati (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998); Bond (2002); Roodman (2006)).  
We use a linear DPD model by adding at least one lagged dependent variable to the explanatory 
variables. We use this model for several reasons. Firstly, we allow for dynamic effects in the 
models. Secondly, we use lags to account for persistence in the variables. Thirdly, we account 
for delayed partial adjustments through lagged variables. Fourthly, we account for country-
specific fixed effects through orthogonal deviations data transformation. Fifthly, we account for 
feed-back from current or past shocks in variables. Some exogenous shocks may have continous 
effects over time. Sixthly, we control for autocorrelation in error terms through the lagged 
dependent variables. Seventhly, we examine inter-temporal behaviour among the variables. 
We use the GMM estimator for several reasons. Firstly, it controls for endogeneity bias and 
persistence in variables, it accommodates time-invariant regressors, serial autocorrelation and 
heteroscadasticity of an unknown form, and controls for unobserved country-specific fixed 
effects. The GMM estimator uses orthogonality conditions to allow for efficient estimation in the 
presence of heteroscadasticity of an unknown form. Secondly, the GMM system checks for 
improved model performance and serial correlation. Thirdly, the GMM estimator is robust 
because it does not require strong distributional assumptions on the data and errors. Fourthly, it 
accommodates models that are partially specified. Fifthly, the GMM estimator is consistent even 
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in presence of measurement error (Gupta et al. (2005)). Sixthly, the GMM estimator can correct 
for rational expectational errors. Seventhly, the GMM system draws IVs from within the GMM 
system, has formal checks on their validity and makes relatively weak assumptions about the 
IVs. GMM estimators gain efficiency by using as IVs, all available lags of the explanatory 
variables. IVs control for potential endogeneity of other variables, which are different from the 
lagged dependant variables. Eighthly, the GMM estimator allows for the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variables as regressors. Ninthly, GMM is appropriate for multivariate regressions, 
caters for joint determination of variables and accounts for cross-country heterogeneity in data.  
Despite its several merits, the GMM estimator has its own conditions and limitations. The 
validity of the GMM estimator depends on the absence of second order autocorrelation in error 
terms, absence of outliers in the data, valid IVs and imposed moment conditions. Weak IVs make 
point estimates, hypothesis tests and confidence intervals unreliable. The GMM estimator is 
subject to small sample bias if the IVs are weak. The GMM estimator can be weak in finite 
samples if more moment conditions are added, which do not add much information to the models 
(Bond et. al. (1995); Altonji and Segal (1996); Staiger and Stock (1997) and Roodman (2006)).  
We use system GMM in preference to difference GMM for several reasons. Firstly, lagged levels 
of the regressors, associated with difference GMM, are poor IVs for the first-differenced 
regressors if the variables are close to a random walk. Secondly, first differences magnify data 
gaps if panels are unbalanced. Thirdly, difference GMM is associated with standard errors that 
are biased downwards. Fourthly, difference GMM performs poorly if the sample size is small. 
Preferably, system GMM has better small sample properties. System GMM is a consistent 
estimator in short samples and can accommodate a small number of cross-sections. Fifthly, by 
adding the second equation in system GMM, additional IVs are obtained. The variables in levels 
in the second equation are instrumented with their own first differences. Sixthly, by using more 
IVs than difference GMM, system GMM increases estimation efficiency. Seventhly, system 
GMM allows for predetermined explanatory variables and is better at modelling non-stationary 
data. Eighthly, system GMM controls for inertia in variables, which generates biased and 
inconsistent estimations if not accounted for. Estimation problems of the first-differenced GMM 
estimator are related to the weak correlation between the current differences of the regressors and 
the lagged levels of the IVs. The difference GMM estimator gets weaker with the degree of 
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persistence in the autoregressive process because as persistence increases, lagged levels become 
less correlated with current first-differences. Ninthly, we follow recent literature, which suggests 
that the efficiency of the first-differenced GMM estimator can be improved by using system 
GMM (Arellano and Bover (1995); Blundell and Bond (1998) and Blundell et al. (2000)).  
We use forward orthogonal deviations data transformation to remove country-specific fixed 
effects. This does not in itself remove the endogeneity of Yi, t-1, but it allows for the use of lags of 
Yi,t-1 as valid IVs since they are not correlated with the transformed error term (Arellano and 
Bond (1991); Arellano and Bover (1995); Baltagi (2005)). Using this data transformation 
method, IV creation is based on group mean deviations instead of first differences (Arellano and 
Bover (1995)). By definition, orthogonal deviation data transformation subtracts the mean of the 
remaining future observations available in the sample from the current observation. The 
deviations are calculated for all observations except the last one and a weighting matrix is 
introduced to equalize variances. The advantages of this data transformation method are that 
orthogonal deviations (i) prevent serial correlation and preserve (ii) sample size by minimizing 
data losses if panels are unbalanced, (iii) homoscadasticity, (iv) orthogonality between 
transformed variables and lagged regressors, and (v) degrees of freedom, among other factors 
(Arellano and Bover (1995) and Roodman (2006)).  
Following some literature, we do not use the fixed effects option because it removes variables 
that do not vary much over time within some cross-sections (Neyapti (2003); Dreher et al. 
(2008); Lucottee (2009)). These include legal CBI indices and dummy variables in our sample. 
For the legal CBI indices, our study period is not long enough to have much variation in these 
indices because CB laws are not changed frequently in most African countries. For example, the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi Act was last changed in 1989, implying relatively static legal CBI 
indices over the 19 years. Fixed effects models would give inconsistent estimates in this case.  
To account for potential heteroscadasticity associated with the cross-sectional component of the 
panel data, we use White (1980) adjusted robust standard errors and covariance matrices. The 2-
step estimator uses residuals from the first step to estimate the covariance matrix. The White 
(1980) standard errors allow fitting of a model that contains heteroscadastic residuals and are 
robust to serial correlation within cross sections and changing time. We use the n-step White 
(1980) period GMM weights with no degrees of freedom adjustments.  
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We use IVs to control for endogeneity and measurement error in the independent variables. We 
only use IVs that are internal in the GMM system. We could not identify valid and strong 
external IVs for our models because most variables that have an effect on included endogenous 
variables also have a direct effect on the dependent variables. As IVs for the differenced 
equation, we use the lagged dependent variables and the standard GMM-type differenced level 
independent variables, lagged once. As IVs for the levels equation, we use the GMM-type lagged 
differenced dependent variables. We define the IV set by Z, which comprises the second lag of 
the dependent variables, a single lag in both transformed and non-transformed explanatory 
variables. The GMM system automatically adds the constant term to the IV list.  
Our relatively small sample size (N), with 18 cross-sections precludes the use of all the IVs in 
the GMM system. We therefore use only a subset of the whole IV set. This is because if the 
number of IVs exceeds N, the weighting matrix becomes singular and the 2-step estimator 
cannot be computed because the optimal weighting matrix has a rank of N at most (Roodman 
(2006)). The Sargan (1958) tests become weaker with too many IVs. Since theory does not 
specify an optimum number of IVs, following Roodman (2006), we use a common practical rule 
of thumb to limit IV count. Firstly, we restrict the number of IVs to the number of cross-sections 
or less. Secondly, we reduce lag depth because deeper lags tend to be weak IVs, which do not 
add more information to the models. Thirdly, we collapse the IV set by reducing the number of 
endogenous variables in the models. Fourthly, we use at least one IV for each variable 
instrumented. To avoid multicollinearity among IVs, we reduce the number of IVs when the IV 
matrix in the GMM system becomes singular. We do not use period dummy variables because 
the 19 annual observations potentially create too many dummy variables, which may cause 
multicollinearity or dummy variable trap. In addition, we do not identify time events over the 
study period that could be represented by the time dummy variables.  
Since we use lagged variables, we use lag length to infer the length of recent past history of the 
dependent variable, which still influences the current dependent variable. We select lag length 
following the Hansen (1982) and Arellano-Bond (1991) guidelines. We restrict the number of 
lags on the dependent variables for several reasons. Firstly, since the sample size is small, deeper 
lags would further reduce the sample size and the degrees of freedom. Secondly, we avoid over-
fitting the endogenous variables in the models. To determine optimum lag length, we use the 
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statistical significance of the coefficient of each additional lagged dependent variable on the 
RHS of the equations. We start with a single period or one-year lag length to reflect the annual 
nature of the data. Given annual data, we consider a single or one-year lag, reasonable to capture 
significant past effects. We experiment with deeper lags and each time, check on the robustness 
of results for each lag added in the model. We only report robust outcomes. 
4.4.2 Pre-Estimation Diagnostic Tests and Data Treatment 
 
It is procedural to test time series panel data for stationarity to ensure valid and statistically 
unbiased regression estimates. However, we do not use panel data stationarity tests for several 
reasons. Firstly, the unit root in time series data is removed by the forward orthogonal deviation 
data transformation in the 2-step system GMM. Secondly, using variables in first differences for 
stationarity purposes and also applying orthogonal deviations data transformation as part of the 
estimation technique would over-process the data. Thirdly, given the relatively small sample 
size, further first-differencing would reduce the sample size to inestimable levels. Fourthly, CBI 
indices, particularly the legal indices are highly persistent. Fifthly, stationarity tests in small CBI 
samples like in this study would not be statistically plausible (Cukierman (2010)). In related 
analysis, a number of previous studies have not used the panel data stationarity tests for some, 
but not all of the reasons we state (Fischer et al. (1996) over 1992-1994; DeMelo et al. (1996, 
1997) over 5 years; Hernandez-Cata (1999) over 1990-1996 and Cukierman et al. (2000) over 
1989-1996)). These studies use annual panel data with 25, 28, 26 and 26 cross-sections, 
respectively. Some related previous studies are silent on stationarity tests. Presumably, they do 
not use the stationarity tests in relatively small CBI samples. In addition, most previous CBI 
studies have used the Cukierman et al. (1992) data sets, which Cukierman (2010) considers 
relatively small for plausible stationarity testing. The Cukierman et al. (1992) data set covers 
1950-1989 on a decade-wise basis. Recently, Inoue (2005) tests annual panel data for stationarity 
using the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS, 2003) test. He estimates a panel data inflation model with 
CBI, fiscal balance in percent of GDP and lagged inflation as some of the key explanatory 
variables. The model is estimated in first differences over 1995-2003, using generalized least 
squares (GLS). For his set of countries, the CBI indices were only stationary at first differences. 
We run panel data regressions for the whole sample because the sample size is relatively small 
and we focus on one group of African countries. Unlike most previous panel data studies, we do 
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not average the panel data. Firstly, averaging would reduce the dynamic effects in the models. 
Secondly, averaging would reduce variability in legal CBI indices. Thirdly, since we use lagged 
variables, we consider a year adequate to capture dynamic adjustments. Fourthly, when a model 
for macroeconomic panel data includes lagged dependent explanatory variables, the GMM 
estimation procedure is asymptotically valid only when T is large. Thus, averaging would reduce 
T. For robustness checks in regression estimations, we estimate the regression equations in 
EViews and in Stata. We get similar results and conclusions. We finally report EViews results.  
4.4.3 Post-Estimation Diagnostic Test Statistics 
 
We test the models for IV overidentifying restrictions (OIRs). We use the Sargan (1958) J-
Statistic to test the joint null hypothesis that the (i) IV models are correctly specified, (ii) OIRs 
are valid and (iii) IVs are valid and are correctly excluded from estimated equations. The null 
hypothesis implies no correlation between the IVs and the residuals. The Sargan J-Statistic is 
robust to heteroscadasticity and autocorrelation within the panels. The degree of OIRs is defined 
by the IV rank (s) less the number of regressors (k). The smaller the J-Statistic, the better the 
model. We calculate the panel data GMM Sargan J-Statistic by J=χ2(s-k). The critical J-Statistic is 
asymptotically distributed with s-k degrees of freedom, χ2(s-k). The null hypothesis of valid OIRs 
is accepted if Jcalculated<Jcritical. We reject the model specification if the J-Statistic is statistically 
significant. Following Roodman (2006), we only apply the Sargan test for OIRs in overidentified 
models as defined by s>k. We assume regressors are endogenous or weakly exogenous variables. 
We calculate the Sargan p-value by scalarpval=@χ2 (J, s-k). The higher the p value, the better 
the model. The p values higher than the 0.05 threshold support the null hypothesis that the IVs 
are valid. Low p values below the 0.05 threshold suggest inappropriate IVs (Bowsher (2002)). 
4.5 Presentation and Analysis of Results  
 
4.5.1 Key Descriptive Statistics (1990-2008) 
 
 
We measured FD by the size of the fiscal balance in percent of GDP. The results suggest that, on 
average, fiscal deficits are high in the selected African countries. The sample average is a fiscal 
deficit of -3.60% of GDP. Countries with high average fiscal deficits in excess of 5% of GDP 
include Angola (-10.95%), Zimbabwe (-9.60%), Ghana (-7.26%), Egypt (-6.11%), Ethiopia (-
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5.21%) and Malawi (-5.67%). Countries with average surplus fiscal balances include Botswana 
(3.82%), Algeria (2.88%) and Nigeria (1.27%). The sample range is an average surplus balance 
of 3.82% of GDP in Botswana to an average deficit balance of -10.95% of GDP in Angola. The 
average figures suggest that fiscal policy is expansionary in the selected African countries. 
Several factors explain the surplus balances reported in only 3 of the selected countries. 
Botswana’s fiscal surpluses are explained by diamond revenues, marked gains in mineral tax 
revenue, increased interest income on high foreign exchange reserves and restraints in 
government spending. The Government of Botswana operates with a fiscal policy rule, which 
restricts annual government expenditure to 40% of GDP. Algeria’s fiscal surpluses are explained 
by high oil revenues and favourable hydro-carbon exports, which resulted in increased fiscal 
revenues and accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Nigeria’s fiscal surpluses are explained 
by oil revenues. Figure 4.1 shows the sample average fiscal balance in percent of GDP. 
Figure 4.1: Fiscal Balance as a Percentage of GDP (1990-2008) 
 
Source: African Development Bank databases (AfDB (2009)).  
After dropping the outliers, Angola and Zimbabwe, the sample average fiscal balance in 
percentage of GDP drops from -3.60% of GDP to -2.86% of GDP. The sample average then 
ranges from a surplus balance of 3.82% of GDP in Botswana to a deficit balance of -7.26% of 
GDP in Ghana. After dropping outliers, Ghana has the highest fiscal deficit. The average sample 
fiscal deficit is below 5%. This implies low average fiscal deficits (Gupta (1992)). There is likely 
measurement error in the reported fiscal deficit data. Some countries only include central 
government fiscal deficits. They exclude quasi-fiscal deficits, which can be substantial in some 
of the countries. Their possible omission could understate the actual size of the overall fiscal 
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deficit. For countries that are under the highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) programme, the 
size of the fiscal deficit may be understated. The HIPC countries are Angola, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. For 
instance, Malawi treats donor funds as government revenue, thus understating the overall fiscal 
deficit. On a comparative basis, the sample average fiscal balance of -3.60% of GDP for the 20 
countries over 1990-2008, compares with an average fiscal balance of -0.77% of GDP in 11 
Latin American countries and -0.67% of GDP in 15 Asian countries over 1990-2008. For Latin 
American countries, the fiscal balance ranges from -2.89% of GDP in Nicaragua to 2.89% of 
GDP in Chile. For Asian countries, the fiscal balance ranges from -6.89% of GDP in Sri-Lanka 
to 11.67% of GDP in Singapore. These results suggest that fiscal deficits are relatively higher in 
Africa than Asia and Latin America. In 39 ESAF-supported and PRGF-supported countries over 
1990-2000, Gupta et al. (2005) find an average fiscal deficit of 6.30% of GDP. 
Panels 4A and 4B show the trend line between the FD measure and the monetary aggregates. 
Panels 4C-4H show the trend line between the FD measure and the CBI indices. Panels 4H-4M 
show the trend line between the FD measure and the macroeconomic variables. The graphs show 
the trends in the variables of choice under fiscal deficit (left) and surplus (right) scenarios.  
4A. FD and Narrow Money Supply Growth (M1)           4B. FD and Broad Money Supply Growth (M2)  
 
Source: Calculated from sample data. The scatter graphs are drawn from annual panel data. 
4C: FD and CWN Index     4D: FD and Aggregate GMT Index  
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4E: FD and Factual Independence Index                                            4F: FD and Political Independence Index  
 
 
4G: FD and Economic Independence Index  
 
Source: Calculated from sample data. The scatter graphs are drawn from annual panel data.   
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4H: Fiscal Dominance and Average Inflation        4I: Fiscal Dominance and Inflation Variability 
  
4J: Fiscal Dominance and Average Economic Growth   4 K: Fiscal Dominance and Economic Growth Variability 
  
4L: Fiscal Dominance and Average Interest Rate    4M: Fiscal Dominance and Interest Rate Variability 
 
Source: Calculated from sample data. The scatter graphs are drawn from annual panel data.  
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Panels 4A and 4B suggest that fiscal deficits are associated with high monetary growth while 
surpluses are associated with low monetary growth. The M1 relationship is, however, weak. For 
the CBI indices, panels 4C-4F suggest that as the fiscal deficit reduces, the level of CBI 
increases. Panel 4G, however, suggests that as the fiscal deficit reduces, economic independence 
declines. This relationship is, however, very weak. The legal CBI indices are relatively static. 
They do not vary much within and across countries. The overall GMT index and its sub-indices 
are typically static. The factual CBI index (TOR) has relatively more variation than the legal 
indices. These outcomes are consistent with results in previous studies (Cukierman et al. (1992); 
Neyapti (2003); Lucottee (2009)). Panels 4H-4M suggest that fiscal deficits are associated with 
high average inflation and its variability, low economic growth and high growth variability, low 
average interest rates and its variability. Fiscal surpluses are associated with low inflation and its 
variability, high economic growth and low growth variability, low average interest rate and its 
variability. For the selected macroeconomic variables, the results confirm theory in all the cases. 
Panels 4A-4M suggest that the selected African countries typically operate more with average 
fiscal deficits and less with surpluses. This outcome implies that although fiscal surpluses are 
good for monetary stability and macroeconomic performance, this benefit is low for the selected 
African countries, which on average, operate with fiscal deficits (see figure 4.1). Tables 4.2-4.4 
show the correlation coefficients between the FD measure and monetary aggregates, CBI indices 
and the macroeconomic variables of choice.  
Table 4.2: Fiscal Dominance and Monetary Aggregates Correlation Matrix (1990-2008) 
Correlation  
Pair 
FD  
Measure 
M1  
Aggregate 
M2  
Aggregate 
FD Measure 1.0000 
  M1 Aggregate -0.0489 1.0000 
 M2 Aggregate -0.0032 0.0471 1.0000 
Source: Calculated from sample data. 
 
Table 4.3: Fiscal Dominance and CBI Correlation Matrix (1990-2008) 
Correlation 
Pair 
FD  
Measure 
CWN  
Index 
GMT  
Index 
TOR  
Index 
POLCBI 
 Index 
ECOCBI 
Index 
FD Measure 1.0000 
     CWN Index 0.2515 1.0000 
    GMT Index 0.1630 0.4881 1.0000 
   TOR Index -0.1780 -0.1141 -0.3055 1.0000 
  POLCBI Index 0.2033 0.4586 0.8817 -0.2734 1.0000 
 ECOCBI Index -0.0453 0.1608 0.4137 -0.0973 -0.0340 1.0000 
Source: Calculated from sample data. 
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Table 4.4: Fiscal Dominance and Macroeconomic Variables Correlation Matrix (1990-2008) 
Correlation  
 Pair 
FD 
 Measure 
Average 
Inflation 
Inflation 
Variability 
Average 
Growth 
Growth 
Variability 
Average 
Interest  
Interest 
Variability 
FD Measure  1.0000 
      Average Inflation -0.2328 1.0000 
     Inflation Variability  -0.1183 0.8117 1.0000 
    Average Growth  0.1683 -0.1030 0.0116 1.0000 
   Growth Variability -0.1240 0.0322 -0.0277 -0.3438 1.0000 
  Average Interest Rate -0.2116 0.5973 0.4904 -0.0880 -0.0420 1.0000 
 Interest Rate Variability  -0.0388 0.4007 0.4336 -0.0565 0.0087 0.5283 1.0000 
Source: Calculated from sample data. 
Table 4.2 shows that the FD measure is negatively correlated with the monetary aggregates, M1 
and M2. This outcome suggests that fiscal deficits result in a reduction in monetary growth, 
contrary to theory. The correlations are low, suggesting a weak negative link between the fiscal 
deficits and monetary growth. The negative correlation between the FD measure and the 
monetary aggregates suggests that fiscal deficits are not monetized. The results refute the FD 
hypothesis. This outcome suggests that FD may not have adverse effects on CBI and 
macroeconomic variables. This outcome, however, is not expected of the selected countries.  
Table 4.3 shows that the relationship between FD and CBI appears to depend on the CBI index. 
The indices CWN, GMT, TOR and POLCBI have wrong correlation coefficient signs. They 
suggest that FD increases CBI. Only the economic independence index weakly supports that FD 
reduces legal CBI. The correlation coefficient is, however, low. As argued by Cukierman (1992), 
the correlation between FD and CBI indices may not be perfect because the CBI indices may not 
capture some other informal and behavioural aspects of the relationship between fiscal and 
monetary authorities. Such behavioural aspects include the power of tradition, evolved informal 
norms, power politics, quality of the CB economic research department, quality of the CB board 
of directors and personalities of key individuals governing the CBs. The negative correlation 
between FD and factual CBI could possibly imply that subservient CB governors are not 
dismissed where FD is high. The results on legal CBI indices could imply that what is written in 
the CB Acts deviates from actual practices. Table 4.4 shows that macroeconomic variables have 
wrong signs. The results refute theory because they suggest that FD improves macroeconomic 
performance. These results support the lack of evidence on monetization of fiscal deficits, which 
is suggested in table 4.2. Since correlation analysis is not adequate for conclusive evidence on 
these relationships, we complement these outcomes with the Granger causality analysis results. 
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Table 4.5: Fiscal Dominance, CBI and Macroeconomic Performance (1990-2008) 
Null  
Hypothesis 
Total Annual Panel  
Observations F-Statistic Probability  
M1 does not Granger Cause FD 306 0.0093 0.9908 
FD does not Granger Cause M1 
 
0.3884 0.6784 
M2 does not Granger Cause FD 306 1.1173 0.3285 
FD does not Granger Cause M2 
 
0.7608 0.4682 
CWN does not Granger Cause FD 306      4.2810*** 0.0147 
FD does not Granger Cause CWN 
 
0.2054 0.8144 
GMT does not Granger Cause FD 306 0.3779 0.6856 
FD does not Granger Cause GMT 
 
0.0543 0.9472 
TOR does not Granger Cause FD 306       4.4039*** 0.0130 
FD does not Granger Cause TOR 
 
0.7074 0.4938 
POLCBI does not Granger Cause FD 306 0.3886 0.6783 
FD does not Granger Cause POLCBI 
 
0.0242 0.9761 
ECOCBI  does not Granger Cause FD 306 0.0583 0.9434 
FD does not Granger Cause ECOCBI 
 
0.1934 0.8243 
Average inflation does not Granger-cause fiscal dominance 306 0.0760 0.9268 
Fiscal dominance does not Granger-cause average inflation 
 
   2.0314** 0.1329 
Inflation variability does not Granger-cause fiscal dominance 306 0.3061 0.7365 
Fiscal dominance does not Granger-cause inflation variability 
 
0.7236 0.4859 
Transformer inflation does not Granger-cause fiscal dominance 306 0.1131 0.8931 
Fiscal dominance does not Granger-cause transformed inflation 
 
0.6293 0.6293 
Average growth does not Granger-cause fiscal dominance 306 1.3480 0.2613 
Fiscal dominance does not Granger-cause average growth 
 
0.1609 0.8515 
Growth variability does not Granger-cause fiscal dominance 306 0.1713 0.8427 
Fiscal dominance does not Granger-cause growth variability 
 
    2.2105** 0.1114 
Average interest does not Granger-cause fiscal dominance 306 0.9435 0.3904 
Fiscal dominance does not Granger-cause average interest 
 
      2.8492*** 0.0595 
Interest variability does not Granger-cause fiscal dominance 306 0.5393 0.5837 
Fiscal dominance does not Granger-cause interest variability 
 
0.9011 0.4072 
Real interest rate does not Granger-cause fiscal dominance 306 0.5559 0.5742 
Fiscal dominance does not Granger-cause  real interest  rate 
 
0.7539 0.4717 
Number of Lags: 2### 
   Source: Calculated in E-Views 7.0. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance level at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. ### We could not use deeper lags because of sample size concerns. 
Table 4.5 suggests that there is no strict contemporaneous Granger causality from the FD 
measure to monetary aggregates, M1 and M2. We do not find evidence of monetization of fiscal 
deficits. There is lack of empirical support for the accommodation of fiscal deficits hypothesis. 
The relationships could be inter-temporal. The CWN index and the factual CBI index Granger-
cause FD. These 2 indices have more variation than others, within and across panels. The TOR is 
typically more appropriate in measuring CBI in less developed countries. FD Granger-causes 
average inflation, growth variability and average interest rate, despite lack of monetization of 
fiscal deficits. This outcome is consistent with findings in Miller (1983) that fiscal deficits may 
increase inflation even if they are not monetized through crowding out of private investment.  
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                     4.5.2 Panel Data Regression Results (1990-2008) 
 
                     Table 4.6: Effects of Fiscal Dominance on Central Bank Independence (1990-2008) 
Dependent  
variable  
Legal  
CWN 
 Index 
Overall  
GMT  
Index 
Factual  
Independence 
Index  
(TOR)  
Political 
 Independence  
Index 
(POLCBI) 
Economic  
Independence 
Index 
(ECOCBI)  
Legal CWN (-1) 0.71***(8.53) 
    Overall GMT (-1) 
 
0.90***(3.47) 
   TOR (-1) 
  
0.59***(42.31) 
  POLCBI (-1) 
   
0.83***(18.30) 
 ECOCBI (-1) 
    
0.64***(14.43) 
Fiscal dominance (FD) measure^^^ 0.0001 (0.25) 0.0001 (1.23) -0.003***(-7.12) -0.0002***(-3.15) 0.00002 (0.32) 
Past domestic inflation -0.0002**(-2.48) 0.0001 (0.63) 0.001***(5.71) -2.41E-05 (-0.21) -0.0000 (-0.10) 
Level of economic development 0.001***(5.28) 0.0003 (0.58) 0.001***(21.7) 0.001***(8.60) -1.92E-06 (-0.11) 
Political instability 0.002**(2.28) 0.003 (0.68) 0.20**(2.35) -0.0004 (-0.26) 0.002***(14.48) 
Openness of the economy -0.009**(-2.22) 0.0004 (0.03) -0.001 (-0.03) -0.01***(-3.00) -0.0002 (-0.43) 
Total panel observations 288 288 288 288 288 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 
Instrumental variable (IV) rank 18 18 18 19 18 
OIRs (d.f.###) or  (s-k) 12 12 12 12 12 
Sargan J-Statistic (Calculated Value) 15.68 7.28 13.20 19.94 1.80 
Sargan J-Statistic (Critical Value) 18.31 18.31 18.31 18.31 18.31 
Sargan P-Value  0.21 0.84 0.35 0.07 0.99 
                                Source: Calculated from sample data.   
                                Notes 
                                The t-values are in parenthesis.  
                                The t-values are based on White (1980) roust standard errors. 
   *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                                 OIRs is overidentifying restrictions.  (d.f.###) is the degrees of freedom at 5% level of significance.  
                      ^^^ is the target explanatory variable.  
                                 s-k is the degrees of freedom defined as the instrumental variable rank (s) less the number of regressors (k).  
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   Table 4.7: Effects of Fiscal Dominance on Inflation Outcomes (1990-2008) 
Dependent  
variable  
Average     
 Inflation 
Average  
Inflation 
Average 
Inflation 
Average 
 Inflation 
Inflation 
Variability 
Inflation 
Variability 
Inflation  
Variability 
Inflation 
Variability 
Average inflation (-1) 0.66***(55.3) 0.64***(6.1) 0.67***(121.3) 0.60***(75.2) 
    Average inflation (-2) 
 
0.08***(2.2) 
 
0.06***(4.6) 
    Inflation variability (-1) 
    
0.25***(90.1) 0.27***(12.5) 0.27***(188.4) 0.26***(40.1) 
Inflation variability (-2) 
     
0.10***(4.6) 
 
0.08***(6.6) 
Fiscal dominance (FD) measure^^^ -0.32**(-2.1) 0.40 (0.2) 
  
-0.16***(-3.0) 0.20 (1.0) 
  Money supply growth 
  
-0.09***(-7.4) -0.07 (-1.6) 
  
-0.04***(-10.6) -0.04***(-2.5) 
International inflation 1.44**(2.3) 8.18 (0.5) 1.59***(3.8) -2.54 (-0.6) 0.29 (0.7) 4.60 (1.3) 0.57**(2.1) 0.57 (0.7) 
Output growth -0.37***(-4.6) -0.20 (-0.7) -0.36***(-5.4) -0.20**(-2.2) -0.06**(-2.3) 0.02 (0.2) -0.06**(-4.5) 0.08 (1.9) 
Exchange rate depreciation 0.05***(21.1) 0.06***( 6.5) 0.06***(22.8) 0.05***(10.9) 0.03***(19.5) 0.03***(7.8) 0.03***(101.8) 0.03***(42.9) 
Total panel observations 306 288 306 288 306 288 306 288 
Number of countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Instrumental variable (IV) rank 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
OIRs (d.f.###) or  (s-k) 13 12 13 12 13 12 13 12 
Sargan J-Statistic (Calculated Value ) 13.75 10.98 15.29 12.66 16.45 9.89 15.77 14.17 
Sargan J-Statistic (Critical Value) 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 
Sargan P-Value  0.39 0.53 0.29 0.39 0.23 0.63 0.26 0.29 
                                           Source: Calculated from sample data.   
                                  Notes 
                                  The t-values are in parenthesis.  
                                  The t-values are based on White (1980) robust standard errors. 
     *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
     OIRs is overidentifying restrictions. 
      (d.f.###) is the degrees of freedom at 5% level of significance.  
                           ^^^ is the target explanatory variable.  
       s-k is the degrees of freedom defined as the instrumental variable rank (s) less the number of regressors (k).  
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Table 4.8: Effects of Fiscal Dominance on Economic Growth Outcomes (1990-2008) 
Dependent  
variable  
Average  
Growth 
Average  
Growth 
Average  
Growth 
Average 
 Growth 
Growth 
Variability 
Growth 
Variability 
Growth 
Variability 
Growth 
Variability 
Average  growth (-1) -0.13***(-8.9) -0.16***(-8.4) -0.10***(-6.71) -0.13***(-6.39) 
    Average growth (-2) 
 
-0.13***(-2.74) 
 
-0.12***(-3.30) 
    Growth variability (-1) 
    
0.37***(22.28) 0.43***(15.90) 0.37***(11.09) 0.44***(6.65) 
Growth variability (-2) 
     
-0.13 (-1.60) 
 
-0.15**(-2.01) 
Fiscal dominance (FD) measure^^^ 0.08 (0.83) 0.13 (0.69) 
  
0.05 (0.48) 0.03 (0.28) 
  Money supply growth 
  
0.03 (1.92) 0.03**(2.23) 
  
0.00 (0.13) 0.00 (-0.32) 
Domestic inflation -0.04***(-4.99) -0.04***(-5.26) -0.05***(-4.08) -0.05***(-4.91) 0.02***(3.89) 0.02***(2.89) 0.01***(2.36) 0.02****(2.77) 
Foreign Direct Investment -0.26 (-0.33) -0.58 (-0.56) -0.35 (-0.53) -0.45 (-0.45) -1.09 (-1.49) -1.28 (-1.67) -1.04 (-1.40) -1.21 (-1.65) 
Domestic Investment 0.34 (0.53) 0.63 (0.71) 0.33 (0.53) 0.46 (0.51) 0.94 (1.47) 1.08*(1.71) 0.88 (1.42) 1.01 (1.54) 
Terms of trade  0.02***(3.09) 0.001 (0.93) 0.02***(3.48) 0.02**(2.11) -0.01 (-1.59) -0.01 (-0.94) -0.01 (-1.47) -0.01 (-0.89) 
Total observations 306 288 306 288 306 288 306 288 
Number of countries  18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Instrumental variable (IV) rank 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
OIRs (d.f.###) or  (s-k) 12 11 12 11 12 11 12 11 
Sargan J-Statistic (Calculated Value ) 14.78 14.72 14.55 14.64 11.31 11.5 11.20 11.5 
Sargan J-Statistic (Critical Value) 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 18.30 
Sargan P-Value  0.25 0.20 0.27 0.20 0.50 0.40 0.51 0.40 
                           Source: Calculated from sample data. 
                               Notes 
                           The t-values are in parenthesis.  
                               The t-values are based on White (1980) robust standard errors.  
                               *, ** and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                               OIRs is overidentifying restrictions. 
                               (d.f.###) is the degrees of freedom at 5% level of significance. 
                             ^^^ is the target explanatory variable.  
    s-k is the degrees of freedom defined as the instrumental variable rank (s) less the number of regressors (k).  
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  Table 4.9: Effects of Fiscal Dominance on Interest Rate Outcomes (1990-2008) 
Dependent  
variable  
Average 
nominal 
interest 
rate 
Average 
nominal 
interest 
rate 
Average  
real  
interest  
rate 
Average 
real 
interest 
rate 
Nominal  
interest 
rate 
variability 
Nominal 
interest 
rate  
variability 
Average interest (-1) 0.53***(25.02) 0.52***( 53.79) -0.04***(-4.40) -0.03***(-3.51) 
  Interest rate variability (-1) 
    
0.33***(16.07) 0.33***(14.11) 
Fiscal dominance (FD) measure^^^ 0.17 (0.78) 
 
-0.10***(-3.65) 
 
0.15***(2.47) 
 Money supply growth 
 
0.01 (0.61) 
 
0.03***(3.13) 
 
-0.001 (-0.14) 
Domestic inflation 0.16***(5.08) 0.16***(10.10) -0.80***(-160.3) -0.79***(-151.51) 0.06***(9.31) 0.06***(6.25) 
International interest rate 0.13 (0.58) 0.15 (1.62) 0.26 (1.98) 0.16 (1.02) -0.12 (-1.71) -0.03 (-0.25) 
Output Growth 0.02 (0.57) 0.05 (1.37) -0.26***(-13.76) -0.30***(-11.59) 0.05 (1.62) 0.07 (1.72) 
Exchange rate depreciation 0.006 (1.67) 0.004 (0.94) -0.01***(-9.69) -0.01***(-4.62) -0.001 (-0.47) -0.001 (-0.57) 
Total panel observations 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Number of countries  18 18 18 18 18 18 
Instrumental variable rank 18 18 18 18 18 18 
OIRs (d.f.###) or  (s-k) 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Sargan J-Statistic (Calculated Value) 10.10 14.01 12.98 12.55 12.90 13.43 
Sargan J-Statistic (Critical Value) 18.31 18.31 18.31 18.31 18.31 18.31 
Sargan P-Value  0.61 0.30 0.37 0.40 0.38 0.34 
                            Source: Calculated from sample data. 
                            Notes 
                            The t-values are in parenthesis.  
                            The t-values are based on White (1980) robust standard errors.  
                            *, ** and ***denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
                            OIRs is overidentifying restrictions. 
                            (d.f.###) is the degrees of freedom at 5% level of significance.  
                            ^^^ is the target explanatory variable.  
                            s-k is the degrees of freedom defined as the instrumental variable rank (s) less the number of regressors (k).  
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The models are overidentified in the range 11 to 13 degrees of freedom. The Sargan tests suggest 
that the OIRs are valid, the models are correctly specified and the IVs are appropriate. Based on 
the specification and statistical significance tests, we accept one-lag equations for CBI and up to 
two-lag equations for inflation, economic growth and interest rates. The statistically significant 
coefficients on lagged dependent variables confirm persistence in the dependent variables. Table 
4.6 suggests that FD only matters for factual and political CBI indices. All the CBI indices 
respond positively and significantly to their immediate past (one-lag) levels, which implies 
persistence. The coefficients on lagged dependent variables are high or at least greater than 0.50 
for all the indices. Past inflation only significantly affects the legal CWN and the TOR indices. 
The overall CBI results are not robust as expected. These results are similar to those in previous 
studies cited in table 4.1 (Masciandaro and Tabellini (1987); Bade and Parkin (1987); Burdekin 
and Laney (1988); Grilli et al. (1991); DeLong and Summers (1992); DeHaan and Sturm (1992); 
Alesina and Summers (1993); Pollard (1993); Benassy-Quere and Psani-Ferry (1994); Sikken 
and DeHaan (1998); D’Amato et al. (2009); Lucottee (2009)). As noted by Cukierman (2002), it 
is not easy to explain CBI as some of its determinants are not easy to quantify. 
The lack of robustness in CBI results is partly explained by the relative static nature of the legal 
CBI indices. The variation is low as shown by the low standard deviations in appendix 4.1 and 
the scatter graphs 4C-4G. The factual and the political CBI indices have better variations than the 
other indices. The variations in the political CBI index are explained by the fact that since 1990, 
a number of countries have established conflict resolution mechanisms and redefined the price 
stability objective as the primary or only objective of the CBs. The economic CBI index is more 
static because although there has been tightening in CB lending restrictions, the improvements 
are still within the previous parameters. The higher variation in the factual index is explained by 
high turnover rates in countries like Angola and Mauritania. The factual index is more variable 
over time and across countries than the legal indices. Cukierman et al. (1992) and Neyapti (2003) 
also found the factual index to have higher variation and better regression results for less 
developed countries. Legal indices have low variation because CB legislation is not changed 
frequently in most African countries. For instance, by the end of 2008, the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi was still guided by the 1989 Act. The relative static nature of the legal CBI indices 
makes it difficult to establish any systematic link between legal CBI indices and their potential 
determinants. It is not generally clear what determines CBI apart from the past CBI levels. 
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Table 4.7 suggests that FD only matters for inflation variability when inflation variability is 
lagged by one period. Table 4.8 suggests that FD does not matter for average economic growth 
and its variability. Average growth responds to its past levels, domestic inflation and changes in 
terms of trade. Growth variability responds positively to its past levels and domestic inflation. 
Table 4.9 shows that FD does not matter for average interest rate but matters for its variability. 
Average interest rate responds positively to its one period lag and domestic inflation. Interest rate 
variability responds positively to FD, its past level and domestic inflation. Exchange rate 
depreciation significantly affects real interest rates. All the macroeconomic variables respond 
significantly to their past levels. Domestic inflation significantly affects economic growth and 
interest rates. Average inflation has higher persistence than its variability. Growth variables have 
low persistence with growth variability having higher persistence than average economic growth. 
Interest rate variables have moderate persistence with average interest having higher persistence 
than interest variability. Several reasons could explain these outcomes for the selected countries. 
Firstly, in some African countries, fiscal deficit data is commonly measured with error. In most 
cases, the overall fiscal deficit is understated. The overall deficit figures may exclude quasi-fiscal 
deficits, which are substantial in some of the countries. Quasi-fiscal deficits include CB losses, 
parastatal deficits and local government deficits. Quasi fiscal deficits have the same effects on 
macroeconomic variables as the central government fiscal deficits. In addition, some of the CB 
losses are transferred to Treasury after some years. These figures may not reflect in the overall 
central government deficit figures till transfer. At times, there are delays in interest payments on 
government debt, resulting in incorrect fiscal deficit figures. Some of the countries are HIPC. 
The size of the deficit and its effects partly depends on how the HIPC funds are treated and used.  
Secondly, CBs that face huge fiscal deficits usually tighten monetary policy to eliminate the 
liquidity effects on macroeconomic variables. They sterilize or neutralize the impact of fiscal 
deficit liquidity injections into the economy, through liquidity mopping up operations. However, 
excessive mopping up can be costly and unsustainable in the long-run. These anti-inflation 
strategies can conceal the full effects of fiscal deficits on macroeconomic variables. Elsewhere, 
anti-inflationary monetary policy tightening has resulted in reduced inflation growth despite high 
fiscal deficits. The respective countries include Malaysia in 1975, Japan in 1975, Barbados in 
1976 and 1984, Honduras in 1984, Belgium in 1985 and Greece in 1988 (Neyapti (2003)). 
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Thirdly, increased pressures for monetization of fiscal deficits may not affect inflationary 
expectations of the public for some time. In the short-run, fiscal deficits can be financed through 
an increase in government debt without necessarily generating much effect on inflation. In 
addition, these effects may operate with a time lag. The contemporaneous fiscal deficit may not 
reflect the permanent or general fiscal policy stance. Fourthly, the effect of fiscal deficits on 
macroeconomic variables may depend on how government funds are used. If the deficits are 
incurred in financing productive expenditure, which boots output, inflation may not rise. On the 
other hand, unproductive expenditures may accelerate inflation and reduce economic growth. To 
create an impression of good economic performance, some governments with a short planning 
horizon, may lower budgetary spending and increase extra budgetary spending (Neyapti (2003)).  
Fourthly, some of the CB governors in African countries are subservient. Operationally, 
subservience implies that the CB would grant ready, automatic and cheap access to credit to the 
government. As a result, interest rates may have to be kept low so as to reduce the cost to 
Treasury, of financing growing fiscal deficits. To avoid high credit cost, a Treasury of an African 
country may put pressure on the interest rate setting monetary policy board of the CB or MPC 
not to raise interest rates, but instead print money and buy Treasury bills with printed money. 
4.6 Conclusion   
 
We measured FD and its effects on CBI and macroeconomic performance. We used the 2-step 
system GMM in DPD for estimations. We do not find evidence that fiscal deficits are monetized. 
The fiscal deficits do not seem to cause monetary expansion. The results suggest that FD 
generally does not matter for CBI and macroeconomic performance. Domestic inflation, which is 
explained by exchange rate depreciation, is a major determinant of factual CBI, economic 
growth and interest rates. It is generally not clear what determines legal CBI. The relative static 
nature of legal CBI indices, due to the infrequent changes in CB legislation in African countries, 
makes it difficult to establish a link between legal indices and their potential determinants. Our 
findings suggest that stabilization policy for macroeconomic variables should shift from fiscal 
deficit reduction to other determinants of macroeconomic variables. It may be government 
expenditure and not the fiscal deficit that affects macroeconomic variables. The relationships 
could be explained by the financing methods as supposed to the size of the fiscal deficit. 
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4.7 Appendices  
 
Appendix 4.1: Key Descriptive Annual Panel Statistics (1990-2008) 
Macroeconomic  
Variable  
Mean 
Value 
Maximum 
Value 
Minimum 
Value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Total Annual 
Panel  
Observations 
Aggregate legal CWN index 0.45 0.59 0.25 0.09 342 
Aggregate GMT index 0.41 0.59 0.34 0.07 342 
Factual independence index (TOR) 0.15 1.00 0.00 0.16 342 
Political independence index 0.22 0.50 0.00 0.12 342 
Economic independence index 0.60 0.69 0.50 0.06 342 
Fiscal dominance measure -2.86 36.70 -24.30 5.39 342 
Average inflation 16.64 183.00 -8.00 23.00 342 
Inflation variability  7.83 95.16 0.00 11.18 342 
Transformed inflation 0.88 2.00 0.00 0.14 342 
Narrow money growth (M1) 37.43 6263.71 -1456.96 396.70 342 
Broad money growth (M2) 0.03 74.00 -97.00 18.62 342 
Economic development 2.16 38.00 -47.00 4.92 342 
Political instability 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.38 342 
Openness of the economy 0.38 5.64 0.00 0.39 342 
Output growth 4.53 35.00 -50.00 5.05 342 
Output growth variability 2.15 38.59 0.00 2.97 342 
Foreign direct investment 2.25 44.00 -7.00 3.51 342 
Gross fixed capital formation 2.47 44.00 -7.00 3.56 342 
Terms of trade 107.32 207.00 40.00 26.56 342 
Inflation variability 7.83 95.16 0.00 11.18 342 
International inflation 2.26 4.00 1.00 0.71 342 
Exchange rate depreciation 19.08 1291.43 -99.63 77.82 342 
Average nominal interest rate 20.21 113.31 5.10 11.90 342 
Average real interest rate  3.57 38.92 -111.43 18.54 342 
Interest rate variability 3.01 49.34 0.01 3.98 342 
International interest rate  7.05 10.00 4.00 1.67 342 
                         Source: Derived from sample data. 
                       
Notes 
We dropped the narrow money definition (M1) from the regression estimations because it has extreme outliers.  
We use the US CPI inflation rate to proxy international inflation. 
We use the US interest rate to proxy international interest rates. 
The data frequency for all the variables is annual. 
We annualized all the CBI indices to generate their time series data.  
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             Appendix 4.2: List of Main Variables, Definitions and Key Sources 
Variable     Acronym  
 Variable  
 Definition                                                                            Source (s) 
Overall legal CWN index CWN Overall legal index, following  Cukierman et al. (1992) Calculated by author 
Overall legal GMT index GMT Overall legal index, following  Grilli et al. (1991) Calculated by author 
Factual independence index TOR Number of Governor Changes/Number of Years Calculated by author 
Political independence index POLCBI GMT sub-index Calculated by author 
Economic independence index ECOCBI GMT sub-index Calculated by author 
Fiscal dominance measure  FD Fiscal balance in percent of GDP AfDB databases  
Domestic inflation π Annualized change in the consumer price index (CPI) IFS, WDI 
CBI dummy variable  Di 1 if a country is a reformer and 0 otherwise Calculated by author 
English language dummy  Ei 1if English is the main official language, 0 otherwise Calculated by author 
Inflation variability INFV Standard deviation of the regular inflation rate  Calculated from average inflation 
Transformed inflation D D=π/(1+π) Calculated from regular inflation 
International inflation USINF Proxied by the US inflation rate IFS,WDI 
Narrow money supply growth M1 Notes and coin in circulation plus demand deposits IFS, WDI 
Broad money supply growth M2 Narrow money (M1) plus near monies.  IFS,WDI 
Level of economic development DEVT Real growth rate of GDP AfDB databases 
Political instability### POLISNT Dummy of political events that potentially affect CBI   Derived by author 
Openness of the economy OPEN Sum of imports and exports, in percent of GDP  Calculated from WDI data  
Output growth GDP Growth rate of  real GDP IFS, WDI 
Output growth variability GDPV Standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP Calculated from average growth  
Foreign direct investment FDI Foreign direct investment, in percent of GDP IFS, WDI 
Domestic investment GFCF Gross fixed capital formation, in percent of GDP IFS, WDI 
Terms of trade TOT Change in the ratio of index of exports to imports  IFS, WDI 
Exchange rate depreciation EXDEPRE Annual change in the foreign exchange rate against US$ Calculated from foreign exchange data 
Average nominal interest rate INTEREST Annual average nominal lending rate IFS, CB databases 
Average real interest rate  RR Average nominal lending rate less inflation rate Calculated from nominal interest rates 
Interest rate variability INTV Standard deviation of the interest rate  Calculated from nominal interest rates 
International interest rate  USINT Proxied by the US interest rate  IFS, WDI 
                           Sources: Compiled from various sources.   
                           ### The political instability variable is a dummy variable representing a mix of political events that potentially affect CBI over the study period. 
The dummy variable takes value 1 when there is such an event, and value 0 otherwise. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This study had 3 objectives. Firstly, we measured the degree of CBI in 20 selected African 
countries over 1990-2008. Secondly, we measured the effects of CBI on macroeconomic 
performance. Thirdly, we measured the effects of FD on CBI and macroeconomic performance.  
5.2 Measurement of CBI  
 
In chapter 2, we measured the degree of CBI in 20 selected African countries over 1990-2008. 
To calculate the CBI indices, we used the methodologies developed by Grilli et al. (1991) and 
Cukierman et al. (1992). Firstly, we measured CBI in political and in economic terms. Secondly, 
we measured CBI in legal (de jure) and in factual (de facto) terms. Thirdly, we used the annual 
average turnover rate (TOR) of CB governors to proxy factual CBI. We benchmarked the CBI 
ratings against 6 of the world’s most renowned CBs in developed countries. The results 
suggested several important outcomes. 
Legal CBI is still low in African countries. However, it has improved significantly from what it 
was in the 1980s, to levels slightly above what characterized developed countries in the 1980s. 
Political CBI is low but economic CBI is high. The cross-country variation in economic CBI is 
very low. This is because most African countries have several common legal CBI principles. 
Factual CBI is high but it varies considerably across the African countries. Factual CBI also 
improved significantly from the 1980 levels for most African countries. The results suggest that 
the factual measure of CBI proxies actual CBI better than the legal measures. However, to some 
extent, factual CBI seems to suggest subservience of CB governors in some of the African 
countries. There is still a wide gap between legal and actual CBI practices in most African 
countries. In most of the countries, actual CBI is lower than legal CBI. On average, political 
factors seem to play a relatively more important role than economic factors, in influencing CBI 
in African countries. We concluded that most African governments still need to further 
restructure their CBs and grant them more CBI in line with modern-day CB practices, world-
wide and to respect CB laws. We found that there was a need to constitutionalize CBI so that it is 
not easily violated. So far, out of the 20 CBs we investigated, only the Bank of Uganda and the 
South African Reserve Bank were constitutionally granted CBI in 1993 and 1996, respectively.  
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5.3 Effects of CBI on Macroeconomic Performance 
 
In chapter 3, we measured the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance. We used the 
difference-in-difference (DID) method, which is associated with Ball and Sheridan (2005). We 
did not find convincing evidence that CBI matters for macroeconomic performance. Instead, the 
recent past and initial macroeconomic performance were significant in explaining 
macroeconomic performance during reform. The results indicated some effect of the regression 
to the mean for some of the macroeconomic variables. Improved macroeconomic performance 
over the study period seems to have resulted from factors, other than CBI. These include 
macroeconomic convergence and stabilization programmes, whose efforts support the aims of 
CBI. The programmes focus on, among other things, reductions in inflation and fiscal deficits. 
The good macroeconomic performance in countries like Tunisia is attributed more to their 
general macroeconomic prudence as opposed to CBI, per se. We concluded that African 
governments need to do broader macroeconomic reforms, alongside and beyond CBI reforms.  
5.4 Effects of FD on CBI and Macroeconomic Performance  
 
In chapter 4, we measured the effects of fiscal dominance (FD) on CBI and macroeconomic 
performance. We used the 2-step system generalized method of moments (GMM) in dynamic 
panel data (DPD). This method is associated with Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998). We found that fiscal deficits were prevalent in African countries, with only a few 
exceptions. However, we did not find evidence of monetization of fiscal deficits in our data. We 
attributed this outcome to anti-inflation strategies. The results suggest that FD does not matter 
for CBI and macroeconomic performance. FD significantly reduced the annual average TOR of 
CB governors, implying that FD increased factual CBI. This outcome could be associated with 
subservience of CB governors in some of the African countries. It could imply that where FD is 
high, political authorities do not dismiss governors. This outcome is possible where FD is high 
and there are limited alternative sources of financing fiscal deficits. We found that domestic 
inflation, explained by exchange rate depreciation, was a significant determinant of interest rates 
and economic growth. We did not find general significant determinants of legal CBI. It is not 
clear what factors really determine legal CBI. The relative static nature of legal CBI indices, due 
to the infrequent changes in CB legislation in most African countries, makes it difficult to 
establish any systematic link between the legal CBI indices and their potential determinants.  
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5.5 Main Contributions of the Study 
 
This study makes several empirical contributions to the literature. Firstly, in chapter 2 we 
produced new and updated evidence on CBI, which is based on 20 selected African countries in 
the post-1989 period. This is one of the latest studies in CBI after DeHaan and Klomp (2010). 
We used a comprehensive set of CBI indices. We use both legal (de jure) and factual (de facto) 
indices. With multiple indices, we were able to account for the multidimensional aspect of CBI. 
The multiple indices were a robustness check on the analysis. This is one of the few studies that 
uses a comprehensive set of CBI indices. We used both aggregated and disaggregated indices. 
We were therefore able to analyze CBI both in general and in specific terms. We were able to 
examine which aspects of CBI had improved and which ones had not. In addition to just 
calculating the TOR figures, we investigated each and every turnover that was not due to 
retirement because of age, whether regular or irregular. Accordingly, we investigated dismissals, 
resignations and reassignments. This enabled us to infer whether the turnovers were based on 
economic, political, legal or historical reasons. This is because resignations and reassignments 
could be politically motivated in some cases. We investigated cases of CBs with extreme 
turnover rates. This is because these could be associated with subservience or political influences 
on CB governors by the key political authorities. In addition to CBI indices, we used a 
considerable amount of qualitative information on CBI to explain the statistical outcomes.  
Secondly, in chapter 3 we used an alternative method of measuring the effects of CBI on 
macroeconomic performance. We used the DID method, which is associated with Ball and 
Sheridan (2005), who apply it to investigate the effects of IT on macroeconomic performance in 
20 OECD countries in the 1990s. We used the DID method to reduce endogeneity bias, which is 
associated with the CBI indices in levels and the macroeconomic variables of choice. We also 
used the DID method to avoid subjectivity and arbitrariness associated with the calculation of 
CBI indices in levels. Unlike most previous studies that examine this relationship using only 1 or 
2 macroeconomic variables of choice, we used 6 key macroeconomic variables. These include 
the means and standard deviations in inflation, economic growth and average interest rate. We 
used the same macroeconomic variables as in Ball and Sheridan (2005), but instead of focusing 
on IT, targeters and non-targeters, we focused on CBI, reformers and non-reformers. We focused 
on a longer time period, which covers both the 1990s and the 2000s, up to 2008.  
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Thirdly, in chapter 4 we attempted an alternative method of estimating the effects of fiscal 
dominance (FD) on CBI and macroeconomic performance. We used the 2-step system GMM in 
DPD. This method is associated with Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
System GMM is a recent move away from correlation analysis and VAR models. This method 
reduced a number of common regression estimation problems, which include endogeneity bias 
among the estimable variables. We used multiple regressions with a number of commonly used 
control variables. We moved away from simple correlations and the traditional bivariate 
regressions, which presume that dependent variables are explained by a single explanatory 
variable, which is not plausible (Campillo and Miron (1997)). In addition, we used several key 
descriptive statistics to support the regression analysis results.  
5.6 Policy Implications and Recommendations of the Study  
 
The results suggest a general lack of CBI for some of the CBs. For some CBs, there is still a gap 
between what the CB Act stipulates and the actual CB practices. Some of the Acts like the 
Central Bank of Nigeria Act, still reflect excessive government control over the CBs. Others CB 
Acts are now considerably outdated. For example, by the end of 2008, the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi was still guided by the 1989 Act, which grants it, low legal CBI. The Bank of Sudan Act 
still does not include the price stability objective in its mandate, when current global trends in 
CBI recommend this as the primary or sole objective of a modern-day CB. Some of the Acts are 
presented in ways that leave some room for interpretation spreads. Our observations on the status 
of CBI in Africa present several policy implications for African governments to consider. 
Most governments still need to grant their CBs, more CBI. They need to restructure their CBs 
and come up with better Acts, which enhance CBI. They need to comply with the modern-day 
requirements for independent and respected CBs (Wessels (2008)). Some of the CB Acts still 
need further revisions. We recommend that most governments consider constitutionalizing CBI 
so that it is not easily violated by some political authorities. The effectiveness of this would, 
however, depend on how political authorities respect their country constitutions. So far, only the 
Bank of Uganda and the South African Reserve Bank have constitutional CBI. Notably, some 
governments like the Kenyan government have regularly revised their CB Acts to standards, 
almost consistent with modern-day CB Acts in terms of presentation, focus, scope, detail and 
specificity, although they still need to do more in terms of some specific CBI dimensions.  
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There is a need to reduce government involvement in the appointment and dismissal of CB 
governing bodies. This would help depoliticize the appointment processes. It would reduce the 
personal dependence of CB governors and other governing bodies on the political authorities that 
appoint them. Appointments through independent professional bodies or Double-Veto 
appointment procedures could be used. If appointment is still done by government, then it should 
be a multi-faceted and extensive consultative process, involving either the CB board, Cabinet, 
National Assembly or Senate. Some CBs still need to move away from the Presidential approval 
for setting the remuneration for the CB governors in order to reduce CB governor dependence on 
political authorities. There is a need to avoid appointment of non-technocrate CB governors, 
based on political motives, political party affiliation or notable persons in society, to avoid 
inefficiency in discharging CB work. We recommend that most governments also consider 
previous work experience in international organizations such as the AfDB, IMF and the World 
Bank in recruiting governors. The governments could explore the use of search teams, with 
independent professional experts, to scout for potential candidates before nominations are done. 
Such a move could ensure that potential candidates are thoroughly scrutinized before any 
announcements are officially made. Further strengthening of immunity conditions against undue 
dismissals is required. The Acts should clearly and explicitly state potential dismissal conditions 
in order to reduce politically-motivated dismissals or undue political interference through hiring 
and firing, which is still prevalent in Angola and Mauritania. In addition, all dismissal cases 
should be thoroughly investigated to avoid unfair dismissals, which in future, potentially create 
dependence of CB governors on political authorities.  
We recommend that governments lengthen the terms of office of CB governing bodies so that 
they are longer than the electoral cycle or term of government, to reduce personal dependency. 
The renewability of the terms of office of CB governors could be removed. This would help 
reduce potential lobbying and soliciting for reappointment, which still takes place in some of the 
countries like Nigeria. The terms of office for the CB board members could be staggered to 
enhance continuity and renewability. Governments like the Angolan and the Ethiopian ones still 
need to remove politicians from their CB boards. This would help depoliticize the policy 
decisions of the CB boards. Most CBs still need to establish open, clear and explicit policy 
conflict resolution mechanisms between the respective CBs and their governments. Some of the 
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CBs that already have these mechanisms need to revise them in ways that strengthen the position 
of CBs in case(s) of policy conflict.  
The financial (fiscal) independence of some CBs requires further strengthening. There is a need 
for the respective countries to develop capital and money markets for government securities, 
which are still shallow in most of the African countries. There is a need to enhance public debt 
management in the Treasury Departments of most governments (Laurens (2005)). This would 
help reduce the demand for CB credit by the governments. It would also help reduce the CBs’ 
discretion on the lender-of-last resort facility. CBs should enforce credit limit conditions in 
practice. Some CBs still need to further tighten credit limits because they are still loose. CBs 
should consider reducing their involvement in bank supervision to avoid forbearance in case of 
financial crisis. Some CBs still need to move away from negotiated interest rates on government 
debt, to market or close to market interest rates. The interest rates on government debt should be 
charged with reference to market interest rates. Some CB Acts need to further clarify repayment 
terms on government debt and the limits on the maturity profile of CB loans to government. 
5.7 Suggested Areas for Further Research  
 
For the chapters 2, 3 and 4, a larger sample size and a longer study period would broaden 
analysis. For chapter 2, as a robustness check on the legal indices we used, a method of Principal 
Components could be explored to calculate legal CBI indices. This method has been explored for 
robustness and recommended in some previous studies (Fujiki (1996) and Mangano (1998)). The 
suggested method could improve on some of the inadequacies of the legal indices that we used. 
Notably, the Cukierman et al. (1992) weights are assigned apriori and arbitrarily. Grilli et al. 
(1991) assign equal weight to all the 15 CBI variables. In principle, these variables are not 
necessarily equally important in overall CBI determination as the Grilli et al. (1991) indices 
would suggest. In addition, the binary nature of the Grilli et al. (1991) indices makes the less 
variable within and across the CBs. The results for our economic CBI index clearly reflect this 
phenomenon. This makes it difficult to do regression analysis using the GMT indices for African 
countries, where CB laws are changed infrequently. Conceptually, the binary nature of the Grilli 
et al. (1991) indices suggests that CBI is either complete (1) or completely non-existent (0). In 
practice, however, CBI is considered as a matter of degree for most CBI aspects. It would be 
more plausible to have more alternative ratings, in addition to the extremes values, 0 or 1 only.  
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In terms of factual CBI, a longer study period would generate more legal terms of office of the 
CB governor than our current 3.2-4.8 legal terms. More terms of office would broaden our 
analysis and give more conclusive results for the factual CBI index. A more detailed qualitative 
analysis of governors and other CB board members would enhance analysis. This would include 
investigating their previous professional experience, charisma, previous position of influence in 
society, institutions they previously worked for, previous political party affiliation and previous 
relationships with key political authorities like State Presidents and Ministers of Finance, and 
evolved behavioural norms between CBs and governments. TOR ratings only are not adequate 
for comprehensive analysis of factual CBI, which is a broad concept. Including more factual CBI 
measures could broaden analysis. These include the political vulnerability of CB governors’ 
index, the compliance index and the questionnaire-based index. It would be possible to compare 
the results among the different indices. It would be a robustness check on the analysis.  
For chapter 3, use of more control variables in addition to the CBI dummy variable would 
enhance analysis of the effects of CBI on macroeconomic performance. An attempt to use the 
DID method in panel data could enhance analysis. It would complement cross-sectional analysis, 
increase the number of observations and reduce the sample size concerns. A larger sample size 
and a longer sample period could enable regression estimation of the model using estimation 
techniques like Probit model, may possibly produce more robust and more conclusive results.  
For chapter 4, as a robustness check on the analysis, more alternative measures of FD would 
enhance analysis and possibly give more conclusive evidence on the effects of FD on CBI and 
macroeconomic performance. This is because no one measure of FD is perfect. Each measure 
has its own merits and demerits. Each measure would fulfill an important function and isolate 
certain specific effects. Further study could explore an investigation of individual countries with 
extreme CBI features like Angola, Mauritania and Zimbabwe. It would be interesting to find out 
how macroeconomic variables react to FD in single country studies. With data availability, 
further research could use fiscal deficit financing methods in addition to the size of the fiscal 
balance, because both determine CBI in less developed countries (Fry (1998)). As explained by 
Neyapti (2003), how fiscal deficits are financed may explain lack of a systematic relationship 
among FD, CBI and macroeconomic variables. Financing methods could be interacted variables 
with the level of the fiscal deficit variable as was done in Aisen and Hauner (2007, 2008). 
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